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PREFACE

This book was the idea of Richard F. Rosser, then president of De
Pauw University, who asked me to plan a symposium here in the
spring of 1987. My charge was to select speakers whose lectures
might form a book that would honor both the Constitution and the
Sesquicentennial of the university's founding, which happened to
coincide with the Bicentennial of the Constitution. The actual
theme of the symposium-the meaning of membership in a consti
tutional order requiring political unity and committed to cultural
diversity-was inspired by DePauw's new president, Robert G. Bot
toms, whose campaign to diversify the university in light of the
changing character of American society seemed to unite the two
commemorations. Prompted by this theme, the title of the book is
taken from a phrase of Thomas Paine's, who argued that the consti
tution of the people, their character as citizens and as a society, is
"antecedent" to the government formally established by a written
constitution.
The essays by Robert N. Bellah, J. David Greenstone, Michael
Novak, and Michael Walzer were originally delivered as lectures at
the symposium. Greenstone's and Novak's, as those present at the
event may recogn ize, are substantially revised versions of their lec
tures. The essays by Jean Bethke Elshtain and myself were written es
pecially for this volume.
It is a pleasure to acknowledge the university's continued and un
stinting support of this project, both the moral and financial sup
port given at every tum by President Bottoms, the administrative
and clerical help provided by Associate Dean John W hite and his
most cooperative staff, the technical assistance offered by the people
in Media Services and in Academic Computing, and the resourceful
work of the reference librarians in the Roy 0. West Library. I am in
debted as well to the Dana Foundation for supporting three student
assistants, Douglas Driemeier, Donald Featherstone, and Vikash
xi
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Preface

Yadav, who as Dana Apprentices worked tirelessly and imaginatively
with me on the editing of this volume and served as discerning critics
in particular of my own essay. "Apprentices," they taught me as
much as they learned.
I also wish to thank Director Fred Woodward and his able staff at
the University Press of Kansas, for their wise advice and editorial talents as I encountered the problems, many of them new to me, associated with putting together a book of this kind. Special thanks are
due Wilson Carey McWilliams, for his willingness to write an introduction for the book and for his many helpful editorial suggestions.
Finally, the inevitable frustrations and sheer work associated with
such a project were reduced enormously by the essayists themselves,
who to a person met deadlines cheerfully and otherwise responded
positively to the requests, some of them no doubt unreasonable or
whimsical, of their editor.
Not the least of the rewards of serving as editor of this volume has
been my good fortune in coming to know personally its several con tributors. This is true above all of David Greenstone, who died, after
a long illness, shortly after completing the final revision of his essay.
My collaboration with David was especially close and intense, and in
the course of many long letters and conversations, by telephone and
in person, I came to appreciate and feel improved by his intellectual
acuity, his compassionate wit, and the depth of his humanity. This
book is dedicated to his memory.
Robert E. Calvert
Greencastle, Indiana
July, 1990

1
INTRODUCTION
WILSON CAREY MCWILLIAMS

The Greeks thought of the polis as an active, formative thing, training the
minds and characters of the citizens; we think of it as a piece of machinery for
the production of safety and convenience. The training in virtue, which the
medieval state left to the Church, and the polis made its own concern, the
modern state leaves to God knows what.
-H. D. F. Kitto

This book is an examination of American political life and culture
by six distinguished scholars, an inquiry into our political soul that is
urgently contemporary and mirrored in headlines. 1 At the same
time, it speaks to the perennialities and, especially, to the political
riddle of the many and the one.
All political societies are "many," complex unions of individuals
and families, skills and interests, so that Aristotle regarded it as a de
cisive criticism of Plato's Republz"c that it seemed to reduce citizen
ship to a mere unison rather than a harmony. 2 Yet, just as harmony
requires some ordering or ruling principle, every political society is
also "one," identifiably different from all others, unique. The unity
of a political society is thus tied to its identity, an understanding
shared by its members of what collectively they are about, extended
over time. It is not visible or material: Boundaries are drawn by con
vention or allegiance; and just as a nation like Poland can persist
without "natural" frontiers, so geographic boundaries may enclose
different and even hostile polities, as in Timor, Ireland, or Santo
Domingo . The members of a public do not necessarily look very
much alike, beyond the humanity that unites all peoples, nor are
their material interests evidently common. Looking at any human
group, the eye sees separate bodies; it may observe a physical simi
larity between members of families and clans; in villages and simple
1

2
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societies it may even perceive common work, with a division of labor
resting on age and gender, hinting at broadly similar interests. This
is ordinary vision's outer limit. A political society, however, includes
complexly related interests that often conflict; in these multinational days, moreover, citizens may very well have some interests that
are closer to those of foreigners than to those of their fellows. For
both reasons unity can be hard to discern. A political society can be
symbolized, but it cannot be seen: It is defined by thought , reflected
in speech and especially in law, so that "the one" is ultimately an
idea, a quality of spirit that serves as the rule or measure for the
quantities that we see in political life. s Thus American patriotism,
in Adlai Stevenson's noble evocation: "When an American says that
he loves his country, he means not only that he loves the New England hills, the prairies glistening in the sun, the wide and rising
plains, the great mountains and the sea. He means that he loves an
inner air, an inner light in which freedom lives and in which a man
can draw· the breath of self-respect. "4 These essays are explorations
in political interiority, an attempt to answer Kitto's question, united
by the effort to understand the identity of the United States in a way
that does justice to the paradoxes and pluralities of American politics.
The book opens with J. David Greenstone's description of American political culture as a continuing debate between two contending
versions of liberal democracy; Robert N. Bellah and Jean Bethke
Elshtain then offer diagnoses of the condition of civil society in
America, based on their understandings of the relation between individuality and community; Michael Novak and Michael Walzer
present two very different views of the Constitution and its impact
on American life; finally, Robert E. Calvert ties his analysis of the
Progressive tradition to a challenging delineation of the language
and conduct of modern American politics. Each essay has its own
special sound, and there is more than a little discord: Michael
Novak is less critical of American life than the other contributors
and more inclined to see economics as a cornerstone of republican
government; in a more muted way, Jean Bethke Elshtain worries
about the implications of some of her colleagues' appreciation of
community. But for all their jangling, these essays have an assonance and, perhaps, a melody.
As Robert Bellah observes, e plur£bus unum, the republic's motto,
originally referred to the states and the federal government , political
societies within a larger union, but that relationship is otherwise all
but invisible in this book. In our America, national institutions and
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allegiances have overwhelmed the states, and the contributors to this
volume seem content to have it so, although several express regret at
the decline of the local and participant politics that Tocqueville admired . In these essays, "the many" ordinarily refers to individuals or
to the families, churches, and associations of "civil society," distinguished from the State. With varying emphasis, all the contributors
warn against the abuse and overextension of State power. An even
stronger theme, however, is set by Tocqueville's fear that individualism, having undermined political life, eventually would weaken all
relationships, leaving human beings only so many isolated selves,
creatures of the moment, desperate but trivial. 5 And all these essays
seek some terti·um, some middle term between a State grown too intrusive and citizens become too distant from public life, a balance
between particular freedom and common purpose.
To speak of purpose is to recall Aristotle's argument that every regime, every "constitution," rests on an implicit answer to the question, "What is the good life?" As Robert Calvert suggests in the concluding essay, Americans from the beginning have assumed a close
relationship between their own prospects for a good life and the
Constitution bestowed by the founders and ordained by their predecessors. And this is the fundamental basis of paradox and ambiguity
in our own time.
Augustine's grand simplification of Aristotle's question, and our
own, reduced the answers to two: "self-love reaching the point of
contempt for God" contrasted with "the love of God carried as far as
contempt for self." Recognizing that, in secular practice, no person
and no regime is wholly devoted to one or the other of these warring
principles in the human soul, Augustinian doctrine regards all politics as a struggle for preeminence between the two loves and their
two cities. 6
In the American tradition, this is a familiar dialectic, the basis of
a "people of paradox, " wonderfully captured by David Greenstone's
contrast of the "two liberalisms" of Jefferson and Adams and the
"civic ambivalence" they entail. 7 Their modern teachers-primarily
Locke and his epigones-taught and teach Americans to see human
beings as by nature separate individuals, so many bodies, each with
its desires and private experiences, engrossed with the pursuit of
gratification and self-preservation. Political society, in these terms,
is an instrument for affording a more effective individual liberty
through civil peace and the mastery of nature. The "first object of
government," Madison urged, is to preserve and enable a fuller development of our diverse faculties.8 Consequently, the common good
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is only an aggregate in which, at any point, some will be losers; a
more inclusive version of the public interest requires that government be so contrived that the "silent operation of the laws" guarantees, in the long term, a measure of equality and community (an unlikely result, Greenstone observes, when some of the losers were
slaves.)9
By contrast, dominant religions in the United States have taught
that originally, individuals are not free. The body, left to itself, is
slavish, the prisoner of desire, while the soul's self-centered, inward
rejection of its finitude, dependence, and mortality is a denial of its
very humanity, not liberty but illusion. Redemption in the highest
sense may be the work of Grace. Nevertheless, biblical religion in
America has generally assigned a role to human societies and polities in drawing the self out of its sullen privacies. 10 Shrewdly used,
delight, punishment, and the regulation of ambition can attach individuals to family, property, friends, country, and even, more tenuously, to humanity itself, nurturing the human capacity for love . In
this view, "self-determining power" Qohn Adams's phrase) is developed only through communities which help us to govern impulse
and overcome illusion. Even the highest liberty, beyond the reach of
convention and law, belongs to citizens of God's city, who see the
partiality of all human polities and things. Individuality is antithetical to individualism, and loving sacrifice for the common good is the
expression of a free spirit .
Greenstone argues persuasively that a healthy politics in America
requires a balanced dialogue between these historic voices, a skeptical individualism to guard against rigidity and dogma, and a reformed, transcendent doctrine to regulate individual and group
selfishness. But maintaining such a balance is a difficult task calling
for great statecraft and good fortune . The ordinary rule when first
principles conflict, as Lincoln observed in relation to slavery, is that
a house divided cannot stand; a riven regime must dissolve or move
toward coherence, a new unity based on the victory of one side or the
triumph of a higher standard capable of subordinating the older antagonisms. 11 In any viable political society, the one must enfold and
govern the many. 12
In their different ways, all the contributors to this book worry that
the religious, communitarian voice in America's cultural debate is
growing dangerously reedy, increasingly inaudible against a strident
individualism. Robert Bellah and Jean Elshtain make explicit appeals to Catholic social teaching and to Protestant thinkers like
Reinhold Niebuhr and Glenn Tinder; Walzer, Calvert, and Green-

Introduction

5

stone invoke republican values informed by religion. Even Michael
Novak, who celebrates the Framers' interest in commercial enterprise, urges us to see commerce as the foundation of their republicanism, part of a political design devoted to the inventive and crea tive spirit, not merely the private pursuit of material gain - a grand
adventure rather than a sordid scrabbling.
These concerns are at least as old as the Constitution, the echo of
Anti-Federalist warnings against the neglect of public spirit and
moral virtue . As Novak reminds us, the American Framers, devoted
to individual liberty, rejected the prevailing aristocratic ideal of a
virtuous republic, abandoning the effort to overcome the "causes" of
a factious private spirit - impossible without intolerable repression,
or so Madison claimed in Federalist l O- in favor of controlling its
"effects." In that familiar argument, the danger of majority faction,
the chief problem of republican government, is minimized by a
large republic in which majorities will necessarily be shifting coalitions, full of conflict and based on compromise, morally mediocre at
best . For the Framers, it counted as an advantage that such a politics teaches citizens to limit their political commitments and enthusiasms: In the school of The Federalist , detachment substitutes for
civic virtue.
In the Framers' doctrine, attachment is to be distrusted because
the ties of love and community bind individuals to particular places
and persons, institutions, and ideas without regard to their utility. It
makes matters worse that the strongest attachments, the results of
early education and long familiarity, chain us to the past. 13 Even reason is dangerous when reinforced by attachment. Like human beings themselves, Madison argues, human reason is "timid and cautious when left alone, and acquires firmness and confidence in
proportion to the number with which it is associated. " 14 In association, human beings are apt to reason and act boldly, and at moments like the American Revolution, when private passions are restrained by common danger and shared outrage, an empowered
citizenry may become a fraternal public, capable of great things.
The Framers, however, had little more fondness than Jean Elshtain
for such "armed virtue, " especially since they thought it certain to be
short lived. Under ordinary circumstances, they held that individuals are likely to be more rational in isolation. Leaders who are subject to scrutiny and hopeful of honor may be able to discipline private desires; for most citizens, the combination of personal
invisibility with strength of numbers is an invitation to faction and
partisanship. Even if every Athenian citizen had been a Socrates,
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Madison contended, the Athenian assembly would have been a
mob. 15
The Framers hoped that the large republic and the Constitution's
design would leave individuals free but psychologically detached,
experiencing within civil society a gentle version of the vulnerability
of the state of nature, with its impetus for order. Human beings who
are "left alone" reason timidly, their very fearfulness a check on passion. They are apt to be circumspect, and to that extent, publicregarding, watching and keeping up the appearances and inclined
to be decently law-abiding.
As Novak's account suggests, commerce is a centerpiece in this
plan for public peace through detachment, since the national market frees and tames, stimulating ambition but broadening and disciplining avarice, and forcing at least a consideration of other interests. Moreover, since values vary with supply and demand,
commercial life promotes flexibility, an emotional detachment from
any particular products or relationships, and especially, a responsiveness to public opinion. Subtly, these economic lessons also assail
prejudice and hint that all virtues and faiths are only so many relativities, commodities for exchange. 16
Certainly, commerce was one of the tempters intended to wean
Americans away from attachment to the states. To the Framers,
surely to Hamilton, if less clearly to Madison, the states, like all political societies, were only artifacts created to advance the interests of
individuals and had become essentially outdated, parochial obstacles to opportunity supported by habit and affection. Consequently, the Constitution allows the federal government to exert its
powers directly on individuals, so that it may make a claim on "those
passions which have the strongest influence upon the human
heart. "17 In the Framers' view, it is natural for interest to prevail unless confused and opposed by overwhelming attachment; by breaking into "those channels and currents in which the passions of man kind naturally flow," federal power allows interest to make itself felt.
Better administered-or so the Framers trusted-and able to hold
out the lures of wealth and power, the central government and national life could be expected to detach affections from the states. 18 It
did not trouble the Framers greatly that the national regime would
attract only diffuse affections and relatively weak attachments:
Lukewarm patriotism, like timid reason, suits a government intended to be the servant of individual liberty.
This is not the only way the work of the American founders can be
understood. Hannah Arendt claimed that the basis of the Constitu-
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tion was a new and distinctively American understanding of power,
power that both Madison and Hamilton sought to harness and control, if for different purposes. 19 The political machinery they created
was both "meant to be powerful," as Walzer notes, and also
grounded in the people, with their "passions" not diminished but
properly channeled through relatively virtuous representatives. And
Bellah elsewhere argues that Madison himself had not wholly given
up on popular republican virtue .2°
The Founders surely recognized the need for some sort of moral
and civic virtue as the foundation for the republic's laws and liberties. Just as self-preservation does not inspire citizens to risk their
lives in defense of their country, the interests of individuals do not
necessarily incline them to fulfill their contracts or obey the law, especially if they are poor, obscure, or oppressed, combining desperation with some hope of going unnoticed . And in general, the founding generation regarded religion , broadly defined , as an
indispensable element of moral education. Even the enlightened Jefferson preferred the social teaching of Jesus over the privatism of
Epicurus, whom he otherwise admired. Thinkers like Adams excepted, however, the leading spirits among the Founders tended to
see moral indoctrination as a benign deception, practiced on behalf
of the community's "aggregate interests" on individuals whose reason was unreliable, or on those-most evidently, slaves, as Bellah
indicates - whose very rights and interests were violated by the law.
In these terms, moral and religious education teaches a combination
of useful untruths or half-truths - that one should never tell a lie, for
example, or that promises should always be kept - and propositions
that are far from certain, like the doctrine that a Supreme judge
will detect and punish all crimes and reward all virtues that are neglected here below. 21
Politically necessary, moral education is at least questionable in
the Framers' theory, a kind of sharp practice too dangerous to be
trusted to government and also demeaning for a regime devoted to
individual freedom and reasoned consent. Consequently, most of
the founding generation were content to leave the shaping of character to families and churches, to civil society, and in some cases, to
the states; and Walzer is right to note that the founders relied on
groups strong and stable enough to nurture conscientious souls.
"Our constitution," John Adams declared, "was made only for a
moral and religious people. It is wholly inadequate to the government of any other. "22 At the same time, however, the Framers gave
these groups no constitutional status or notice: The Constitution ac-
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knowledges no subjects other than persons and states. While left
largely at liberty, civil society and local community were subordinated to a constitution-and through it, to a national marketwhose ruling principle is individual freedom, advanced by the strategy of detachment. From the beginning, the laws have worked to
undermine the "habits of the heart."
Nevertheless, in contemporary America, this long-term tendency
has taken on a magnitude so great as to resemble a change of kind,
like pebbles become an avalanche: Perceptively, Walzer speaks of a
second Constitution, a virtually new regime, Calvert of Progressivism's politically denatured citizen. Tocqueville's Americans, for all
their "taste for well- being," were at least familiar with the biblical
and republican languages of the common good. 23 Today, as Robert
Bellah has indicated, even public-spirited Americans-a more significant group than we sometimes imagine - are more and more in dined to justify their lives and deeds in terms of calculating selfinterest ("utilitarian individualism") or personal authenticity
("expressive individualism"). 24 To a surprisingly wide public, it is
now axiomatic that moral and political norms are relative to one's
times or culture, the reflection of the unique experience of individuals or groups, and perhaps the strongest intellectual current of the
day regards speech itself as only a construction for private purposes,
an instrument for domination. 25 The revived "discussion concerning
political philosophy," to which Bellah invites Americans, requires us
to recover or learn the power of public speech.
However, curing political aphonia is not easy, and Robert
Calvert's shrewd diagnosis indicates some of the difficulties and the
dangers. He argues that in their effort to develop a new public philosophy and a language of politics suited to modern America, Progressive theorists found it necessary to challenge the authority of the
Framers and that of the "steel chain" of nineteenth-century orthodoxy. Following Beard's "debunking" of the high claims of the
founding, Progressivism developed an "anti-myth" to take the place
of the traditional American democrat, describing politics not as an
affair of citizens but as nothing more than a conflict of interests, a
parallelogram of forces. Paradoxically, however, the upshot of this
Progressive critique has been to strengthen but vulgarize the Framers' emphasis on self-interest. Retaining the belief that political society is a contrivance manufactured to serve private aims, Progressive
doctrine denied the Framers' claim that a political minority may act
from broader and more elevated ideas of self, identifying with the
polities it creates or governs, or even with humankind. 26 But if Pro-
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gressive teaching acted a democratic part in "unmasking" the pretensions of the elite, it also stripped away the moral claim of the
many: Justice, Progressive analysis implied, is the interest of the
stronger, and any appeal to a public or common good is only the rationalization of subjective interests and values. 27 Deemphasizing
speech, Progressivism imitated and extended the Framers' reliance
on political technology, hoping to make good the deficiencies of the
Constitution's "mechanistic" politics through a more "organic" social
science and a more scientific administration.
Yet whatever their faults, the Progressives were wrestling with
problems that still shadow our politics, most notably the republic's
setbacks in its struggles with power. As Novak indicates, the American Founders accepted a considerable measure of inequality as the
natural expression of individual differences, the social and economic face of personality. On the other hand, the Founders also recognized that unequal wealth and power can be used to restrict the
development of the faculties of the disadvantaged. 28 For a solution,
they relied on the "silent operation of the laws," hoping that the advantage they saw in a large republic- the competition between
many interests, denying more than short-term ascendancy to anywould be an effective check on inequality in social and economic life
as well as in politics. 29 It didn't work: Large-scale private organizations largely elude those controls, and many have come to constitute
private governments on which citizens depend and to which, for
practical purposes, they can create no alternative. so Private power
called for public government in its own image, and that necessityreinforced by international politics and by technology-has created
a politics dominated by mass associations and great bureaucracies,
aggregations of money, technique, and support adequate to the
scale and intricacy of modern life.
Necessarily, this sort of politics grows away from most citizens, losing its connection to their daily lives and competences. It is now almost axiomatic that organizations large enough to be politically effective will dwarf their individual members. 31 Publz"c politics, the
sphere of speech and deliberation, has come to seem less and less relevant or worthy of attention. In the mass media, the coverage of
what candidates say, never very extensive, is losing ground to an
analysis of their advertisements, now treated as news events, while
the content of either kind of statement is given less attention than
the strategy it reflects. The "real world" of politics increasingly is
presented and understood as outside the public's view, a place of bu reaucrats and hidden persuaders, penetrable only by experts. 32 For
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too many Americans, the political is a place of indignity, where they
are not heard and do not matter-except as parts of some abstract,
statistical category - and in which they are subject to manipulation
and deception. Small wonder that private life engrosses Americans,
or that the republic suffers from a chronic shortage of public confidence and commitment. 33
However, the private order - civil society- is itself in disarray.
Limited liability, the great capitalist principle, seems to permeate
social life. Divorce, as a normal and even expected hazard, teaches
Americans to be at least guarded in their commitments. Even stable
families, none too numerous, are likely to be short-term associations
for limited purposes, composed of only two generations and pressed
to find "quality time. "34 Local communities, vulnerable to change,
are also weakened by mobility, and the loss of old homes and friends
counsels us to be content with superficial roots and relationships.
Associational life grows more peripheral, displaced by private recreations and a politics in which the donation of money, solicited by
mail or phone, is replacing membership in face-to-face groups as the
reigning mode of civic participation. 35 It is an "unconstituted" society the citizen must vainly try to face.
The extent of this privatization is debatable, and Elshtain warns
against exaggerating it; but the problem is serious and the tendency
alarming. All the contributors to this book are broadly Aristotelian
in regarding civil society, though formally separate from the state, as
playing an indispensable role in the regime, particularly as the first
course in civic edification, the traditional school and stronghold of
communitarian teaching. Thus their evident conviction, Aristotelian through and through, that the American Constitution must ultimately be judged by the "way of life" it reflects and encourages. At
the same time, they recognize that civil society cannot be self-ruling.
Households and other social groups, Aristotle argued, nurture and
provide for individuals, aiming at the safeguarding of "mere life."
Beyond the securing of physical existence, however, families and associations require some other rule and principle: Even the enrichment of material life depends on the division of labor and the exchange of products, and hence, on political institutions like money. 36
An association like the market or the church, the community theater or the professional society, enhances our lives in some respect,
but a fully human environment depends on access to all these associations and hence on political principles and institutions which assign to each its place and its limits. As Bellah indicates, without a
common rule, pluralism degenerates into communalism - Leh-

Introduction

11

anon's agony-or into the less stark, but more radical, fragmentations of individualism.
Of course, there is not much doubt as to which is the greater danger in the United States: The Constitution and the laws accentuate
or promote the weakening of civil society. As Walzer observes, the
Constitution affords Americans any number of ways to exit from relationships, localities, and social institutions, but the voice it gives
them to work for the improvement of groups and communities is
rarely as loud as a whisper in the din of modern politics and economics. Public life and spirit suffer, since it is easier to leave a city
than combat its decay, and in contemporary constitutional law,
Walzer points out, rights to exit or separate have become "a virtual
substitute for social change." Even decency is hard-pressed: "The
scale and dynamism of American democracy," Lewis Lapham
writes, "grants the ceaselessly renewable option of moving one's conscience into a more congenial street. "37 By contrast, both Walzer and
Elshtain ask for what amounts to a civil revolution, a public policy
which cherishes the solidarities of civil society, lending the support
of law to the internal life and cohesion of associations, hoping-as
Elshtain puts it-to strengthen moral obligations rather than substitute for them.
Of course, none of the authors in this book needs to be reminded
that communities and social groups can be repressive, or that they
can tear up, as well as lay down, the foundations of human excellence. They expect government to protect civil rights and to regulate
groups by the standard of public purpose; the doctrine of subsidiarity, which Elshtain derives from Catholic thought, subordinates civil
society and yet respects its sphere. However, Walzer speaks for the
contributors-Novak excepted, at least in part-when he urges
Americans and American law to see rights as the basis of politics
rather than private immunities, less as barriers against government
than as claims to government of a certain kind. The soul needs the
city: Human beings are certainly political animals, if they are also
something more, and citizenship is the middle term between individuals and individuality. In this view, American democracy should
be understood as a form of "associated living," in John Dewey's
phrase, a way of life entitled to rule private liberties and gratifications.
There is in these essays, then, at least the outline of an answer to
Kitto's vital question. For Novak it is commerce (but not only commerce) that must train us in the virtue enabling us to be unified as
well as diverse and industrious. The remaining authors are more or
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less Tocquevillian, preferring to believe that the "political associations" of civil society may yet serve to some degree as "large free
schools" in which we may learn the arts of association in general.
There is no nostalgia in these essays for the glory that was the ancient city-state nor even for a fabled and simpler American past; the
necessity, in Bellah's precise formulation, is for a "critical reappropriation" of our political and religious traditions. Rather, the essays
aim at the recovery - or the reappreciation-of republican politics,
a prescription less for a polity conceived as an engine of virtue militant than for one no longer able to aspire to unchecked dominion.
This is a contemporary version of the ancient argument that a republic must prefer political freedom to affluence, treating its liberties as beyond price, so that in principle it must always suspect
wealth and subject it to limits. 38 Through much of its history, America has felt able to evade that choice and necessity, favored as the
country has been by nature, culture and situation. Today, however,
the embattled economy of the United States needs the disciplines of
self-denial, the ethics of craft and saving no longer adequately supported by "worldly asceticism." 39 Even economic well-being, in our
time, calls for some sacrifice of personal comfort and immediate desire on the altar of common purpose.
For all their diversity, these essays share a regard for America's political institutions - the common ground, as Greenstone notes, for
the very different liberalisms of Jefferson and Adams. And at least a
majority of the contributors are convinced that America faces a
time of great decisions, calling for great politics. Like the hope of
rearticulating the second, communitarian voice of the American
tradition, the plea for reinvigorated public discussion - Elshtain's
"fractious" politics - runs through the book like a leitmotif.
There is a connection between Royce's Philosophy of Loyalty , invoked by Bellah, and the special role of political parties in democratic deliberation, as competitive subcommunities which are also
self-consciously parts of a political whole. 40 The arguments in this
book give support to the effort to renew political parties, particularly local party organizations as opposed to national bureaucracies.
Yet each of the essayists has his or her own preferred schools of political speech and allegiance . Walzer suggests that "state action" in the
service of democracy, public policy aimed at encouraging the solidarities necessary to republican politics (he cites the Wagner Act), is
hardly unprecedented. We should be willing to listen to all such suggestions. Animating political debate is almost desperately difficult,
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but events are pressing Americans to discover to what extent they
still speak a common language.
For more than fifty years, foreign policy has substituted for public
philosophy, establishing the United States as the champion of freedom in its contest with totalitarianism. That stark confrontation
justified departures from democratic practice and the imperial expansion of executive prerogative. It also seemed to justify the regime
as a whole, since America's faults , even serious ones, were less severe
than those of her rivals: To a great many Americans, any faultfinding was morally obtuse, not to say unpatriotic, while others,
more tolerant , treated criticism as "idealism," mere word-spinning,
irrelevant to the real struggles of the real world. Of course, foreign
policy sometimes moved America in the direction of reform: The
need to blunt the appeals of communism, here and abroad, was an
important argument in favor of greater racial and economic equality. Nevertheless, Americans have been encouraged and accustomed
to see domestic political life in the scenes and costumes of the international megadrama.
With the waning of the cold war, anticommunism is losing its
force as a negative public purpose, and the United States has an opportunity to look inward, to mend or reweave the fabric of law and
society. A half-century of habits, however, is not easily put aside, especially since it is tempting to fix on the fear of enemies when the
sources of civic trust and affection run thin. Elshtain's critique of
"armed virtue," consequently, is an invaluable and pointed lesson
(one paralleled, in domestic life, by Bellah's dissection of "communalist pluralism"). A country-or a soul-defined by negation is not
autonomous: It is the mirror of its antagonist, ruled by the contest it
hopes to win. Hatred of enemies asks too little of friends.
Historically, American xenophobia has always been at least troubled by the universalism of religion and natural right. In Sam
Adams's vision of the virtuous city, Boston, like Winthrop's city on a
hill, was to be a Christian Sparta, austere but humble, patriotic but
aware of the duty to love peace and show compassion .41
Less certain in faith, contemporary Americans still profess a belief in the proposition that all human beings are created equal; that
bedrock of our nationality is a starting point for reconstruction. An
antidote to individualism, equality links us to others: We can be free
alone, but it is only in relationships that we can be equal or have
rights. Equality also opposes relativism, since it argues that our
common humanity is decisive, a quality that overrides all others, a
likeness that makes one of many. By implication, all cultures and
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polities are not incommensurable, but variations on a theme, answers, more or less adequate, to the human dilemma. Equality, G.
K. Chesterton observed, sets limits and duties, so that America turns
on "the pure classic conception that no man must aspire to be anything more than a citizen, and that no man shall endure to be anything less. " 42 For all their different accents, these essays speak the
language of the universal, seeking to recall America to its best and
ancient creed.
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2
ADAMS AND JEFFERSON ON SLAVERY:
TWO LIBERALISMS AND THE
ROOTS OF CIVIC AMBIVALENCE
J. DAVID GREENSTONE

The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution affirm the
vision of e plurz"bus unum. While promising "a more perfect union,"
they also committed the United States to the essentials of liberal politics: limited government, individual rights, and (eventually) political equality. One influential interpretation holds that Americans
have been liberal to a fault. We have avoided political and social fragmentation only by adopting a deep and abiding cultural
consensus, and this single liberal ideology has effectively precluded
any meaningful disagreement over fundamental-that is, philosophical-issues. The price of our admittedly enviable political
stability, therefore, has been an individualism masquerading as "diversity" and a stifling uniformity, indeed a "tyranny," of mass opinion, a caricature of genuine political unity. 1
This claim bears directly on the question of unity and diversity in
American life. As I have argued elsewhere, it is partially, but quite
seriously, mistaken. 2 American politics, I contend, has been pervasz"vely liberal, but not consensually so. For at least a century and a
half, it has been marked by a conflict between two very different liberal traditions over a range of essentially philosophical questions.
On one side, a humanist liberalism has emphasized individuals as
holders of preferences that must in principle be respected equally
This essay benefited from the criticism and comments of Chris Ansell, Robert
Calvert, Louisa Bertch Green, Carla Hess, John Schlotterbeck, and Vickie Sullivan.
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and ought in practice to be satisfied as equitably as possible. On the
other side, to adopt the terminology of Franklin Gamwell, a reformed, originally neo-Calvinist liberalism has emphasized individual faculties that ought actively to be cultivated, often in and
through political action. 3 The chief duty is to develop the abilities of
oneself and one's fellow citizens. There are profound implications
for our politics and political culture in the conflict between these
two liberalisms, it seems to me, that the standard theory of liberalism either ignores or misunderstands.
When we view American liberalism as bipolar, we see that our
unity is not simple but complex, marked as it is by agreement on
some beliefs and divergence on others. Accordingly, I believe this bipolarity is as much a source of cultural diversity as are differences
based on religion, race, ethnicity, or gender. Precisely because this
diversity derives from so fundamental a tension in our basic political
culture, it conditions the ways we deal with other cultural differences in our politics. I want to suggest, finally, that the tension between our two liberalisms, and our sometimes fitful attempts to embrace both, engenders a deep ambivalence both about our personal
responsibilities as citizens and about our ethical responsibilities as
members of the American community.
To provide a foundation for this claim, I shall examine the
thought and politics of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, the two
great revolutionary figures on diplomatic service in 1787 who assumed leading roles under the newly ratified Constitution. As I shall
try to show, for all Jefferson's egalitarian fervor, his humanist liberalism readily supported the protective attitude toward slavery that he
eventually adopted. In contrast, however conservative his own inclinations, Adams's reformed liberalism readily supported his own
and, much more, his family's antislavery inclinations.
Before developing this account in detail, a word is in order about
procedures and assumptions. First, while noting both their many
common convictions and their political disagreements, I mainly
want to connect Adams's and Jefferson's specifically philosophic differences to the slavery issue that would engulf their successors. Second, I want to examine the consequences of this connection for the
outlooks of their followers, in order to illuminate central features of
American political thought and culture. I advance no claim here
that their philosophic orientations had a direct or singularly determining influence on the political cleavages of later decades, or for
that matter even of their own. At best, Jefferson's humanist liberal-
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ism made it easier for most, but not all, of his northern followers to
seek an accommodation with the slave states. So too, Adams's reformed liberalism made it easier for many, though not all, of those
who shared his ethical commitments to give increasing support to
the antislavery cause.
Instead, I shall treat these beliefs not as causes but as disposz'tions,
that is, combinations of concepts and attitudes that encourage certain types of reactions to particular events but discourage others.
Such a triggering or genuinely causal event might be an important
economic or social change, for example, slavery's growing importance in the southern economy. Given this change, the presence of
opposed dispositions helps account for the ensuing heightened con flict. Specifically, I shall argue that the two liberalisms of Jefferson
and Adams permitted and even encouraged just such conflicting responses to slavery's changing status. In that sense their debates show
Jefferson and Adams to be revealing rather than representative or
fundamentally innovative intellectual figures. Though not great
philosophers, they nevertheless went beyond their conventional
countrymen in delineating the conceptual and normative resources
available in their humanist and reformed liberalisms. Thus they illuminated the ground on which the battle over slavery would be
fought in the next generation, as well as later cleavages in American
politics.

ADAMS, JEFFERSON, AND THE SLAVERY
ANOMALY
"I have thus stated my opinion on a point on which we differ,"
Thomas Jefferson wrote John Adams in 1813 , "not with a view to
controversy, for we are both too old to change opinions which are the
result of a long life of inquiry and reflection; but on the suggestion
of a former letter of yours, that we ought not to die before we have
explained ourselves to each other. "4 Explain themselves to each other
they did, in what is surely the richest and most memorable correspondence in our political history; but while the old passions of the
1790s and 1800s had subsided, their renewed friendship did not
mean the end of disagreement between them. On the contrary, their
correspondence in their reflective retirement years reveals a range
and depth of philosophical differences heavy with meaning for their
views on slavery-and for American liberalism. To make this clear,
we must recall their old controversies.
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During their political conflicts of the 1790s, Jefferson celebrated
liberty and equality and, as an ardent believer in progress, scorned
the dead hand of the past. A tribune for all those who insisted on
political democracy, a champion of the common man, he welcomed
the French Revolution as a herald of the new age. Preaching this
new creed, he led the revolution of 1800, becoming, after his presidency, a symbol of liberty. 5 By contrast, his predecessor, Adams, insisted on the conservative values of hierarchy and self-discipline, respect for authority, reverence for his ancestors, and institutional
constraints on popular passions. He recoiled in horror from the Revolution in France and became a leading Federalist . 6 Encumbered by
his elitist and therefore "irrelevant" version of republicanism, however, and embittered by his defeat in 1800, he left the White House
for a relatively obscure retirement.7 His party would never win another national election. "Adams was a voice from the past," writes
Merrill Peterson, "while Jefferson continued to voice the aspirations
. . . of American democracy. "8 Peterson's judgment is accurate
enough on most issues, though it overlooks the important areas of
agreement suggested by their collaboration during the 1770s and
1780s. In the case of slavery, however, his claim is simply mistaken.
It was Jefferson who clung to the past and Adams who showed the
way to the future.
Toward the end of his life, the ordinarily optimistic Jefferson became apprehensive about the drift of American politics, in particular the North's growing opposition to chattel slavery.9 Although he
was a strong opponent of slavery early in his career, in later years his
public opposition ceased. As president, he refused to discuss slavery
at all, and by 1820, agitated by the Missouri controversy, he called
for slavery's spread throughout the Louisiana Purchase. Northern
opposition to admitting Missouri as a slave state, Jefferson thought,
would promote sectional rancor without helping the slaves. In effect , he believed that Americans could find happiness in areas with
slavery as well as in those without it. 10
Adams shared some of Jefferson's caution. As a political conservative concerned about governmental authority and control, 11 he worried about all demands for universal emancipation, and he feared
that suddenly freeing the angry slaves would endanger the whites. 12
Even his disagreements in the 1770s with his wife, Abigail, on such
subjects as slavery and the position of women reveal a more fundamental agreement that the despotic dominion by one human being
over another is intolerable. By 1829 the same development of the
slavery controversy that troubled Jefferson left the usually conserva-
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tive Adams relatively unperturbed. In his retirement, primarily in
his private correspondence (to others than Jefferson), he moved toward his wife's view of slavery. Some of his reasons were prudential,
having to do with the effects of slavery on others besides slaves;
hence his concern for white workers and distrust of the "aristocratic"
slave owners. For such reasons, reversing Jefferson's view of sectional
issues, he opposed permitting slavery in Missouri. 13 The prudential
shaded into the ethical, however, and a concern for the harm slavery
did to white workers was joined by a concern for the slaves themselves: "If the gangrene is not stopped- I can see nothing but Insurrection . . . till at last the Whites will be exasperated to Madness [and] shall be wicked enough to exterminate the negroes." Thus the
Missourians ought to be moved by "feelings of humanity" in deciding "to exclude slavery sternly from their state . " 14 For all Adams's
concern for white workers, this appeal anticipated later antislavery
arguments that were embraced by his son John Quincy and his
grandson Charles Francis and would help lead the antislavery struggle.
Here, then, is the slavery anomaly: A deeply conservative side to
Jefferson's genuine egalitarianism was matched in 1820 by a potentially radical, prophetic side to Adams's equally genuine suspicions
about popular passion. Heavily qualified as their positions on slavery were, the egalitarian Jefferson had become increasingly protective of the institution, and the conservative Adams came to see it as
both morally evil and politically dangerous.
This anomaly, however, was not an aberration in which Adams
and Jefferson somehow violated all their most important principles.
Nor did it simply reflect differences between them, either in personal or regional interests or in racial attitudes. It is true enough
that their racial attitudes and economic and political interests were
so pronounced that we are tempted to think these explain the positions on slavery they came to adopt. Adams, for example, had little
that was disparaging to say about blacks. On the other hand, even
the younger Jefferson who openly opposed slavery had asserted in his
Notes on Virginia that blacks were inferior to whites, 15 and his draft
of the Declaration had treated blacks and whites, as well as Americans and the British, as different peoples. Then, too, many of Jefferson's northern followers were racially prejudiced. 16 It might also be
argued that their eventual shift on slavery was but the inevitable recognition of where their economic and political interests really lay.
Jefferson derived his income, after all, from his extensive plantations
that relied on slave labor, and his political career ultimately de-
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pended on backing from other southern whites. More broadly, the
introduction of the cotton gin confounded the Founders' hopes
about slavery's demise by making slave labor an increasingly central
feature of the southern economy. In these circumstances, it became
steadily more difficult for Jefferson, or any other southern leader, to
oppose the institution . By contrast, this argument runs, Adams
could so freely invoke the "feelings of humanity" in the Missouri crisis because neither he nor a significant number of his followers had
any economic stake in slavery. On the contrary, slavery was also moving toward the center of sectional tensions over such issues as tariffs
and internal improvements, and such issues inevitably affected the
climate in which Adams and his fellow Yankees thought and talked
about slavery.
Nevertheless, the movement in their positions on slavery cannot
be seen as merely an expression of their changing interests, comfortable as that explanation may seem. For one thing, neither Jefferson
nor Adams, although each man had changed his position on slavery
by 1820, seemed to think he had disrupted his intellectual universe.
In fact neither man had. It is indeed precisely that intellectual universe, along with triggering economic and social causes, that accounts for, or at any rate allowed for, the evolution of their views on
the peculiar institution.
Counterintuitive as it may seem, my claim is that these positions
on slavery exemplify the basic polarity of the humanist and reformed sides of the American liberal tradition. Each man's shift on
slavery was firmly rooted in his most fundamental beliefs, in those
categories and commitments-political, social, and overtly philosophic- that shaped his view of politics and all human life.
In coming to terms with slavery in their own ways, the "radical"
Virginian focused on the concrete and worldly interests and con cerns of particular human beings; the "conservative" Yankee, on the
other hand, insisted on the central importance of a divinely given
and therefore transcendent moral law. This basic opposition, in
turn, involved two further sets of questions of a distinctly ethical and
philosophic nature:
1. How important is it as a principle of politics to balance the
competing claims, rights, and preferences of different human beings, as opposed simply to doing one's (individual)
moral duty? In addressing this question, the two men addressed the issues of happiness, moral obligation, and human freedom.
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2. How important ethically are the observable facts of a given
situation; in particular, what deference should one accord
the existing social practices and institutions of a free society?
Here the two men considered both the character of human
rationality in determining social action and the philosophic
issues of epistemology and ontology.
In exploring these issues we shall begin with Jefferson.
JEFFERSON'S HUMANIST LIBERALISM
Jefferson's humanist liberalism was firmly grounded in a sensationalist and materialist philosophy, a "creed of materialism," as Jefferson
himself put it, "supported" by John Locke. Amending Descartes, he
wrote Adams that" 'I feel: therefore I exist.' . . . When once we quit
the basis of sensation, all is in the wind." He thus rejected "all organs of information ... but my senses." The reality thus known was
thoroughly material. "I feel bodies which are not myself: there are
other existences then. I call them matter . . . . Where there is an absence of matter, I call it void, or nothing, immaterial space. On the
basis of sensation, of matter and motion, we may erect . . . all [our)
. . . certainties. " 11 On this philosophical basis, indeed, he erected his
ethics.
Well-regulated personal pleasures and a tranquil private happiness were among Jefferson's preoccupations. 18 He commended the
French for excelling Americans in "the pleasures of the table," and
savored these delights himself. 19 He disliked pain in himself or others. "For what good end," he asked Adams, could "the sensations of
Grief . . . be intended? All our other passions, within proper
bounds, have an useful object . . . [but] what is the use of grief?" 20
Jefferson coupled this concern with a charitable presumption about
every individual's motives, including his own. In Miller's words, he
believed "in original goodness, not original sin; if man had fallen
from grace it was [only] . . . because he had submitted his own free
will to the oppressive rule of kings, priests, and nobles. "21 In his view,
when "our duties and interests . .. seem to be at variance, we ought
to suspect some fallacy in our reasonings. " 22 He was "an Epicurean,"
Peterson adds, "though of sober mien, to whom emotional torment
and self-flagellation were alien." "Never [a diarist] ... [he] kept records of everything . . . except the state of his soul. " 25
Nor was this concern exclusively self-regarding. 24 Jefferson followed the Scottish Enlightenment in holding that pleasure came
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from helping others as well as from satisfying oneself. "Self-love,"
Jefferson wrote, "is the sole antagonist of virtue," and he assailed
Hobbes's egoism. 25 As he wrote Abigail Adams, "I am never happier
than when I am performing good offices for good people . . .. "26
This regard for others included a relativistic utilitarianism . "Nature," he remarked "has constituted utility to man, [as] the standard
and test of virtue. Men living . .. under different circumstances
... may have different utilities; the same act, therefore, may be
useful, and consequently virtuous in one country-[ even though it]
is injurious and vicious in another differently circumstanced. "21
But what if people in the same society have conflicting goals? Like
Locke, Jefferson thought in terms of rights. As a good humanist, he
thought there was little if any room for an obligation to obey God or
some transcendent moral law. Instead, individuals had the right to
define their own happiness and then pursue it. Because every individual's rights must be weighted equally, no person or group deserved special consideration. Accordingly, he was deeply ambivalent
about demands for his continued public service. As he wrote to his
protege James Monroe, "If we are made in some degree for others,
yet, in a greater, we are made for ourselves . . . [A situation in
which] a man had less rights in himself than . . . his neighbors [have
in directing his activities] . . . would be slavery. "28 Thus the controlling principle was one of balance- here the balance between Jefferson's own right to happiness, as he defined it for himself, and the
claims of his fellow citizens.
Jefferson had a parallel understanding of human freedom. If individuals define happiness for themselves, then they should be as
free and unobstructed as possible in pursuing their self-determined
goals. As Cooke remarks, Jefferson's position "was . . . very much in
the tradition of what ... Berlin has called 'negative freedom,'" or
exemption from the coercion of others. 29 This stand, in turn , reinforced Jefferson's fundamental commitment to fairness in weighing
competing moral claims. If freedom means unobstructed action,
and if individuals and groups have conflicting goals, an equitable
arrangement will probably subject everyone to some restraint. In his
own words, freedom is rightful only "within the limits drawn around
us by the equal rights of others. "30
This commitment to establishing an ethical balance also supported Jefferson's emphasis on the moral relevance of the factual, of
the observable realities of the world around him. The crucial connection here is between the idea of negative freedom and an instrumental view of rationality. Individuals have the right to choose their
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own goals without asking permission of others. Others can observe
such choices, but there is no reasonable basis on which to criticize
them. Thus an individual's action is rational to the extent that it is
an effective way to secure whatever goal the actor happens to have.
This point illuminates Jefferson's noted enthusiasm for collecting
facts. Assuming that an individual's chosen goal will not unduly interfere with the rights of others, the only questions that can be asked
legitimately by outsiders are empirical rather than evaluative: Are
the actions that an individual undertakes the most effective available? Jefferson himself devoted considerable attention to this question of practical efficacy. It shaped his view of education, of travel,
and the way he ran his plantation. "The study of the law," he wrote a
nephew, "qualifies a man to be useful to himself, to his neighbors,
and to the public." Fortunately, it is also "the most certain steppingstone to [political] preferment. "31
This orientation is broadly consistent with Jefferson's humanism .
One of the Enlightenment's deepest impulses was its revolt against
everything supernatural and mysterious in medieval and feudal culture in favor of the natural, the human, the commonplace - and the
observable.

JEFFERSON'S PARADOXICAL DISPOSITIONS
No claim can be sustained that Jefferson's humanist liberalism directly caused his proslavery shift. Methodologically, the difficulty is
that stable beliefs cannot cause changes in attitude or behavior.
Substantively, the problem is that slavery violated Jefferson's general
liberal commitment to political freedom and equality, as well as his
more specific beliefs in altruism and egalitarianism. So too, his humanist celebration of the solid, observable, and therefore familiar
would seem to run against the unwarranted pretensions of any social
elite. French aristocrats or southern slave holders might wear expensive clothes and have refined tastes, but for a materialist like Jefferson, all human beings clearly belonged to one biological speciesand by virtue of that fact, they enjoyed the same natural rights.
These beliefs supported his attack on the French Old Regime and on
Hamilton's social and economic vision; the latter not only because it
favored those who were already rich but also because it seemed likely
to produce new, governmentally created social and economic inequalities.
From this perspective, the youthful Jefferson's opposition to slav-
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ery would seem to be a matter of course. In any event, many of the
European philosophes whom Jefferson admired joined a society
called Amis des Noirs precisely because they moved from their humanist premises to antislavery conclusions. Thus Jefferson's humanism would seem to constitute an ethical disposition to support human equality and oppose human slavery.
Just how, then, did this humanist liberalism dispose either Jefferson himself or his northern followers to protect slavery? As he wrote
in the Declaration, these beliefs included, first, human equality at
least with respect to basic political rights; second, the ordering of
these rights in terms of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness;
third, instituting government with the consent of the governed. How
could those beliefs ever condone slavery? Again, tolerance was a centerpiece of Jefferson's political creed: He detested every governmentally sponsored religious or cultural orthodoxy. How, then, could
tolerance come to apply to chattel slavery?
Jefferson offers a clue in his draft of the Declaration. There he berated the English king, not just for imposing slavery on the colonists
but for then threatening white lives by trying to incite the slaves to
revolt. Evil though slavery was in the abstract, the issue became
much more complex once the institution was in place - and presumably enjoyed substantial popular support. This stand can be connected to the Declaration's more fundamental principles. Leaving
aside for the moment any possible conflict between the rights of the
two races, there is also a tension between the very ideas of individual
rights and consenting to the governance of a body of citizens.
For Jefferson, the doctrine of consent, supplemented by his devotion to maximizing human unity, had two important consequences.
First, a regime based on consent was intrinsically worthy of support.
Second, the regime could only fulfill its obligations through an inherently political process, one that was devoted to helping all its
citizens pursue their own self-defined happiness. Accordingly, each
decision had to satisfy as many citizens as possible, and the process
had to preserve the regime itself so that it could continue to meet its
obligations. One could not simply say, as in a Lockean state of nature, that the rights of every individual must be respected. On occasion, citizens might have to sacrifice their own claims either to preserve the regime itself or to help it fulfill its obligations. In this way,
Jefferson's doctrine of consent inspired both loyalty to liberal political regimes and support for the process of compromise and
accommodation - that is, balancing conflicting claims - characteristic of genuinely democratic politics.
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This spirit marked not only the celebrated compromises of the
Constitutional Convention but also many key episodes of Jefferson's
political career: his reluctant agreement to the assumption of state
debts in exchange for locating the new capital city on the Potomac;
his middle position on the notorious Yazoo land frauds; his pragmatic decision to buy Louisiana, contrary to his own strict Constitutional principles; his eventual openness to manufacturing as a response to British threats; and above all, his skillful management of
the Republican party. 32 In every case, his pursuit of his own preferences was affected by both his assessment of the balance of political
forces and the overriding need to preserve the new republic. When
Jefferson would not compromise, as in his support for the Revolution
and religious freedom and in his opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts, the issue involved governmental threats to individual freedom. Otherwise, he was typically devoted to harmonizing interests
through compromise and accommodation.
Further, as Jefferson pointed out to the defeated and anxious Federalists in his First Inaugural, "though the will of the majority must
in all cases prevail, that will, to be rightful , must be reasonable." He
then went on to assure them that "the minority possess their equal
rights, which . . . to violate would be oppression ." He suggested in
that address that a genuinely free process of argument and debate
would eventually lead to the right political decision. 33 He also accepted the argument of Adam Smith and others that economic activity would be most generally beneficial if only the relevant markets
were genuinely free. In each case, the right setting-a republican
government or a free market-would produce good results. Here, it
seems, was a presumption in favor of those social practices and insti •
tutions that had emerged and flourished in a liberal regime, and
here, too, was a further warrant for accommodation. As a familiar
maxim of democratic politics puts it , in order to get along, one has
to go along with established institutions as well as influential politicians. This spirit of accommodation and free interchange would
prove as relevant, later, to the interests of slavery as to the worried
Federalists of 1801.
Two features of Jefferson's political outlook could be used to argue
against a strong antislavery stand. First, with respect to consent and
opinion, slavery was strongly supported by many whites in the South
and at least tolerated by many others in the North. The idea of compromise suggested taking these views seriously. Second, with respect
to social experience, slavery was an important social and economic
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institution that had in fact flourished in America's liberal society. At
the least, therefore, it had to be treated circumspectly. On both
counts, then, there was a political disposition to protect the institution.
To this point, the paradox remains unresolved. Jefferson's humanist ethics seemed to dispose him in one way; his humanist politics
seemed to dispose him in another. Early in his career, the balance
between them had an antislavery tilt. The question, then, is what
triggering conditions caused him to shift to a protective attitudeand why did these conditions have the effect they did? Several events
come readily to mind. First, a series of slave revolts, most notably in
Santo Domingo and then in the United States, heightened white
fears for their safety and even survival. 34 Second, the introduction of
the cotton gin made slavery a much more important, and seemingly
permanent, feature of southern life in particular and the American
economy in general. Partially as a result, southern opinion (on
which much of Jefferson's political influence depended) increasingly
turned against any antislavery agitation. Finally, the great American experiment in republican government, to which Jefferson had
devoted his whole career, seemed more and more secure, more and
more successful. Thus, an attack on any of the regime's important
political or social institutions, including slavery, seemed more problematic. Taken together, these developments reinforced just those elements in Jefferson's thought that argued for protecting slavery as an
existing institution.
In its own terms, I believe this argument is convincing. One question remains: How could Jefferson make this move with so little sense
that he was contradicting any of his basic beliefs? To answer that
question, we must examine the specifically humanist way in which
his creed understood such liberal tenets as freedom, rationality, and
human well-being.

SLAVERY AND HUMANIST LIBERALISM
Point by point, Jefferson's basic humanist values reinforced his political disposition to protect slavery. To be sure, his commitment to
negative freedom, to the norm of unobstructed action, would seem
to favor the slaves' emancipation, since it would surely increase their
liberty. But as we have seen, when the people have conflicting preferences, protecting or increasing the freedom of some necessarily
limits that of others. As a practical matter, every viable liberal re-
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gime will constrain everyone to some extent. In particular, abolition
would just as surely limit the freedom - the unobstructed action - of
those who favored slavery or owned slaves. True to his altruistic and
charitable attitudes, toward himself as well as others, Jefferson never
seems seriously to have reproached himself for owning slaves.
More generally, Jefferson's principles required him to recognize
the fears of southern whites about the reprisals they would suffer if
their slaves were ever freed. Here was a compelling interest to be balanced against the slaves' claims to freedom. As Jefferson himself put
it, first in the Declaration and then forty-four years later, the blacks'
right to freedom conflicted with the whites' ultimately more important right to life. Nor did he entirely ignore the white masters' property rights. 35 As early as 1781, he could refer rather matter of factly
to the southerners' "lands, slaves, and other property. " 35 Once again,
it was necessary to weigh competing objectives.
At the same time, the relativistic side of Jefferson's utilitarianism
sharply qualified the blanket condemnation of any institution. The
key question was always the institution's effect in particular cases. As
immoral as slavery might be in general, the institution had flourished in a free society, and its persistence could be persuasively justified in the South where racial conflict was a real threat. Specifically,
Jefferson qualified his universalism with a certain particularism. If
the two races were separate peoples, as Jefferson suggested in his
draft of the Declaration, the two races had not contracted with each
other to observe and mutually enforce their several natural rights.
For that reason, those blacks who were freed might well be expected
to be particularly vengeful. For even conscientious whites, then, the
primary obligation was presumably to other members of their own
political community.
Jefferson's empirical orientation, his philosophic sensationalism
and materialism, and his respect for observable facts and the institutions of a free society proved comforting to southern whites in
other ways. His humanist belief in progress, for example, meant that
historical facts could determine values. Given the political freedom
to pursue individually defined goals, social arrangements that survive and flourish can be presumed to be progressive and therefore
valuable. As an integral part of American society, slavery could
readily be seen to fit this description.
Again, Jefferson surely believed in human equality in the abstract, but his empiricist outlook made it difficult to treat this belief
as a postulate from which one might begin to reason. Even if assertions about human equality might all be true, they still had to be
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verified by sense perception and more specifically by an empirical
inquiry, e.g., into the differences between the two races. 37 Whatever
the causes that kept the slaves from acquiring literacy or other valuable skills, the observable fact, as he saw it, was their intellectual inferiority to whites. Jefferson's empiricism, of course, did not require
him to read the facts this way; he could have identified the blacks'
problems as a consequence of their bondage. Given his self-interest,
racial fears, and loyalty to his region, Jefferson's empiricism made it
easier for him to reach his conclusion.
A similar account applies to Jefferson's materialism. In fact, his
notorious discussion in the Notes on Virginia (Query 14) emphasizes
those racial differences that were physical and therefore readily observable. 38 What is more, this outlook encouraged the view that
these observed patterns of racial difference and inequality would
persist. If human beings are essentially material entities, their future
development is likely to be consistent with their physical makeup, including the physiological and thus observable differences between
the races.
None of these considerations refutes the claim that Jefferson was
committed to the liberal values of freedom, equality, and individual
rights. Jefferson's devotion to compromise and accommodation did
not block his early opposition to slavery nor his general support for
trying to help the common people on most economic issues. Problems arose only when political controversy touched on an institution
that was deeply embedded in a society's fabric and was therefore entitled to respect from Jefferson's empiricist outlook. He voiced one
version of this attitude when he suggested that the utility of an institution or practice would differ from one situation to another. He applied it in practice when he urged his French friends to take the existing situation into account and therefore to move cautiously in
reforming the Old Regime. 39 It was particularly relevant to his own
society and polity. First, Jefferson was a good democrat who had a
profound confidence in the good sense of the common people; his
humanist philosophy helped extend that optimism to those institutions and practices that had developed in a free society. In other
words, the fact that the American polity and society was liberal in
general created a presumption in favor of any particular social institution that had flourished within its confines. In any case, Jefferson
had less and less to say, over time, at least in public, on slavery's evil
character. Second, slavery had deeply embedded itself in American
life. Thus any attempt to uproot it would threaten the health, or indeed survival, of the liberal republic to which Jefferson had devoted
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his life. Here, then, was the real importance of Jefferson's humanist
liberalism. His most basic beliefs rationalized and legitimated a
process by which his political disposition to protect slavery eventually overrode his ethical disposition to attack it.

ADAMS'S REFORMED LIBERALISM
Like Jefferson, Adams valued balance and political compromise.
His theory of republicanism focused on the appropriate balance
among both political institutions and social groups. At the end of
his administration, he frustrated the belligerent Hamiltonians in his
own cabinet by deciding to avoid a bitterly controversial war with
France. Nevertheless, he was no humanist liberal.
As Peterson puts it, Adams "was a zealot, not about any particular
creed, but about religion. It was in his blood and [it] had weighed
on his mind all of his life. "40 Without religion, he thought , there
could be no philosophy, 41 and he repeatedly praised his Puritan forebears for their morals, courage, intellectuality, and even their antiCatholicism. 42 He also embraced much of their traditional piety. For
all his disagreements with orthodox Calvinists on many issues, he
shared their belief in human inferiority and ignorance when compared to God's infinite and inscrutable majesty. There "never was
but one being who can Understand the Universe," he wrote Jefferson
in 1813. "And ... it is not only vain but wicked for insects to pretend to comprehend it." Because "the World is . . . a Riddle and an
Enigma," 43 he thought humility was the only appropriate response.
The human soul "ought to fill itself with a meek and humble anxi ety. "44 Here, to be sure, was an almost Kantian focus on the limits of
the human mind, anticipating the Transcendentalism of the next
generation.
However, Adams also insisted on the individual's responsibility to
act in the light of transcendent moral standards, rather than be
guided by Jefferson's sensationalist and materialist pursuit of a selfdefined happiness. Indeed he def-ined that state, happiness, as had
Aristotle, holding that it "consists in virtue, "45 not in a subjective
sense of well-being. He was therefore deeply suspicious of pleasure as
a goal in human life, at one point proclaiming his own devotion to
"business alone." 46 As he wrote in his diary in 1756, "He is not a wise
man . . . that has left one Passion in his Soul unsubdued. " John
Adams was no hedonist. 47
Adams could not accept Jefferson's view of human freedom. He
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agreed, to be sure, on the importance of negative freedom, particularly the right of conscience, and on the need to restrict the negative
liberty of some in order to protect that of others. "I have a right," he
wrote, "to resist him [who] shall take it into his head . .. that he has
a right to take my property without my consent. "48 But liberty for
Adams also had a positive side. One can undertake an activity only
if one has the ability to perform it. Thus freedom from the "Passions," he believed, meant freedom to cultivate one's faculties, physical, intellectual, and moral. For his Puritan forebears the object was
to secure the greater glory of God. For the more secular Adams, the
object was to develop one's talents and abilities to become more useful to oneself and others. In a sense, liberty defined and empowered
the responsible human being and indeed enabled the citizen to do
his duty. "Liberty, according to my metaphysics," he wrote, "is an intellectual quality . .. it is a self-determining power in an intellectual agent. It implies thought and choice and power." 49 A central
goal, then, was to foster general self-improvement, including the
improvement of his and other people's moral faculties.
The contrast with Jefferson is clear. Given his belief in negative
liberty and tranquillity, the Virginian placed less emphasis on fundamental changes in individuals. Education and experience would
help in pursuing one's goals more effectively, but even without such
assistance, all normal individuals could be trusted to identify their
goals, i.e., to define happiness for themselves-and then act altruistically where appropriate. For Adams, however, positive liberty
meant that completely free individuals would develop themselves by
systematically cultivating their faculties.
As a result , he put relatively little emphasis on balancing competing claims. The true moral imperative was to make sure that individuals did their duty and obeyed an appropriate moral law. Public
service offers an interesting case in point. Where Jefferson sometimes regarded it as a burden imposed on him by others for their
benefit , Adams saw it as an opportunity for conscientious individuals to undertake self-improvement. The obligation of the rulers, he
wrote John Taylor, is "to exert all their intellectual liberty to employ
all their faculties, talents, and power for the public, general universal good . .. [ and] not for their own separate good or the interest of
any party. "50 Because public service offered this opportunity, the issue of balancing the public's interest with that of the individual official became irrelevant.
This stand was broadly reinforced by Adams's epistemology and
ontology. In an 1816 letter, Adams dismissed Jefferson's materialism
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as inconsistent with human liberty, conscience, and morality. 51 At
other times, he resorted to skepticism. The "question of spirit and
matter" he wrote Jefferson in 1820, was "nugatory because we have
neither evidence nor idea of either. "52 Nor could sensory experience
resolve matters. Against Jefferson's sensationalism, he held that the
"essences of body and mind" cannot be penetrated by "our senses or
instruments." "Incision, knives and microscopes make no discoveries
in this region. "53 What is more, the mind also provided a knowledge
independent of sensory experience. 54 "Philosophy which is the result
of Reason," he wrote Jefferson, "is the first, the original Revelation
of the Creator to his Creature, Man. "55 In effect, then, Adams rejected any effort such as Jefferson's to ground notions of human wellbeing in the sensory experience of the human animal. There was, instead, "a law of right reason common to God and man" that is
essential for "all human reasoning on the moral government of the
universe. "56

ADAMS'S COMPLEX DISPOSITIONS
ON SLAVERY
Just as Jefferson's humanist liberalism sustained two seemingly opposed dispositions with regard to slavery, Adams's reformed outlook
pointed in two quite different directions. His belief in social and individual development upheld many of his political stands against
the Jeffersonians. Despite his reservations about banks, he loyally
supported Hamilton's economic program because he believed in the
government's obligation to promote individual and collective improvement. Here was the Federalists', and later the Whigs', commitment to government activism that the Jeffersonians assailed as conservative or paternalistic.
This stress on the cultivation of human faculties also implied that
levels of development would almost certainly vary from one individual to another. For Adams, these personal differences posed a
double threat to republican regimes that required a plainly conservative response. On one side, the able and ambitious might well use
their abilities to dominate the government for their own benefit. On
the other, the uneducated and undisciplined common people might
succumb to demagoguery and become unruly mobs, as they did in
the French Revolution and Shays's Rebellion. He prescribed the
same familiar solution for both problems: a system of checks and
balances in which each governmental institution represents a differ-
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ent social stratum, with the people dominating the lower house of
the legislature and the elite "ostracized," as he put it, in the upper
chamber. Although Adams angrily denied that his stand favored
aristocratic government, it did rely on the well-educated and socially successful to control popular passions.
This generally conservative outlook did not ensure a protective
stand on slavery. Other northern Federalists often charged their
egalitarian opponents, including Jefferson, with quietly but hypocritically condoning slavery. 57 For our purposes, the important point
is that Adams's own doctrine of piety had a similar thrust. If every
individual was vastly inferior to God, then all forms of human pride
and selfishness were surely unwarranted. From that position it was
but a short step to the conclusion, which Abigail had implied in her
1776 letter to him, that slavery is unGodly - impious - because it elevates some human beings to a position over others, an elevation
that belonged to God alone. Also, Adams's devotion to a republican
system of checks and balances was meant to prevent anyone, be it
English rioters or French or American radicals, from exercising absolute power. 58 Excessive power, and the pride that went with it, often tempted the powerful to act on desires that were contrary to
their self-development or that of others. As Abigail argued in her
letter of 1776, a concern of this sort could readily acquire an antislavery cast. 59
Adams's position on slavery thus exhibited a tension between development and restraint. On one side, he was deeply worried about
restraining the passions of the untutored. On the other, if selfdevelopment was so important for the species, then the slaves ought
to be allowed to cultivate their faculties- and they presumably
could not do so if they were owned as chattel. Here, then, are two
central questions: First, if there were both pro and antislavery elements in Adams's outlook, how can we say that his position, as a
whole, was disposed against the institution? Second, given Adams's
obvious conservatism, what triggering conditions brought that antislavery disposition into play- what changes in American society or
culture actually produced an antislavery shift by Adams himself,
and to a greater degree, the Adams family?
Knowing as we do the eventual antislavery drift of the Adams
family, it is not hard to identify changes that resolved the tension in
his outlook. Consider first the perception that the American republican experiment seemed increasingly secure because it was a proven
success. Given that security, there was less need for restraint, because popular protests could be seen to pose a less serious threat to
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the political order. Accordingly, there was more room to tolerate antislavery agitation and less need to worry about its consequences. At
the same time, of course, the cotton gin had made slavery a much
more important, and seemingly permanent, feature of the American economy. If slavery subjected one human being to the illicit
domination of another, its growing importance could become areason for opposing and not for protecting it: The individual slaves
faced permanent subjection to their masters, and the number of
slaves so dominated was likely to increase.
Although these two factors, taken together, may have helped shift
the balance between development and restraint that produced
Adams's ambivalence, by themselves they seem insufficient to have
shaken Adams's deeply conservative outlook. As it happened, however, there was a third triggering condition that had a major impact
on Adams's outlook, namely the emergence of a much less elitist and
less deterministic current within New England's Calvinist tradition.
According to the orthodox Calvinist doctrines of predestination
and original sin, most individuals were doomed to damnation by a
divine decree . Only a few redeemed saints would help shape the
world according to God's plan - and to better perform this task they
would systematically develop their faculties. These beliefs made it
feasible - though certainly not necessary-to defend slavery as a regrettable but useful restraint on willful sinners. Indeed, this stand
paralleled one for which Adams had some sympathy: keeping the
slaves under control of masters whose intellectual faculties were
much better developed.
This orthodox argument for protecting slavery became increasingly difficult to assert once the elitist and deterministic doctrine of
predestination was abandoned. According to the new view, all individuals were eligible for salvation and could achieve it by following
the way of the saint through the exercise of their own free will. Following that path meant showing devotion to God by cultivating one's
moral, intellectual and physical faculties in order the better to serve
the divine cause, and it was just such a path that the slave masters
prevented their chattel from following. In this regard, slavery egregiously violated the obligations that human beings owed their Creator, not just each other. Not surprisingly, the Second Great Awakening of the early 1800s, which powerfully advanced this new liberal
creed, also spawned the abolitionist agitation of the 1830s.
The resemblance between Adams's own religion and the Awakening was only approximate. Where the Awakening was enthusiastic
and trinitarian, Adams was a philosophically attuned Unitarian.
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Where the Awakening stimulated the abolitionist movement,
Adams's children and grandchildren became Whigs and Republicans. But if the Adams family did not experience a direct link between evangelical Christianity and abolition, their politics did undergo a somewhat parallel development. Specifically, Adams's son,
John Quincy, responded much more than his father to the democratic currents that helped produce both the Jacksonian revolution
in American politics and the Second Great Awakening in American
Protestantism. Over time, the son therefore incorporated the ideas
of political equality and unconstrained self-development into his political rhetoric. At one level, then, the liberal religious beliefs that
the two men shared had more direct influence on the political views
of the son than on the father's. 60 But toward the end of his life, John
Adams himself began to look to his son for political guidance.
In retrospect, at least, these changes do account for Adams's shift
on slavery. Still, as with Jefferson we must ask how he accomplished
his shift with no real sense of contradicting his basic values. To answer this question, we must ask what features of Adams's reformed
liberalism encouraged the emergence of a moderate though still fervently moral antislavery ethos. As I shall now show, the elements of
Adams's thought that he largely shared with his New England forebears and that separated him from Jefferson made it especially and
increasingly difficult for the Adams family to remain indifferent to
human slavery.

SLAVERY AND REFORMED LIBERALISM
Once again , a comparison is helpful. The young Jefferson saw slavery as a moral evil and wished for its elimination when practicable,
but this desire had to be balanced against competing considerations
of both utility and rights. Adams, in rejecting a subjective, selfdetermined happiness as an ultimate moral guide, undercut the
whole rationale for this concern. Consider, once again, the issue of
public service. For Adams this activity offered an opportunity both
to cultivate one's own faculties and to serve others. Consequently, the
positive freedom of all would benefit. More generally, because there
was no necessary conflict between developing one's own faculties and
those of other people, there was no presumption that one group's
freedom or well-being would necessarily conflict with those of another. Indeed, the public servant had a clear obligation to help oth-
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ers follow the right path. Like his Puritan forebears, therefore,
Adams favored educating the slaves, however much this position became anathema in the South after his death. 61
This analysis applied to policies and institutions as well as to the
actions of individuals. Some institutions and policies might help
both oneself and others develop their faculties; other institutions or
policies might be generally harmful, regardless of the preferences
involved. Here too, the question of weighing valid but competing
claims could not arise, for either the abolitionists or the Adams family. As Adams himself suggested in his comments about the Missouri
Crisis, the institution blighted the moral development of the slave
owners as much as it prevented the intellectual development of the
slaves. On this view, everyone would benefit from emancipation.
As we have seen, Jefferson's shift on slavery also rested on his empiricist regard for what he took to be facts, notably that blacks were
inferior and that slavery had a growing importance in American
life. Here too, though, Adams's basic beliefs led down a different
path because he refused to take individual goals as automatically
deserving respect. Instead, he submitted all such goals to moral
evaluation and objected to any group's having unlimited power to
pursue whatever aims it wished, be it husbands, wives, or the British
authorities. For Abigail in 1776 , this list included slave holders, as it
did for John (at least on the Missouri question) in 1820. Later, their
children and grandchildren would make open war against the slave
power.
The deeper contrast with Jefferson was more explicitly philosophical. Consistent with his ontology and epistemology, Jefferson stressed
racial differences that were mainly physical and empirically observable. Adams rejected this philosophy because he believed the decisive issue was the condition of an individual's soul, that is, an immaterial object that cannot be directly observed. On Adams's view,
then , Jefferson was not simply wrong about the facts. The more fundamental mistake was to rely in the first place on irrelevant empirical observations about racial differences. Instead, Adams asserted
the moral equality of human beings, i.e. , the equality of souls, as a
postulate from which one should begin to reason - rather than the
conclusion of an empirical, scientific inquiry. For him, this belief
warranted supporting education for all, black and white alike. For
his family, this same dignity required emancipation.
By rejecting Jefferson's concern with balance and facts, Adams's
reformed liberalism made every feature of his society open to moral
criticism, no matter how popular or well established. For this rea-
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son, the changes considered here, i.e., the success of the American
republican experiment, slavery's apparent permanence, and the
spread of a more liberal Calvinism, can be seen to have encouraged
antislavery attitudes. The Civil War did not come in 1861 simply because there were differences of opinion about the morality of slavery: It came, in part at least, because some antislavery northerners
undertook a sustained emotional crusade that eventually enlisted
relative moderates such as John Quincy and Charles Francis Adams.
Crusades require crusaders, those committed enough to sacrifice for
a cause, and here the least humanist feature of Adams's reformed
liberalism, the Calvinist tradition of piety, was crucial.
A perceived contrast between an almost worthless humanity and a
remote and finally inscrutable God may not seem a likely source for
a moral crusade. If God were so remote that divine will and intention were beyond human knowledge- if the human world were dead
in sin, or at least profoundly removed from a majestic, perfect
God- how could a conscientious believer confidently adopt any militant cause? Again, if all humankind were so deficient, how could
any one of them presume to launch a moral crusade against established social institutions and practices? The short answer is that the
great distance between a majestic God and most human beings
made it all the more vital to be among those who were singled out
for redemption. If that redemption was associated with actively serving God, then the consequence may be militant activism, rather
than quiescence. In other words, the very sinfulness of the human
state made it especially imperative that the redeemed believers distinguish themselves by actively seeking to remake the world. To be
sure, the world was so morally ambiguous that the right path was
never fully knowable, human efforts never perfectly successful, and
every achievement only provisional. But it followed that every step
forward left many more to be taken, and the efforts of the righteous
had to be especially intense and unremitting. This profound tension
between the human and the divine could be best relieved by throwing oneself into the activity and drama of a moral, reformative
crusade - be it the Puritan Revolution, the Great Migration to colonial New England, or Yankee Calvinist support for the American
Revolution.
Skeptical as he was about political enthusiasms, Adams recognized just this connection between piety and moral duty. "The faculties of our understanding," he wrote Jefferson in 1825, "are not adequate to penetrate the Universe." After thus expressing his piety, he
moved immediately to the issue of moral conduct. "Let us do our
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duty which is, to do as we would be done by . . . . "62 In the right
circumstances - those of his children and grandchildren after
1830-this sentiment could be more than a demand for good conduct in one's usual calling. It could sustain a prophetic call for a relentless moral struggle.

LIBERAL MORAL CODE
VERSUS LIBERAL CONTEXT
Adam's reformed liberalism in and of itself was not directed against
any single type of institution, policy, or practice. It sustained his distaste for the Revolution in France in the 1780s and his opposition to
Jefferson's egalitarian politics after 1790 as easily as it supported his
own revolutionary stand in the 1770s. The point, instead, is that approval for any such institution or social arrangement was always provisional. No matter how socially important an institution had become, or how much it conformed to the preferences of a political
faction, the decisive issue was always one's ethical obligations in respect to it. Institutions repugnant to the moral law must be condemned. As reformed liberalism came to assert the dignity and
moral equality of every human soul, this stand turned against slavery.
Here the difference between Jefferson and Adams was one of context vs. moral code. For Jefferson, the essential point about American politics was the liberal character of the context, of the regime
and society, in which politics took place. Institutions and practices
deserved support because the context from which they emerged was
so thoroughly liberal, that is, because they allowed individual freedom and required that the expressed preferences of one's compatriots be taken into account. Jefferson's belief in the intrinsic goodness
of individuals prompted in him a suspicion of political institutions;
eventually, however, his optimism came to include the political and
social institutions as well as individuals that flourished in a liberal
society. Genuine as his liberal commitments were, they could not
readily be used to criticize the central features of either that society
or its polity.
Adams shared Jefferson's devotion to these liberal values, but he
understood them differently. For the Yankee moralist, they helped
constitute a set of norms, an ethical code, not just for regulating interactions among individuals, but for evaluating and criticizing
one's social and political world. In particular, he retained the Cal-
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vinists' lively sense of human sin, or at least frailty. In that sense, his
reformed liberalism drew on enduring features of New England culture that encouraged passing negative moral judgments on the social order. Because he had a much more benign view of the human
being than the orthodox Calvinists, he was sometimes inclined to relocate that sin in institutions and social conditions, i.e., intemperance and ignorance. As that tendency became more pronounced in
the next generation, it sustained a negative disposition toward human slavery.
Adams, then , helped lay a foundation for a prophetic politics that
he did not, and perhaps could not, fully embrace. Others-in his
family, his region, and his cultural tradition, including western
Whigs like Abraham Lincoln - could and did build on that founda tion; but they would add to these enduring features of New England
culture - that is, to Adams's neoCalvinist sense of sin and moral
obligation - a view of human beings still more egalitarian and voluntarist than Adams's own. Thus they went beyond his view of slavery as an unfortunate practice to see it as profoundly offensive to
God or to their own basic moral commitments. As the nation moved
closer and closer to secession and civil war, this quarrel with the hu manist liberalism became the dominant cleavage in northern politics. What may be less clear - but just as true-is that this same
cleavage would continue in later generations and even in our own
time.

UNITY, DIVERSITY, AND CIVIC
AMBIVALENCE IN AMERICAN CULTURE
This last claim is too broad to be taken up here, but I do want to
suggest that we can find in the tension between Jefferson's humanist
and Adams's reformed liberalisms a latent theory of e pluribus
unum. This theory, I contend, is better able than the standard theory of the liberal community to explain and appraise our national
political life. To bring up to date Jefferson's observation in his First
Inaugural Address, we are all humanist liberals-we are all reformed liberals. Some of us are more one than the other, no doubt,
and it is also surely possible to find something like pure types; without question there are individuals or groups who represent an outlook seemingly wholly committed to one or the other poles of our
liberalism. However, I would argue that both liberalisms are necessary to a vibrant American democracy, and that neither, untem-
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pered, unmoderated by the other, is sufficient .63 At the same time, to
be self-consciously an American, to embrace both forms of our liberalism, is inescapably to live with ambivalence as we ponder our
problematic and ambiguous roles as citizens.
Indeed, for either humanist or reformed liberalism to dominate
our politics or our culture would arguably be disastrous for the viability of social diversity and for the integrity and coherence of the
nation itself. That this is so is strongly suggested by our history.
Return for a moment to the conflict between the reformed and
humanist liberalisms of the antebellum era . For many reformed liberals, the prophetic attack on slavery as un-American and unChristian was a thinly disguised call for moral homogeneity, that is,
for the slave holders to adopt a new moral code . Not surprisingly,
perhaps, this attitude led some Yankees, though not the Adams family, into a nativist attack on Roman Catholicism as a foreign , immoral, and undemocratic creed. There was, indeed, a significant,
though far from perfect, correlation between opposition to slavery
and an anti-Catholic nativism. As we perhaps know more vividly
from the experience of such dogmatisms in our own century, the re formed liberalism of John Adams can, when it loses its head, descend from the lofty heights of a transcendent moral law to the
depths of a rigid and mindless conformity.
On the other hand, the northern humanists who admired Jefferson espoused the sovereignty of individual preferences and thus a
right to adopt whatever beliefs or folkways one finds appealing, although they scorned religious or ethnic prejudices. Attractive as this
generous and tolerant pluralism can be, especially as we witness the
efforts of blacks, ethnic minorities, women, and gays to achieve
equal justice in our society, Jefferson's humanist liberalism can degenerate into little more than a crass defense of established privilege. For all its professions of respect for individuality and diversity,
Jefferson's liberalism in fact capitulated to darkness in the name of
balance and accommodation. It lost its heart if not its soul in the
face of what must be regarded as the most monstrous evil in all our
political history.
As Hannah Arendt once said of behaviorism in the social sciences,
the problem with the standard theory of the liberal community is
not that it is true, but that it may become true. It is in fact Jefferson's
humanist liberalism that serves as a barrier against the monolithic
consensus perceived by that theory, and through its concern with
compromise and accommodation insists that our unity be a genuine
political unity. And it is Adams's reformed liberalism that keeps Jef-
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ferson's relativism and concern with private satisfactions from degenerating into mere individual and group selfishness. It continues
to demand a shared moral vision that in some loose but vital way
binds us all together.
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3
CITIZENSHIP, DIVERSITY, AND
THE SEARCH FOR THE COMMON GOOD
ROBERT N. BELLAH

The motto e plurz"bus unum appeared on the Great Seal of the
United States adopted by Congress in 1782 and clearly referred to
the formation of one nation out of thirteen states. The Preamble to
the Constitution, speaking in the name of the people, gives as its first
purpose "to form a more perfect union." Certainly there were many
concerned with the protection of the diversity symbolized in the notion of states' rights-they were prominent among the opponents of
the new Constitution - but the Constitution itself emphasizes the
unum more than the e pluribus. Perhaps this primary concern with
unity was inevitable in the infancy of a still fragile republic that
would face threats of dissolution for many decades. Our situation is
quite different. The American nation faces many problems, but dissolution into its constituent states is probably not one of them. Under these circumstances anxiety about the protection of diversity is
more salient in the minds of many than worries about unity. The
commonest contemporary term for diversity is pluralism . Our culture is pluralistic, and that pluralism, we are told, is in need of nurture and encouragement.
In this context the "search for the common good," which is my
central concern here, may even sound threatening. I know from previous experience that many will find the very idea of the common
good problematic in a pluralist society. They will object that there
can be no quest for the common good in a pluralist society because
there can be no common good in a pluralist society. The essential
critical question is, "Whose common good?" or, more belligerently,
"Who are you to talk about the common good?" Won't any notion of
the common good be just some particular idea reflecting the inter47
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ests of some particular group trying to force itself on the rich diversity of American pluralism?
In meeting this objection I must develop what I take to be a defensible idea of pluralism that is compatible with the notion of the
search for the common good. In so doing I will attempt to distinguish this defensible idea of pluralism from what I believe are two
inadequate versions of it.
In one of its versions pluralism is almost synonymous with individualism . Not only society as a whole but every group and every subgroup is said to be pluralistic, and the logical conclusion of that line
of thought is to reduce society to its constituent individuals. After
all, are we not, each of us, indelibly different? That is one of the
deepest beliefs of our society. It is just this kind of individualistic
pluralism that can provide the basis for a radical rejection of the
idea of the common good by mounting an attack on the good itself.
Thomas Hobbes in Levz"athan argued that there is no Good in itself
but only the goods of individuals. The idea of the Good always involves the idea of a right way of life-a life lived together and enacted in common practices that are good in themselves. Such ideas
were seen as oppressive by some early modern social thinkers who
preferred to think of individuals pursuing personal advantage,
goods, interests. Society, they argued, will be torn apart by sectarian
warfare if we try to establish the common good, but if we try more
modestly to regulate the pursuit of interest and leave morality to the
inner life of individuals, then we can have a peaceful society. John
Locke drove the point home toward the end of the seventeenth century, concluding, in his Letter Concerning Toleratz"on , that religion
was a private matter and of no legitimate concern of public authority. 1 In this tradition the idea of "the common good" is replaced by
the idea of "the public interest," which turns out to be not something good in itself but merely the sum of all the private interests.
Now the problem with this individualistic notion of pluralism,
what I would call shallow pluralism (for example, the Wall Street
Journal review of Habz"ts of the Heart, which argued that people
obey traffic lights, the credit system works, what's the problem? Who
needs community?) , is that it has never described what we are really
like. Indeed it is doubtful if a society based on interest alone could
even exist . Stephen Douglas, in his great debate with Abraham Lincoln over whether slavery should be extended to the new states being
formed from the territories, took the line of the public interest . If
the people want slavery, let them have it-one simply sums individual interests. But Lincoln asked whether the interest was morally de-

Citizenship, Diversity, and the Common Good

49

fensible or not. If slavery is absolutely wrong, then it is tragic that it
is permitted in the Constitution, but it certainly must not be allowed
to spread to new states, regardless of what the population in those
states might wish. 2 Here we have a strong notion of good opposing a
strong notion of interest, and even though the good has not always
won in American politics we have never been allowed to forget the
necessity to seek it.
The second inadequate notion of pluralism is what I would call
communalist pluralism. It is less likely than individualist pluralism
to criticize the idea of the good or even the common good except at
the level of the society as a whole. Each community is seen as having
its own idea of its own common good, radically different from the
idea of other communities. If individualistic pluralism sees society as
a limited contract entered into by individuals to maximize their selfinterest, communalist pluralism sees society as resting on uneasy
treaty relations between communities so autonomous as virtually to
be subnations.
People who think of pluralism in communalist terms have a variety of communities in mind. Often these are racial or ethnic, such as
the Black community or the Japanese-American community. Sometimes they are religious, such as the Evangelical community or the
Catholic community. The word "community" is used so loosely in
America that in recent years it has appeared in such expressions as
"the gay community." Even women are sometimes spoken of as a
community.
But there is a serious question of what community means in any
of these expressions. Often people have in the back of their minds a
rather romantic idea of the old ethnic communities in our larger
eastern cities, where recent immigrants collected in close proximity
to each other and maintained a whole set of institutions, churches,
clubs, newspapers, and a wide variety of commercial establishments,
often using the native language . Today in cities like Los Angeles we
can see Korean or Vietnamese communities that approximate this
type.
Yet in America such geographically-bounded communities have
usually been transient. Most of the older ethnic groups can no
longer be located in specific neighborhoods, or such concentrations
are small remnants of what was formerly the dominant pattern. A
student of mine studying "the Japanese-American community" in
San Francisco discovered that almost no Japanese live in Japantown
anymore. With the exception of a couple of retirement homes, most
Japanese have moved to middle-class neighborhoods in San Fran-

50

Robert N. Bellah

cisco or to the suburbs. What was once Japantown is now the location of the Japanese Cultural Center and a collection of shops, restaurants, and cultural institutions, many of them financed with
Japanese rather than Japanese-American money. Even blacks, sub jected to a segregation more systematic and stringent than any other
group, have moved in large numbers out of the ghettos, which in
consequence are the depopulated and impoverished fragments of
what they once were .
In Habits of the Heart we tried to give the much abused term
"community" a concise and coherent meaning. We defined it thus:
A community is a group of people who are socially interdependent,
who participate together in discussion and decision making, and
who share certain practices that both define the community and are
nurtured by it. We differentiated what we called communities in the
strong sense, as just defined, from what we call life-style enclaves,
composed of people who share patterns of dress, consumption, and
leisure activities but who are not interdependent, do not make decisions together, and do not share a common history. Many groups
that are called communities in America are really closer to life-style
enclaves, including some of those I have mentioned above. 3
But even the strongest communities seldom if ever meet the definition that is implied by the idea of communalist pluralism. For true
examples of the latter we would have to go to Northern Ireland or
Lebanon. There we do indeed find communities that are subnations, radical in their separateness, and in latent or actual armed
conflict with their neighbors. In such situations loyalty to the communal group is absolute. It is only there that a common good exists;
there is no sense of a common good in the larger society, or that
sense has become so submerged as to be inaccessible . We have had
such instances in America, but they are not normal. The most striking example divided us into two nations, one slave holding and one
free, and led to the Civil War. But there are a few others: the Mormons in their early history, certain groups of radical survivalists in
rural America today, and the American Indians, but the latter is a
special case that I will consider later. If groups that meet the full
definition of communalist pluralism are rare and transient, then we
can see that communalist pluralism is an inadequate expression of
the reality of pluralism in America.
Having disposed of the two inadequate notions of pluralism, how
can we define a defensible conception? What we need is a notion of
plural communities that are not easily decomposed into their constituent individuals but that are far from total in their demands ;
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that have boundaries but that encourage a good deal of give and
take across those boundaries. Such an idea of community is possible
because all of us belong to more than one community and there is
no community to which we belong exclusively without having some
of our roles outside of it. This means that we are constantly shifting
between being insiders and outsiders with respect to all the significant communities to which we belong. In principle that allows for
openness and flexibility. It may, however, tempt us to think of ourselves as disengaged individuals, only tenuously and voluntarily connected to any community.
It is only in complex societies that the notion of multiple and flexible community membership becomes possible, and it is not until
modern times that such an idea becomes fully legitimate. In tribal
societies and in premodern complex societies, all-encompassing
community membership was the norm. Modern nationalism
emerged at a unique moment in the history of communal identities.
It served to break the hold of the traditional particularistic communities of kinship, region, and religion, but it substituted an identity that could be as absolute in its demands as any traditional one.
While nationalism remains a powerful force everywhere in the
world, including in our own country, its excesses have brought it into
disrepute and subjected it to searching criticism. We can differentiate between patriotism, which is love of country, and nationalism,
which is idolatrous worship of country. We can be patriotic while asserting many loyalties that transcend the nation, such as to religion,
science, and art, and that involve us in quite concrete communities
that are international in scope. Yet disillusionment with nationalism
may serve only to disaggregate people into private and transient loyalties.
In short the third conception of pluralism for which I am arguing
is difficult to maintain and involves balancing between the conflicting pull toward radical individualism on the one hand and absolutist communalism on the other. Perhaps some historical examples
might be helpful in clarifying the issues.
We might begin with a look at how the founders of our country
saw the problem of unity and diversity. We have already seen that e
plurz"bus unum meant in the first instance the creation of one nation
out of thirteen colonies, each of which had its own particular history
for a hundred or a hundred and fifty years before independence and
had learned to work together only in the crisis of independence itself. There were differences in their economies, the degree to which
they depended on agriculture, slave agriculture, commerce, fishing,
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and shipping. Some New England colonies had Congregational
establishments, some southern colonies had Anglican establishments, and the middle colonies had no religious establishments at
all. But among the various forms of diversity that had to be reconciled, the one that we would think of first, cultural diversity arising
from a multiethnic, multiracial population, was not prominent in
the thinking of the founding generation. For one thing there was not
much ethnic diversity among the white population, although there
were Dutch in New York and Germans in Pennsylvania. Nor, by contrast with European societies, was colonial America a class-divided
society. Assimilating relatively small numbers of northwest Europeans in an overwhelmingly Anglo-Saxon white population of the
"middling rank" was not viewed as a major problem.
On the other hand racial diversity was seen more as a threat to
unity than a creative challenge to it. Although there were a few
voices raised in favor of the emancipation of the slaves already in the
late eighteenth century, there was little reflection on the inclusion of
blacks in a genuinely multiracial society. Southerners, like Jefferson,
who opposed slavery in principle but could not see how the issue was
to be resolved practically, thought ultimately the resolution would
come only through radical separation, either a return of blacks to
Africa or the establishment of separate political entities here. In the
North segregation was considered the only acceptable solution. A
similar solution was assumed in relation to Indians, whose status as
separate nations was accepted in principle. However, these nations
were constantly required to move westward as their more immediately accessible lands were desired by white settlers. In the 1830s
America was so little a multiracial society in the sense of unity in diversity that Alexis de Tocqueville, in the longest and gloomiest chapter in Democracy in America, predicted a war of racial extermination between the three races as the only solution to the racial
problem in America. We may be glad that Tocqueville, who was
right in so many of his predictions, was wrong in that one. 4
It is commonly assumed that the inability to accept racial and
cultural diversity and to develop a positive sense of pluralism derived
from communal absolutism. For example, it was the arrogant assumption of the superiority of Anglo-Saxon race and culture that
made white Americans unwilling to include others in a genuinely
multiracial, multicultural society. I would suggest that radical individualism was just as inhospitable to the acceptance of genuine difference. Let me give an example.
Jefferson's views on slavery and blacks are too complex and too
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controversial to be dealt with briefly,5 but his views on American Indians are simpler. Jefferson had great respect for the Indian peoples.
Some of his addresses to Indian leaders are quite moving. As president he did what he could to ensure that Indians were treated with
justice and their claims legally recognized. But two paragraphs of
his Second Inaugural Address are most revealing:
The aboriginal inhabitants of these countries I have regarded with the commiseration their history inspires. Endowed
with the faculties and rights of men, breathing an ardent love
of liberty and independence, and occupying a country which
left them no desire but to be undisturbed, the stream of overflowing population from other regions directed itself on these
shores; without power to divert, or habits to contend against,
they have been overwhelmed by the current, or driven before it ;
now reduced within limits too narrow for the hunter's state, 6 hu manity enjoins us to teach them agriculture and the domestic
arts; to encourage them to that industry which alone can enable them to maintain their place in existence, and to prepare
them in time for that state of society, which to bodily comforts
adds the improvement of the mind and morals. We have therefore liberally furnished them with the implements of husbandry
and household use; we have placed among them instructors in
the arts of first necessity; and they are covered with the aegis of
the law against aggressors from among ourselves. 7
We may be already uneasy at Jefferson's confidence in the rightness
of attempting to turn Indians into yeoman farmers of the sort he
thought were the backbone of the American republic . But the next
paragraph is alarming indeed :
But the endeavors to enlighten them on the fate which awaits
their present course of life, to induce them to exercise their reason, follow its dictates, and change their pursuits with the
change of circumstances, have powerful obstacles to encounter;
they are combated by the habits of their bodies, prejudice of
their minds, ignorance, pride, and the influence of interested
and crafty individuals among them , who feel themselves something in the present order of things, and fear to become nothing in any other. These persons inculcate a sanctimonious reverence for the customs of their ancestors; that whatsoever they
did , must be done through all time; that reason is a false guide,

54

Robert N. Bellah

and to advance under its counsel, in their physical, moral, or
political condition, is perilous innovation; that their duty is to
remain as their Creator made them, ignorance being safety,
and knowledge full of danger; in short, my friends, among
them is seen the action and counteraction of good sense and
bigotry; they, too, have their anti-philosophers, who find an interest in keeping things in their present state, who dread reformation, and exert all their faculties to maintain the ascendancy
of habit over the duty of improving our reason, and obeying its
mandates. 8
In this paragraph Jefferson reveals a complete antipathy to traditional Indian culture, whose communal conception of landholding
consistently opposed the notion of dividing tribal land into individual family farms and succeeding in the world on the basis of individual enterprise. But Jefferson's antipathy is not based on any alleged
superiority of Anglo-Saxon race or traditional culture . Rather it is
based on the rejection by the Indians of the ideas of reason and
progress as Jefferson understood them.
Interestingly enough this passage had a double meaning. There is
no reason to believe that Jefferson did not mean what he said to apply to the Indians. But its more salient and only thinly disguised intent was to attack the New England Federalists and particularly the
New England clergy whom he saw as standing behind them. Jefferson had rejoiced at the near destruction of the Episcopal church in
Virginia following disestablishment there and looked forward to a
similar result once the last remnants of establishment (not outlawed
at the state level by the first amendment) were eliminated in Massachusetts and Connecticut . So it was the New England clergy who
were the crafty medicine men, holding their people in the thrall of
ignorance, bigotry, and ancestral custom and opposing innovation,
reason , and progress. 9
It may come as a shock to learn that Jefferson's views on religious
freedom involved no love of religious diversity. Jefferson was an early
example of what could be called a religious individualist-he said,
for example, "I am a sect myself''- and he believed his views were
based on reason and free inquiry. Rejecting what he called the "demoralizing dogmas of Calvin," he advocated Unitarianism in theology, which he hoped would soon replace all other religious beliefs. "I
rejoice," he wrote in 1822 , "that in this blessed country of free inquiry and belief, which has surrendered its creed and conscience to
neither kings nor priests, the genuine doctrine of one only God is re -
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v1vmg, and I trust that there is not a young man now living in the
United States who will not die an Unitarian." His hostility was particularly directed toward Presbyterians (among whom he included
New England Congregationalists), of whom he writes,
Their ambition and tyranny would tolerate no rival if they had
power. Systematical in grasping at an ascendancy over all other
sects, they aim, like the Jesuits, at engrossing the education of
the country, are hostile to every institution which they do not
direct, and jealous at seeing others begin to attend at all to that
object. The diffusion of instruction, to which there is now so
growing an attention, will be the remote remedy to this fever of
fanaticism; while the more proximate one will be the progress
of Unitarianism. That this will, ere long, be the religion of the
majority from north to south, I have no doubt. 10
Denouncing the fanaticism of his opponents, he nonetheless looked
forward to that "ascendancy" of his own views "over all other sects"
which he accused them of desiring. Jefferson would be quick to
point out the difference. The Calvinists and Jesuits are characterized by priestcraft, creeds, and confessions of faith , whereas his Unitarianism keeps "within the pale of common sense" of the enlightened individual. 11 Yet it is just the community-forming capacity of
religion, its rootedness in traditional practices and its nurturance by
trained specialists, that Jefferson would undermine, whether among
his fellow citizens or among the Indian tribes. 12
Jefferson's individualism was tempered by a residual Christianity- he did believe in the moral teachings of Jesus and in the
Golden Rule-and by his republicanism, his belief that citizens
must act together for the common good. But his complex intelligence also embraced a strong dose of individualistic liberalism , as in
his views on religion, that would grow progressively stronger in succeeding generations. It is interesting to observe Jeffersonian themes
in the great apostle of American individualism, Ralph Waldo Emerson.
Emerson's religious individualism was so radical that he found
even Unitarianism too confining and celebrated the essentially solitary spiritual quest of every individual. Like Jefferson he strongly
contrasted tradition and innovation. Indeed he saw American culture as divided by a schism between "the party of the Past and the
party of the Future," or, as he sometimes called them, the parties of
"Memory and Hope." And as with Jefferson there is no problem of
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knowing which side Emerson was on. He tells us to "desert the tradition" because "The perpetual admonition of nature to us, is, 'The
world is new, untried. Do not believe the past. I give you the universe
a virgin to-day.'"'~ Perhaps nothing in all American literature has
had a greater influence on our culture than Emerson's single essay
"Self-Reliance," which spells out the individualistic creed and advises us to stand loose to involvement in any community. As the relentless credo of individualism grew ever stronger in America from
the late nineteenth century on, it is easy to see how the idea of the
common good became harder and harder to understand. Only the
summing of individual goods was intelligible, and by the middle of
the twentieth century that gave rise to the public opinion poll, itself
a misnomer, for it merely sums private opinions and substitutes for,
rather than encourages, the development of a genuine public opinion.
Fortunately individualism never dominated the entire field. Not
only did the older churches have a stronger doctrine of our social
nature than Jefferson or Emerson would have agreed with, but just
as Emerson was beginning to write, millions of Catholic immigrants
arrived, bringing with them a clearer understanding of social solidarity and the common good than that of even the most Calvinist of
Protestants. Yet among the most significant voices raised in this discussion toward the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning
of the twentieth was that of the philosopher Josiah Royce, who developed the most articulate philosophy of community that we have yet
seen in America.
Although Royce does not mention Emerson in this connection, it
is possible that he was influenced by Emerson's terminology when he
spoke of communities of memory and of hope. But Royce does not
speak of a schism between the two parties; rather he sees memory
and hope as belonging together in any healthy conception of community. He begins one of his major books, The Philosophy of Loyalty, by commenting on just such attitudes toward the past as Emerson's. "One of the most familiar traits of our time is the tendency to
revise tradition, to reconsider the foundations of old beliefs, and
sometimes mercilessly to destroy what once seemed indispensable. " 14
Royce accepts the inevitability of criticism yet seeks to discover
the true meaning that was latent in the old traditions. Those
traditions were often better in spirit than the fathers knew. . . .
Revision does not mean mere destruction. We can often say to
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tradition: That which thou sowest is not quickened except it
die . . .. Let us bury the natural body of tradition. What we
want is its glorified body and its immortal soul. 15
What Royce advocates is the life of a community rooted in memory,
reverent yet critical of the past, and expectant of the future, cherishing not a blind hope but a hope nurtured by reflection and interpretation . What he fears is what he calls "the individualism of the detached individual, the individualism of the man who belongs to no
community which he loves and to which he can devote himself with
all his heart, and his soul, and his mind, and his strength." That
sort of individualism has "never saved men and never can save men.
For mere detachment, mere self-will, can never save men. What
saves us on any level of human life is union." Yet Royce is averse to
communal absolutism. A tendency to make absolute any community, for example the national community, he equates with the individualism of the detached individual. For a community that does
not see itself as part of other communities behaves like a detached
individual. Ultimately for Royce all communities come together in
what he calls "the great community" or "the beloved community, "
which is the human race, seen in a religious perspective. It is interesting in this connection to see Royce speaking out in 1905 in his essay "Race Questions and Prejudices," opposing the "scientific" racism so prominent in his day and defending the dignity of Asians and
blacks. He concludes the essay by writing, "For my part, then, I am
a member of the human race, and this is a race which is, as a whole,
considerably lower than the angels, so that the whole of it very badly
needs race-elevation. In this need of my race I personally and very
deeply share. And it is in this spirit only that I am able to approach
our problem." 16
Just as Royce saw vigorous and effective individuals strengthening
communities, so he saw strong and effective communities strengthe?ing larger societies. He lamented the decline of local loyalties in
America and offered the notion of "provincialism," not in a pejorative but in a positive sense, as an antidote. He thought a vigorous
provincialism would strengthen national life, not weaken it, for he
believed that genuine communities, oriented toward past and fu.
ture, living out of memory and hope, are communities of interpreters capable of communicating with other such communities in
search of the common good. 11
It has been difficult to maintain continuity with ideas such as
those of Royce in the twentieth century. John Dewey already in the
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1920s lamented the decline of a genuine public which he understood
in terms not far from Royce as a community capable of discourse
about the common good. 18 Instead we have seen the rise of what
Alasdair MacIntyre calls "bureaucratic individualism. "19 This is an
individualism less heroic than Emerson's, resigned to the pursuit of
private good within the large, bureaucratic structures that generally
dominate our society. Bureaucratic individualism produces a public
discourse dominated by experts and technocrats arguing about who
has more effective means to increase economic productivity and national power. These means need no end to justify them; it is assumed
that they will increase the sum of individual benefits. Yet our best
minds have frequently pointed out the poverty of an understanding
of public life as the quest for private benefits modulated by bureaucratic management. Walter Lippmann, writing in 1955, spoke of
"the hollow shell of freedom." He said that "the citadel is vacant because the public philosophy is gone, and all that the defenders of
freedom have to defend in common is a public neutrality and a public agnosticism."
In 1962 John Courtney Murray offered a stunning judgment: 20
And if this country is to be overthrown from within or from
without, I would suggest that it will not be overthrown by Communism. It will be overthrown because it will have made an impossible experiment. It will have undertaken to establish a technological order of most marvelous intricacy, which will have
been constructed and will operate without relations to true political ends: and this technological order will hang, as it were,
suspended over a moral confusion; and this moral confusion
will itself be suspended over a spiritual vacuum. This would be
the real danger resulting from a type of fallacious, fictitious
fragile unity that could be created among us. 2 1
Certainly American society in the twenty-five years since Murray
wrote those words has shown many symptoms of moral confusion
and spiritual vacuum. In the late sixties and early seventies our society was torn apart by controversy over our involvement in a war
whose means seemed far more terrible than any attainable end
could justify. Then we underwent the unprecedented experience of
events leading up to the resignation of a president, who otherwise
would have been impeached, and the sordid tale of the unscrupulous manipulation of power that was revealed at that time. By the
middle of the 1970s measurable confidence in all major American
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institutions was at an all-time low. And only ten years later we went
through a similar experience. Under an administration that came
into office asserting that the period of national doubt was over, we
witnessed a new wave of doubt whose implications we cannot yet
fathom. In the fall of 1984, President Reagan, on the floor of the
New York Stock Exchange, declared that "this is the age of the individual, this is the age of the entrepreneur." It was part of the ethos of
that administration to legitimate a spirit of private acquisition such
as we had not seen in many decades, and when the harvest came in
it was evident in the daily newspaper headlines. It would seem that
Ivan Boesky was only the first of many members of our highest financial circles who put pnvate greed above fiduciary responsibility.
Nor was the age of the individual and the entrepreneur confined to
the stock exchange. Apparently there were those in the White House
who would have run our government in that fashion. President
Reagan's admiration for Oliver North suggested that North's failings
and those of his confederates were not merely private weaknesses of
their own .
But while that administration encouraged the spirit of what
Royce called "the individualism of the detached individual" to a
unique degree, it simultaneously saw fit to encourage the revival of
communal absolutism on the part of the Christian right. And so we
saw on the public stage proposals for a "Christian America" with an
agenda not open to public discussion but pursued with triumphalist
self-righteousness. Headlines of the day suggested that even the
heartland of religious communal absolutism is not immune to the
entrepreneurial power plays that led to disgrace in Wall Street and
the White House . Yet what we did not see, between rampant individualism on the one hand and communal absolutism on the other,
is anything that Lippmann or Murray would have recognized as a
public philosophy concerned with the common good.
It was in hope of reviving a discussion concerning a public philosophy, of reinvigorating traditions that can still speak to us, and of
encouraging the communities of memory and hope that are still to
be found among us that my four coauthors and I published Habits
of the Heart. Many of our academic colleagues have assured us that
our effort was vain. The forum is empty and the voices are stilled
they tell us. Or they worry that our sympathy for communities of
memory, such as the family and the church, will only encourage regressive patriarchalism and fundamentalist bigotry. They did not
see that our attitude toward tradition was that of Royce: not unthinking acceptance, but active and critical reappropriation. And
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perhaps they did not appreciate our position because they too are
devoted to the individualism of the detached individual. What
could be more detached than the assertion of the critical intellectual
that there is no hope for America?
Yet in spite of much criticism and many doubts we have been
heartened by the wide variety of groups actively involved in American life who have found our work helpful. These include civic
groups, charitable groups, labor and business groups, but above all
religious groups, and from an extraordinarily wide spectrum: American Indians, Buddhists, Jews, Catholics, mainline Protestants, and
Evangelicals. This is not surprising, for among the communities of
memory and hope in America religious groups take a prominent
place. Nor do most of them , including most Evangelicals, see themselves as communal absolutists. Rather, they would be prepared to
accept Reinhold Niebuhr's conception of the role of religious groups
in American life. Niebuhr spoke of a "religious solution of the problem of religious diversity":
This solution makes religious and cultural diversity possible
within the presuppositions of a free society, without destroying
the religious depth of culture. The solution requires a very high
form of religious commitment. It demands that each religion,
or each version of a single faith , seek to proclaim its highest insights while yet preserving an humble and contrite recognition
of the fact that all actual expressions of religious faith are subject to historical contingency and relativity. . .. Religious toleration through religiously inspired humility is always a difficult achievement. It requires that religious convictions be
sincerely and devoutly held while yet the sinful and finite corruptions of these convictions be humbly acknowledged; and the
actual fruits of other faiths be generously estimated. 22
In that spirit, each religious community brings the insight of its
own tradition to bear on our common problems while remaining
open to discussion and persuasion by others who bring different insights. I would like to close with one example to show that this Royc ean conception of diversity, what we might call deep pluralism, is
not dead: The example of the American Catholic bishops' pastoral
letter "Economic Justice for All. " The pastoral letter draws on the
Bible, the church fathers, and modern Catholic social teaching to
address critical issues in our economic life today. The letter does not
offer dogmatic solutions to particular problems but calls for further
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discussion and judicious action with respect to them . But rather
than the particular policy recommendations, what I want to discuss
here briefly is the fundamental framework of the letter which expresses so eloquently the argument I am trying to make.
The letter asserts firmly that "Human life is life in Community."
It roots this teaching in the most central tenets of Christian faith, in
Jesus's commandments to love God with all one's heart and one's
neighbor as oneself. Indeed it finds community central to the trinitarian conception of God as the very focus of Christian belief. And it
draws from this fundamental belief an inescapable norm for social
life: "Human dignity, realized in community with others and with
the whole of God's creation, is the norm against which every social
institution must be measured. " From the norm flows the obligation
to perform personal acts of charity by individuals, families, and the
church itself. But the norm is not exhausted by personal acts of
charity. The bishops argue for the importance of citizenship as an
essential expression of the norm:
The virtues of citizenship are an expression of Christian love
more crucial in today's interdependent world than ever before.
These virtues grow out of a lively sense of one's dependence on
the commonweal and obligations to it. This civic commitment
must also guide the economic institutions of society. In the absence of a vital sense of citizenship among the businesses, corporations, labor unions, and other groups that shape economic
life, society as a whole is endangered. Solidarity is another
name for this social friendship and civic commitment that
make human moral and economic life possible. 25
I am not a Roman Catholic but an active member of another
communion, yet I and others like me have been involved with the
letter both in the hearings that led up to it and in discussions that
have followed. In this letter we have an example of a community of
memory and hope, drawing on its own deepest resources but open ing up a discussion in fellowship with other citizens about the common good. If this discussion , and others like it , can broaden and
eventuate in lively debates that will affect policy decisions, then
there is still hope for us as citizens of America and of the larger
world. The letter and the process it has stimulated are exemplary in
showing us how we can draw on our diversity to nourish the virtues
of citizenship in pursuit of the common good.
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4
"IN COMMON TOGETHER":
UNITY, DIVERSITY, AND CIVIC VIRTUE
JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN

I
The question of the one and the many, of unity and diversity, has
been posed since the beginning of political thought in the West. The
American Founders were well aware of the vexations attendant upon
the creation of a new political body. They worked with, and against,
a stock of metaphors that had previously served as the symbolic vehi des of political incorporation. As men of the Enlightenment, they
rejected the images of the body politic that had dominated medieval
and early modern political thinking. For a Jefferson or a Madison
such tropes as "the King's two bodies" or John of Salisbury's twelfthcentury rendering, in his Policraticus, of a body politic with the
Prince as the head and animating force of other members were too
literalist, too strongly corporatist, and too specifically Christian to
serve the novus ordo saeculorum. But they were nonetheless haunted
by Hebrew and Christian metaphors of a covenanted polity: The
body is one but has many members. There is, there can be. unity
with diversity.
Indeed, one could even go so far as to insist that it is incorporation, enfolding, within a single body that makes meaningful diversity possible. Our differences must be recognized if they are to exist
substantively at all. We cannot be "different" all by ourselves. A political body that simultaneously brings persons together, creating a
"we," but enables these same persons to separate themselves and to
recognize one another in and through their differences as well as in
My thanks to Robert Calvert for his meticulous editing and perceptive criticisms as
this essay was in progress.
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what they share in common-that was the great challenge. If debates in recent years between the individualist and communitarian
positions, as these have been tagged, are any indication, the problems generated by the need for unity that goes beyond mere "law
and order," as well as the quest for diversity that goes beyond mere
"tolerance," have become ever more acute. There is, then, an unresolved tension embedded in our history and our primary documents
between individual rights and immunities and the vision of "we the
people."
This ambiguity is inherent in American political culture and has
persisted since the founding. It is an ambiguity encoded in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, in a simultaneous commitment to a
"we" and to a protection of the "one," and it is at one and the same
time a source of strength and a cause for concern. Current individualist and communitarian debates are not, therefore, engagements
between traditionalists and antitraditionalists, or between liberals
and restorationists. Rather, the intensity of, and interest in, this discussion is best understood as a contestation over the appropriation
of tradition itself. 1 The Founders were Enlightenment figures who
rejected traditions embodied in monarchical absolutism, but they
also thought in some very traditional ways: Natural law and natural
right were not their invention. Preoccupied from time to time with
classical republican precedents, the Federalists and Anti-Federalists
struggled with a general fund of ideas, a repertoire of stock concerns
and understandings much as contemporary interlocutors do .
Modern American political culture is neither an la carte menu
nor a fixed dinner. No one among us could participate in all the possibilities contemporary culture spreads before each human subject.
Neither is it really workable to be so totally immersed in one fixed
mode that no alternative to this conception, this belief, this way of
doing things ever presents itself. Total rejection of the entire cultural
menu is no genuine alternative either, as defenders of liberal individualism and their critics make clear. Traditions exist; they are
never created de novo. To "think" a tradition is to bring matters to
the surface, to engage in debate with interlocutors long dead or protagonists who never lived save on the page and , through that engagement, to elaborate alternative conceptions through which to
apprehend one's political culture and the way that culture represents
itself or is represented. The meaning and rationale of the most basic
things about us-we the people-as well as each one of us taken
singly is at stake.
Thus Robert Bellah in Chapter 3 argues for a vision of commu-
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nity that opposes both radical individualism, on the one hand, and
a flattened-out, homogeneous union that obliterates differences, on
the other. Michael Walzer reminds us that much of the strength of
our tradition is its protesting, separating, even privatizing tendencies, with the Bill of Rights the touchstone of this robust individuating dynamic. We look to a second prong, our "federal" or constitutional tradition, to revitalize associative life, a process open to many
abuses and pitfalls. Specifically, according to Walzer, despite "its anticipation of collective action, the Constitution has turned out to favor something else, nicely summed up in the twentieth-century
maxim about 'doing your own thing.' "2 In this essay I begin by
building on Bellah's and Walzer's insights but from a somewhat different angle of vision. I go on to offer reflections on an epoch in our
history unpacked in Robert Calvert's essay, namely the Progressive
Era, which was the point at which a rather loose, federated union
moved in the direction of building and justifying the need for a powerful, centralized, bureaucratic order. That, in turn, helps to set the
stage for my tum to two evolving traditions- Catholic social
thought and the democratic theorizing of civil society emerging
from Central Eastern Europe - as sources of insight and strength for
American political thinkers who, with me, have grown weary of the
stark alternatives, individualism versus collectivism, or choice versus
constraint, alternatives all too often presented to us when the philosophic debate over tradition takes actual shape in our political rhetoric and public policy alternatives.

II
A preliminary discussion is needed to frame the horizon for my considerations of the way that the quest for national unity under the
auspices of the state has, over time, exercised a corrosive effect on
America's regional and localist images of community and, as well,
on a once deeply and widely shared, religiously grounded concept of
the human person, the "exalted individual," in the words of political
theorist Glenn Tinder. Tinder has argued that the idea of an individual whose ontological dignity is such that he or she deserves "attention" and is not to be "grossly violated" is fundamental to the
Christian standpoint that is constitutive of our political institutions
and culture at its best. Were the horizons of our political life to cease
being framed through an insistence that the destiny of each individ-
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ual matters, that life would become what it now is only in part, "an
affair of expediency and self-interest. "3
This possibility, in turn, invites a focus on ciuil sodety, by which I
mean "the many forms of community and association that are not
political in form: families, neighborhoods, voluntary associations of
innumerable kinds, labor unions, small business, giant corpora tions, and religious communities. "4 Some may cavil at the notion
that such associations are not "political," but theorists of civil society
would insist, in response, that this network and the many ways we
are nested within it, lie outside the formal structure of state power.
Walzer claims that the Bill of Rights aimed specifically to promote
and to protect such associative group rights, not merely or solely individual immunities or entitlements. There is no sharp dichotomy
between state and society in this understanding; rather a complex
dialectic pertains, or ideally ought to pertain, between the two.
State and society are intimately intertwined, at least this is the assumption that guides the most thoughtful constructions of that rela tionship.
The statist, however, is one who wants us to thin out these ties of
civil society and the plural loyalties and diverse imperatives they give
rise to and sustain. His citizen is represented as unhesitatingly loyal
to the state and prepared to give primacy to it and its purposes in
any and all situations. For the statist identifies us primarily as civic
creatures available for mobilization by a powerful , centralized
mechanism rather than as family men and women, neighbors,
members of the Elks Club or a feminist health cooperative, activists
trying to save the African elephant from extinction, participants in
a reading group, Baptists, and so on. Indeed, statist politicians and
philosophies often design programs and policies aimed at destroying
alternative loyalties and the containers for identity they provide.
Civil society is a realm that is neither individual in a narrowly relentless individualist sense nor communitarian in a strong collectivist sense. It is that world evoked by the Anti-Federalists in debates
over ratification of the United States Constitution. From time to
time, Anti-Federalists no doubt pushed an idealized image of a selfcontained and self-reliant republic which shunned imperial power
and worked, instead, to create a polity modeled on classic principles
of civic virtue and a common good. Writes a historian of this argu ment:
Anti-federalists saw mild, grass-roots, small-scale governments
in sharp contrast to the splendid edifice and overweening ambi-
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tion implicit in the new Constitution - and, indeed, heralded
by Publius and its other proponents. The first left citizens free
to live their own lives and to cultivate the virtue (private and
public) vital to republicanism, while the second soon entailed
taxes and drafts and offices and wars damaging to human dignity and thus fatal to self-government. 5
Despite the often roseate hue with which the Anti-Federalists surrounded their arguments, they were on to something, as we like to
say. They hoped to avoid, even to break, a cycle later elaborated by
Alexis de Tocqueville in which highly self-interested and motivated
individualists disarticulated from the saving constraints and nurture
of overlapping associations of social life require more and more
checks, balances, and controls "from above" in order that the disintegrative effects of untrammeled individualism be at least somewhat
muted in practice.
To this end, the peripheries must remain vital; political spaces
other than or beneath (it is almost impossible not to employ spatial
metaphors as a kind of lexicon of power-talk) those of the state need
to be cherished, nourished, kept vibrant. They had in mind local
councils and committees, and they had in mind to avoid concentra tions of power at the core or "on the top." Too much centralized
power was as bad as no power at all. Only small-scale civitates would
enable individuals, as citizens, to cultivate authentic civic virtue. For
such virtue turns on meaningful participation in a powerful ideal of
community. Too much power exercised at a level beyond that which
permits, indeed demands, active citizen participation is destructive
of civic dignity and, finally, fatal to any authentic understanding of
democratic self-government. Anti-Federalist fears of centralized and
overnationalized power presaged Tocqueville's later worry that imperial greatness bought through force of arms is "pleasing to the imagination of a democratic people" because it sends out lightning bolts
of "vivid and sudden luster, obtained without toil, by nothing but
the risk of life. "6
Tocqueville had another worry, one much debated by political
and social theorists: Even as the reality of American democracy
freed individuals from the constraints of older, undemocratic structures and obligations, individualism and privatization were also unleashed. Tocqueville's fear was not that this invites anarchy; rather,
he believed that the individualism of an acquisitive commercial republic, especially one bent on a course of empire, will engender new
forms of social and political domination. All social webs that once
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held persons intact having disintegrated, the individual finds himself or herself isolated and impotent, exposed and unprotected. Into
this power vacuum moves the organized force of government in the
form of a top-heavy, centralized state.
This Tocquevillian anxiety has spurred thinkers in the communitarian tradition, whether indebted to Burkean traditionalism or
not, to score American individualism and to see its effects as the
bane of our times that a more communal ethic must tame or even
supplant. I agree with the general contours of this critique, and my
work has been associated with this theoretical and political tendency; however, I have a fear of my own spurred by responses to the
Tocquevillian scenario adumbrated above. My worry is that critiques of excessive, atomistic, and acquisitive individualism often do
not distinguish carefully enough between the phenomenon grasped
in the 1980s slogan "greed is good" and the ennobling strengths of
our tradition of individuality, of respect for the human person,
taken as a single, unique, irreplaceable self.

III
I ask the reader to return with me for just a moment to the Greeks,
to that classical world dominated by the ideal of the city-state, the
polis. One sees a world in which war is construed as the natural state
of mankind and an imperious source of communal loyalty and purpose. The Greek city-state was a community of warriors whose political rights were determined by the fundamental privilege of the soldier to decide his own fate, to choose death nobly. There was a direct
line of descent from Homeric warrior assemblies to Athenian naval
democracy. Citizenship was restricted to those who bore arms.One
reigning definition of justice, repeated by Thrasymachus in his sparring with Socrates in the first book of Plato's Republic, was "the interest of the stronger." The Greek citizen army was an expression of
the Greek polis, its creation one of the chief concerns and consequences of the formation of the city-state. In Sparta, the army organized into mess groups was substituted for the family as the basic
element of the state. Another custom of the male group, homosexuality, was developed and institutionalized, most systematically at
Thebes in the fourth century, to create a sacred band of fraternal
lovers fighting side by side. Such institutions served to ensure that
fellowship was deemed a prerequisite of disciplined courage in war,
of the willingness to risk death together.
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The human body in Greek, then Roman, antiquity was wholly
conscripted into society, an insight I owe to the great historian of
late antiquity, Peter Brown. 7 His is an important point: The preChristianized individual was not free to withhold his or her body
from conscription into the extant social order. One could with Socrates endorse withdrawal of the soul from the body, but one could
not take oneself out of the group- one could not constitute one's
body as a protest against its conscription into the social body in the
form of warrior, slave, or householder. The classical view is that the
city-state should have complete control of human bodies for the purposes of labor, procreation, and war.
The body, hence the self, existed at the behest of the wider social
order. St. Augustine argues that Rome perfected the regime of cupiditas run rampant, the triumph of a lust to dominate. The distinctive mark of Roman life as a civitas terrena, a city of man, was greed
and lust for possession that presumed a right of exploitation. This
became a foundation for human relationships, warping and perverting personality, marriage, the family, all things. Augustine writes:
"For he who desires the glory of possession would feel that his power
were diminished, if he were obliged to share it with any living associate ... he cherishes his own manhood. "8
The political importance of Christianity, one marked by an impressive array of analysts, critics, and political theorists including
Sheldon Wolin, Michael Walzer, Robert Bellah, Gilbert Meilander,
and many others, is that Christians created a new vision of community that sanctioned each life as well as everyday life, especially the
lives of society's victims, and granted each a new-found dignity. The
warrioring politics of the ancient world found itself put on trial.
Writes Tinder: "No one, then, belongs at the bottom, enslaved, irremediably poor, consigned to silence; this is equality. This points to
another standard: that no one should be left outside, an alien and a
barbarian. "9
Christianity introduced a strong principle of universalism into the
ancient world even as it proclaimed a vision of the "exalted individual," brought into being by a loving creator, not, therefore, the mere
creature of any government, any polis, any empire. Although early
Christians saw themselves as a very particular community, theirs was
a community open in principle to all. Had not St. Paul proclaimed
that in Christ there is neither Jew nor Greek, free nor slave, male nor
female? As early as Monica's death in 387 (Monica, of course, was
St. Augustine's indefatigable mother) , Christian universalism had
taken strong hold. As Monica approaches her death on foreign soil ,
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far away from her city, Carthage, she renounces a "vain desire" to be
buried in that soil next to her husband. She is not frightened at leaving her body so far from her own country, for "nothing is far from
God, and I need have no fear that he will not know where to find
me . . .. " 10 Augustine himself declares, in The City of God, that a
person's body "belongs to his very nature," and is no "mere adornment, or external convenience." 11 Thus, human beings were not instruments to be put to a civic purpose over which they had no say;
rather, persons qua persons "deserve attention." There is a minimum standard of care and concern, for every person "has been immeasurably dignified. " To be sure, as Tinder almost wearily suggests, this ideal is often "forgotten and betrayed," but "were it erased
from our minds our politics would probably become altogether what
it is at present only in part-an affair of expediency and selfinterest . . . . "12
The heady drama of this moral revolution in the ancient world is
a story that has lost none of its excitement or importance. The legitimacy once accorded automatically to the claims of the city-state and
the empire upon the human body of each person now had to make
its case and could not be assumed unproblematically. The human
body could withdraw from the demands placed upon it by society.
The sexual-social contract could be broken. Freedom of the will
could be brought to bear on the body itself as a tangible locus, a sign
of a newfound relation of the self to the social world. An elemental
freedom was endorsed. Liberated individuals formed communities
to validate their newfound individualities and to shore up the transformed , symbolically changed good represented by the new social
body: The body is one but has many members.
It is important to be clear about the nature of this freedom. The
body was not exempt from a self-imposed discipline. To be a member of the faithful, one embraced this discipline as one's own. The
aim was to be "truly alive," to slough off the "deadness" of abuse of
the body flowing from an ontology of lust and domination. The human will-and the concept of "will" is unknown before Christianity,
most importantly St. Augustine-freely imposed a discipline on itself as a visible sign of freedom: freedom from the abuses of one's
own time, freedom for involvement in an alternative construction of
self in community. 13 For Christian thinkers, as Hannah Arendt observes, "Free Choice of the Will" was a "faculty distinct from desire
and reason . . . " and Augustine is "the great and original thinker"
who posited two active principles, willing and nilling, as constitutive
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of "the faculty of Choice, so decisive for the liberum arbitrium.
to the choice between velle and nolle , between willing and nilling. " 1•
The Christian life was not primarily a solitary life but a communal one. Nevertheless, the principle introduced by Christians is one
in which persons are irreducibly individuals, but this individuality is
exquisitely social. The person is neither absorbed totally into a communal order, having no identity outside its boundaries, nor is he or
she defined wholly apart from the society of others. The Christian
ideal of community not only departs radically from that of the classical city-state, it also challenges the revivification of this ideal of
fraternal order in the civic republican tradition associated most importantly with Machiavelli and Rousseau. Rousseau scorns any particular interest that might block the general will. He lambastes
Christianity as a notion wholly at odds with that of "republic." For
the polity must be as one; the national will must not be divided; citizens must be prepared to defend civic autonomy through force of
arms; whatever puts the individual at odds with himself is a threat to
"la nation une et indivisible." I call the civic republican ideal one of
"armed civic virtue," for the human virtues are given a strong civic
description and culminate in bearing arms for the republic. Although this ideal has never been embraced in any full-blown form in
the United States, in part because of the brakes to its attainment encoded in the Bill of Rights, enlivened in Tocquevillian associations,
and enshrined in Christian ideals of individuality and sociality, we
have flirted with and even witnessed moments of "armed civic virtue" extolled as an ideal of a community coterminous with a great
nation-state unified and speaking with one voice.

IV
Now join me on the shores of the New Land. The Founders have
done their work. Federalist arguments have won the day though
Anti-Federalist fears simmer just beneath the surface of things. By
the nineteenth century, building on the views of such dissenting Pu ritans as Roger Williams and Anne Hutchinson, the Christian ideal
of the exalted self takes on a solitary profile in the thoughts and
writings of such important celebrants of individual freedom as Thoreau , Emerson, and others. In contrast to the strong Puritan ideal of
a commonwealth, this refurbished American self stands out more
and more in bold relief against a shadowy and less and less distinctive social background. Philip Abbott has elaborated the peculiarly
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American ideal of "perfect freedom ," the freedom of a self apart
from community rather than not-wholly-dominated-and-defined-by
an overarching civic body. Americans began to celebrate, indeed to
privilege personal experience, whether political, social, or sexual, a
celebration that involved a highly evolved, romantic reading of both
the Lockean and Christian traditions. 15
This mirror of freedom is held up beautifully, even chillingly, in
an essay by Elizabeth Cady Stanton called "The Solitude of the
Self." In common with many American thinkers and activists, Stanton embraced a bewildering smorgasbord of different civic and personal philosophies- liberal, republican, utopian, scientific, and
nativist-throughout her long life. As did many Americans of her
epoch, she praised the free market yet longed for a community of
like-minded souls. She is thus both a representative figure and, as
one of the movers and shakers of early feminism and the suffrage
movement, an exceptional one. As a representative, even quintessential American thinker of the time, she did not break new intellectual ground, nor did she articulate a coherent system of thought
that launched new fields of inquiry or altered the way human beings
see their world. (Precious few thinkers do, of course.) She is, however, justifiably regarded as a feminist philosopher whose work embodies an eclectic synthesis and often uncritical embrace of philosophies of individualism and social harmony, laissez-faire, and social
cooperation.
But when she got down to brass tacks philosophically, Stanton
embraced an ideal of almost perfect freedom, framed from the
standpoint of a self she declares sovereign. She locates this ideal,
correctly on my view, in "the great doctrine of Christianity," namely,
"the right of individual conscience and judgement." You will not
find an ideal of the sovereign self in "the Roman idea . . . that the
individual was made for the State. "16 As a vision of the self alone,
hers is a very selective appropriation of "the great doctrine of Christianity." One could, of course, line her up against other Christian
thinkers -particularly those in the social gospel tradition - in order
to chasten her robust, romantic embrace of the soul alone . But that
is beside the point for my purposes. I call upon Stanton as one of the
foremothers of contemporary individualism, particularly in its expressivist variation.
The individual is preeminent, first and foremost, Stanton argues,
deploying the Robinson Crusoe metaphor to characterize women on
their solitary islands. After the sovereign self comes citizenship, then
the generic woman, and last the "incidental relations of life, such as

74

Jean Bethke Elshtat"n

mother, wife, sister, daughter... . "11 But such incidental social relations are not essentially constitutive of self. The self is prior to social
arrangements. She speaks of the self-sovereignty of women and men
and calls human beings solitary voyagers. We come into the world
alone. We go out alone. We "walk alone." We realize "our awful solitude." Life is a "march" and a "battle," and we are all soldiers of the
self who must fight for our own protection. In "the tragedies and triumphs of human experience, each mortal stands alone. " Ideally, she
notes almost offhandedly, this complete individual development is
needed for the "general good." The exalted individual is one who
exults in her own solitude, and Christianity's specifically social and
communal features recede.
Stanton's words conjure up a universe stripped of meaning save
what the individual gives to it and its objects. She aims to disenthrall
the self, to disencumber it in the sure and certain hope that a lofty
and invigorating ideal of freedom will be the end result-and redound to the general good. But this admittedly bracing ideal of the
self is too thin to sustain any notion of a social good, of a civic virtue
we experience "in common together" that we cannot know alone.
Because, in Wolin's words, the political is based on a possibility of
commonality, on "our common capacity to share, to share memories
and a common fate," a recognition of our common being is "the natural foundation of democracy," for "we have an equal claim to participate in the cooperative undertakings on which the common life
depends. " 18 Stanton attempts to construct commonality based upon
a vision of isolated, Robinson Crusoe, sovereign selves. Her social
project falters for this reason. She failed to see the irony embedded
in proclamations of a totally individualistic ontology that would, she
optimistically trusted, usher in unproblematically a politics of the
common good, a politics of civic virtue.

V

When America entered the twentieth century, she was a society
driven by dreams and fears of rapid industrialization and commercial expansion, dreams and fears of empire, dreams and fears of perfect freedom, dreams and fears of community. I will pick up the
story of these tangled threads and themes in the World War I era
when the siren allure of an overarching, collective civic purpose took
a statist turn that seemed a cure for what ailed the Republic, at least
on the view of those who lamented our excessive diversity. Stanton's
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ideal self, together with throngs of diverse immigrants, invited a
centralism response. Nationalizing Progressives, disheartened at the
messy sprawl that was American life, appropriately outraged at the
excesses of corporate capitalism, and desirous of finding some way
to forge a unified national will and civic philosophy, saw the coming
of World War I, championed by President Woodrow Wilson, as a
way to attain at long last a homogeneous, ordered, and rational society. The central organ of Progressive opinion, the New Republic,
had inveighed against "unassimilable communities," a fear
prompted by the enormous surge in immigration during the waning
decades of the nineteenth century and the early decades of the twen tieth.
"To be great," wrote John R. Commons, a Progressive labor economist, " nation . . . must be of one mind. " 19 Walter Lippmann assaulted the "evils of localism" and fretted that American diversity
was too great and had become a block in the way of "order, purpose,
discipline. " 20 Even before Wilson committed American troops to the
European war, Lippmann and other Progressives claimed that war
would be good for the state. Writes one critic of Lippmann and Progressives in general: "His conception of both [reform and civic good]
presupposed a monolithic, static social structure in which a scientific elite directed a docile, relative homogenous public. " 21 A unity
engineered from the top must, argued the nationalizers, triumph
over pluralism, diversity, excessive and necessarily backward localisms.
World War I was to be the great engine of social progress with
conscription an "effective homogenizing agent in what many regarded as a dangerously diverse society. Shared military service, one
advocate colorfully argued, was the only way to 'yank the hyphen'
out of Italian-Americans or Polish-Americans or other such imperfectly assimilated immigrants. "22 President Wilson, who had already
proclaimed that any "man who carries a hyphen about him carries a
dagger that he is ready to plunge into the vitals of this Republic,"
and who championed universal service as a way to mold a new nation, now thundered in words of dangerously unifying excess:
There are citizens of the United States, I blush to admit, born
under other flags but welcomed under our generous naturalization laws to the full freedom and opportunity of America, who
have poured the poison of disloyalty into the very arteries of our
national life . ... Such creatures of passion, disloyalty, and an-
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archy must be crushed out . . . . The hand of our power should
close over them at once. 23
Armed civic virtue had found a home on the shores of the New Land
and this mobilized and manipulated common good proved very
common indeed.
A few brave, dissenting voices held out against the tide of xenophobic unity championed by academics and politicians alike. Most
important among them was Randolph Bourne, who bitterly attacked his old idol and master, John Dewey, for supporting the war
and talking blithely of its "social possibilities." His essay on "The
State" retains its force nearly fifty years after he left it incomplete at
his untimely death during the flu pandemic in the winter of 19181919:
War-or at least modern war waged by a democratic republic
against a powerful enemy-seems to achieve for a nation almost all that the most inflamed political idealist could desire.
Citizens are no longer indifferent to their Government, but
each cell of the body politic is brimming with life and
activity. . . . In a nation at war, every citizen identifies himself
with the whole, and feels immensely strengthened in that identification. 24
Bourne championed the "trans-national" state. He yearned for a
civic unity, a politics of commonalties, that cherished and celebrated the bracing tonic that perspicuous contrasts offer to the forging of individualities and communities. He called for an experimental ideal where each of us is free to explore in a world of others;
where we can act in common together and act singly. Such an ideal
is necessarily hostile to any overly robust proclamation of civic virtue
that demands a single, overarching collective unity to attain or to
sustain its purposes.

VI
If one cherishes and champions individuality-the exalted individual- and community, diversity and unity, what resources are
available in our contemporary civic repertoire that push in this complex direction? We-we late-modern or postmodern citizens of the
United States-are no longer naive. We have witnessed and are wit-
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nessing the corrosive effects of acquisitive individualism as well as
those of the hypernationalistic, collective fevers which have occasionally run rampant in our history. With Bourne's saving and healing irony ready to hand, I will conclude this essay with intimations
of a chastened version of civic virtue, one that embraces civility as a
feature of that virtue yet also endorses, quite heartily, a fractious,
even rumbustious politics.
I will draw from two perhaps unlikely sources-Catholic social
thought and the theorizing of civil society that has emerged in a rapidly and hearteningly transforming Central Eastern Europe. This
move seems to me politically and discursively justified because we
are all citizens of the Occident, shaped by Catholicism, the Enlightenment, and the Reformation. One emergent feature of our current
pluralism is the growth in numbers and public visibility of Catholics
in a culture still riddled with anti-Catholic prejudice. Patterns of recent immigration are adding more Catholic citizens to our numbers.
It behooves us to pay attention. We are dominantly a Protestant and
not a Catholic nation. But mainline Protestantism, in recent decades, has so thoroughly embraced the expressivist-individualist pole
of modernism that its spokesmen and spokeswomen find it increasingly difficult to address questions of community. Once again, what
is at stake is not jettisoning a tradition-robust Protestant individualism - in favor of some other; rather, I have in mind to chasten the project of the untrammeled self with alternative readings of
Christianity and civil society as traditions of discourse.
If one turns to recent Catholic social thought one finds, first, adamant criticism of "superdevelopment, which consists in an excessive
amount of every kind of material good for the benefit of certain social groups." Superdevelopment "makes people slaves of 'possession'
and of immediate gratification, with no other horizon than the multiplication of continual replacement of the things already owned
with others still better. This is the so-called civilization of 'consumption' or 'consumerism,' which involves so much 'throwing away' and
'waste.' "25
The "sad effects of this blind submission to pure consumerism, "
argues Pope John Paul II, is a combination of materialism and a relentless dissatisfaction as "the more one possesses the more one
wants." Aspirations that cut deeper, that speak to human dignity
within a world of others, are stifled. John Paul's name for this alternative aspiration is "solidarity," not "a feeling of vague compassion
or shallow distress at the misfortunes of so many people" but instead
a determination to "commit oneself to the common good; that is to
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say, to the good of all and of each individual because we are really
responsible for all." Through solidarity we see "the 'other' . . . not
just as some kind of instrument . . . but as our 'neighbor,' a
'helper, ' 26 to be made a sharer on a par with ourselves in the banquet
of life to which we are all equally invited by God. " 21 The structures
that make possible this ideal of solidarity are the many associations
of civil society "below" the level of the state.
To the extent that John Paul's words strike us as forbiddingly utopian or hopelessly naive, to that extent we have lost' civil society. Or
so, at least, Alan Wolfe concludes in his important book, Whose
Keeper.'I Socz'al Science and Moral Obligatz"on. Wolfe updates Tocqueville, apprising us of how far we have come, or how rapidly we
have traveled, down a road to more and more individualism requiring more and more centralization of political and economic power.
For all our success in modern societies, especially in the United
States, there is a sense, desperate in some cases, that all is not well,
that something has gone terribly awry. We citizens of liberal democratic societies understand and cherish our freedom, but we are
"confused when it comes to recognizing the social obligations that
make ... freedom possible in the first place. "28 This confusion permeates all levels, from the marketplace, to the home, to the academy.
The political fallout of our current moral crisis is reflected in the
irony of a morally exhausted left embracing rather than challenging
the logic of the market by endorsing the relentless translation of
wants into rights. Although the left continues to argue for taming
the market in a strictly economic sense, it follows the market model
where social relations are concerned, seeing in any restriction of individual "freedom" to live any sort of lifestyle an unacceptable diminution of choice. On the other hand, many conservatives love the
untrammeled (or the less trammeled the better) operations of the
market in economic life but call for a restoration of traditional morality, including strict sexual scripts for men and women, in social
life. Both rely either on the market or the state "to organize their
codes of moral obligation" when what they really need is "civil
society-families, communities, friendship networks, solidaristic
workplace ties, voluntarism, spontaneous groups and movementsnot to reject, but to complete the project of modernity. " 29
Wolfe reminds us that early theoreticians of liberal civil society
were concerned to limit the sphere of capitalist economics by either
assuming or reiterating a very different logic, the moral ties that
bind in the realms of family, religion, voluntary association, com-
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munity. The market model, Adam Smith insisted, should not be extended as a metaphor for a process of all-encompassing exchange.
Were we to organize "all our social relations by the same logic we use
in seeking a good bargain'~ and this is the direction we are pushed
by the individualist project-we could not "even have friends, for everyone else interferes with our ability to calculate conditions that
will maximize self-interest. "50
Nor is the welfare state as we know it a solution to the problems
thrown up by the operations of the market. The welfare state
emerged from a set of ethical concerns and passions which ushered
in the conviction that the state was the "only agent capable of serving as a surrogate for the moral ties of civil society" as these began to
succumb to market pressure. But over forty years of evidence is in,
and it is clear that welfare statism as a totalizing logic erodes "the
very social ties that make government possible in the first place."
Government can strengthen moral obligations but cannot substitute
for them. As our sense of particular, morally grounded responsibilities to an intergenerational web falters and the state moves in to
treat the dislocations, it may temporarily "solve" delimited problems
broadly defined; but these solutions, over time, may serve to further
thin out the skein of obligation.
Just as Tocqueville did in the nineteenth century, Wolfe today appreciates that a social crisis is also an ethical crisis. Although he
presents no menu of policy options, he calls for a "third perspective
on moral agency different from those of the market and the state,"
one that "allows us to view moral obligation as a socially constructed
practice negotiated between learning agents capable of growth on
the one hand and change on the other. "31 This formulation is similar
to one offered by David Hollenbach, S.J., when he endorses a
"pluralist-analogical understanding of the common good and human rights. " Hollenbach, with Wolfe, recognizes that social and institutional change is not only inevitable but needed "if all persons
are to become active participants in the common good, politically,
economically and culturally. "32
At this point, Catholic social thought , here represented by Hollenbach, makes contact with American experiences and theories of
community, association, local autonomy. Latter-day Tocquevillians
and Catholic social thinkers share a hope-the hope that the social
practices in which individuals engage in their everyday lives in modern American democracy are richer and reflect greater sociality
than atomistic visions of the acquisitive, unencumbered self allow.
Perhaps, they muse, most of us most of the time do not govern our
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lives by principles of exchange, despite the totalizing logic of
rational-choice contractarians and hard-core individualists. The
call is not for some utopian vision of participatory democracy but
for a more effective, more authentic form of representative democracy embodied in genuinely viable, overlapping social institutions.
Framed by this horizon, the notion of rights central to the American tradition becomes the counterpart of responsibilities. Rights are
not "spoken of primarily as individual claims. . . . Rights exist
within and are relative to a historical and social context and are in telligible only in terms of the obligations of individuals to other persons. "55 This understanding of persons steers clear of the strong antinomies of individualism versus collectivism. Catholic social thought
begins from a fundamentally different ontology from that assumed
and required by individualism, on the one hand, and statism, on the
other-assumptions that provide for zndividualz"ty and rights as the
goods of persons in community, together with the claims of social
obligation. This version of individuality makes possible human
unity as a cherished achievement and acts as a brake against coerced
uniformity.
Or take these words from the U . S. Bishops' Pastoral Letter on the
economy: "The dignity of the human person, realized in community
with others, is the criterion against which all aspects of economic life
must be measured." All economic decisions must be judged "in light
of what they do for the poor, what they do to the poor and what they
enable the poor to do for themselves. "54 The Bishops draw upon the
principle of subsidiarity, central to Catholic social teaching, when
they speak of the "need for vital contributions from different human
associations," considering it a disturbance of the "right order" of
things to assign to a greater and higher association what a "lesser"
association might do. In this way, institutional pluralism is guaranteed and "space for freedom , initiative and creativity on the part of
many social agents" is made possible. 35 Hollenbach calls this
"justice-as-participation, " noting that the Bishops' contribution to
the current, deadlocked "liberal/ communitarian debate" lies in the
way justice is conceptualized "in terms of this link between personhood and the basic prerequisites of social participation. "56
Summing up subsidiarity, Joseph A. Komonchak lists nine basic
elements: (1) The priority of the person as origin and purpose of society; (2) The essential sociality of the human person, whose selfrealization is through social relations - the principle of solidarity;
(3) Social relationships and communities exist to provide help to individuals, and this "subsidiary" function of society does not supplant
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self-responsibility, but augments it; (4) "Higher" communities exist
to perform the same subsidiary roles toward "lower" communities;
(5) Communities must enable and encourage individuals to exercise
their self-responsibility, and larger communities must do the same
for smaller ones; (6) Subsidiarity serves as a principle to regulate interrelations between individuals and communities, and between
smaller and larger communities; and (9) Subsidiarity is a universal
principle, grounded in a particular ontology of the person. 37 Subsidiarity thus favors Tocqueville's associative version of democracy at its
best and works to exclude unnecessary centralization. Subsidiarity is
a theory of and for civil society that refuses stark alternatives between individualism and collectivism.
Ironically, or perhaps not so ironically, the richest theorizing of
democratic civil society in the past decade or so has come from citizens of countries who were subjected for forty years or more to authoritarian, even totalitarian statist regimes. They pose positive alternatives to statism and individualism by urging that the
associations of civil society be recognized as "subjects" in their own
right. They want a genuinely pluralist law to recognize and sustain
this associative principle as a way to overcome excessive privatization
and excessive state control, as a way to achieve a diverse yet solidaristic democratic society.
Consider Solidarity theorist and activist Adam Michnik's characterization of democracy. In an interview, he insists that democracy
entails a vision of tolerance, an understanding of the importance of cultural traditions, and the realization that cherished
human values can conflict with each other. . . . The essence of
democracy as I understand it is freedom - the freedom which
belongs to citizens endowed with a conscience. So understood,
freedom implies pluralism, which is essential because conflict is
a constant factor within a democratic social order.
Michnik insists that the genuine democrat always struggles with and
against his or her own tradition, eschewing thereby the hopelessly
heroic and individualist notion of going it alone. Michnik here positions himself against our contemporary American tendency to see
any defense of tradition as necessarily "conservative"; indeed, he
criticizes our entire banalized and hopelessly rigid distinction between right and left. He proclaims: "A world devoid of tradition
would be nonsensical and anarchic. The human world should be
constructed from a permanent conflict between conservatism and
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contestation; if either is absent from a society, pluralism is destroyed. "38
One final, vital voice, that of Vaclav Havel's. For years an oftimprisoned champion of civic freedom and human rights, as well as
Czechoslovakia's premier playwright, Havel is now, amazingly, the
president of the Czech republic. In an essay on "Politics and Conscience," he writes:
We must trust the voice of our conscience more than that of all
abstract speculations and not invent other responsibilities than
the one to which the voice calls us. We must not be ashamed
that we are capable of love, friendship, solidarity, sympathy
and tolerance, but just the opposite: we must see these fundamental dimensions of our humanity free from their "private"
exile and accept them as the only genuine starting point of
meaningful human community.
He adds:
I favor "anti-political politics," that is, politics not as the technology of power and manipulation, of cybernetic rule over humans or as the art of the useful, but politics as one of the ways
of seeking and achieving meaningful lives, of protecting them
and serving them. I favor politics as practical morality, as service to the truth , as essentially human and humanly measured
care for our fellow humans. It is, I presume, an approach
which, in this world, is extremely impractical and difficult to
apply in daily life. Still, I know no better alternative. 39
Nor, in truth , do I.
At the conclusion of Public Man, Private Woman , I articulated a
vision of an "ethical polity." I was not thinking specifically of diversity and unity, individuality and solidarity as I wrote, but that seems
to have been what I was all along aiming for:
Rather than an ideal of citizenship and civic virtue that fea tures a citizenry grimly going about their collective duty, or an
elite band of citizens in their public space cut off from a world
that includes most of us, within the ethical polity the active citizen would be one who had affirmed as part of what it meant to
be human a devotion to public, moral responsibilities and ends.
For the body is one but has many members.
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5
HOW TO MAKE A REPUBLIC WORK:
THE ORIGINALITY OF THE
COMMERCIAL REPUBLICANS
MICHAEL NOVAK

Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country to one united
people - a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same Ian guage, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs, and who, by their joint
counsels, arms, and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a long and
bloody war, have nobly established their general liberty and independence.
-John Jay, Federalist 2

Just over a hundred years ago, my family began the long voyage to
the United States from the villages of Dubrava and Brutovce, high in
the Tatra Mountains of Central Europe, near the birthplace of the
written Slavic languages-and near the burial place of Attila the
Hun. I have often had reason to breathe a quiet prayer of thanksgiving that they settled here rather than in the many other places to
which Slovaks then emigrated. I am especially grateful that they settled in an Anglo-Saxon place, nourished in the traditions and habits
of English common law and custom_ Although I am a Roman Catholic, I am happy that they settled in a predominantly Protestant
land, where religious life is deeply respected and religious liberty is a
I would like to thank the following researchers for their assistance, especially with
the notes: Scott Walter (I 987), David Foster (1989), and Kevin O'Halloran (1990).
I also owe many challenges to my thinking about the Framers to two colleagues at
the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), in particular, Robert Goldwin, head of
an acclaimed series of studies on the Constitution, and Walter Berns, author of
Taking the Constitution Seriously; and also to a former colleague at AEI, William
A. Schambra. It should be noted that I do not write as a historian or political scientist but as a theologian concerned to understand the uniqueness (in Christian
history) of the American experiment.
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central impulse. I especially cherish the tradition of the "commercial republicans," a school of thought not solely but very largely
Anglo-Saxon in its focus (even in Montesquieu). It is this tradition
that I mean to highlight in our inquiry into diversity.
My aim is to stress the originality of the Founders, an originality
of which they were poignantly conscious. This consisted chiefly in
finding a practical solution to two key problems on which republican experiments had heretofore foundered: how to prevent the tyranny of a majority and how to defeat envy and divisiveness. Duly
stressing both their originality and their practical wisdom, I want to
highlight the plain, humble solution they offered, so often despised
by those of aristocratic or moralistic bearing: that is, the lowly solution of encouraging commerce, industry, and invention. They did
this to promote the energetic engagement of "the middling classes"
in those prosaic tasks of economic growth that classical authors had
looked down upon. In my youth, I did not appreciate the commercial, economic side of this brilliant solution; my teachers suggested
that I should despise it. As so often happens in life, we look long and
fruitlessly among faraway, high and mighty things, only to overlook
the humble places where the secrets lie near at hand. What I like
most about the commercial republicans is their willingness to take
the lowly path, where the solution they were seeking had for centuries lain humbly buried.

ORIGINALITY AND PRACTICAL WISDOM
To build human life around practical wisdom is a distinctively Jewish and Christian impulse, a central thrust in what we mean by "the
West." The God of Judaism and Christianity offers us in the Scripture the Names He most prefers: "I am Who am," Creator of all
things, Truth, Light, Law. Not by accident does our Statue of Liberty bear in one upraised arm a light and, in the other, a book. Not
by accident did Abraham Lincoln wholeheartedly support the Morrill Act, whose effect in 1862 was to base the development of the
West upon the land-grant colleges and therefore upon practical, inventive intelligence, as the Homestead Act had based it upon the
principle of free labor, which Lincoln judged to be prior to, and the
superior of, capital. 1 The Framers of our Constitution knew-as
Lincoln knew -that the cause of the wealth of nations is wit, discovery, invention, caput (L., the head). The defining element that distinguishes a capitalist from a traditional or mercantilist economy is
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neither private property nor markets nor profit (all of which are as
traditional as biblical Jerusalem) but invention and discovery, as in
the invention of Adam Smith's pin factory.
Jews and Christians are taught, in a way that Buddhists, Hindus,
Animists, and others have not been taught, that it is our vocation
not merely to reflect the world, to contemplate it, or to be reconciled
with it (although all those things are both beautiful and necessary),
but to change it: to probe it, to analyze it, to seek out its secrets, to
reconstruct it, to complete it. Having been made in the image of the
Creator, Jews and Christians believe, it is the vocation of humans to
create. They are to build up and to prepare "the Kingdom of God."
From this impulse toward inquiry came the great monasteries of the
fourth century, the universities of the eleventh century, and even tu ally the great tide of invention and "progress" that so distinguishes
the West.
Judaism and Christianity understand human nature as liberty
and thus propel history with a cultural dynamism of which we are
the heirs, and they root liberty in the pursuit of truth. Western universities and institutions of research have thus become history's cutting edge. In the U.S. , in addition, an impulse toward diversity uncoils from our constitutional structure, which limits the state and
empowers alternative centers of action. This twin impulse toward inquiry and diversity helps to explain why in the state of Ohio by the
year 1872 there were already more colleges and universities than in
all of France and Great Britain and how most of these came to be
founded, not by the state, but by free associations of individuals, often Methodist, or Lutheran, or Catholic, or Episcopal, or Baptist,
and so forth.
Three convictions, ancient in root but modern in their American
form, lie behind this distinctive cultural dynamism: first, that human beings are made in the image of the Creator and fulfill their
vocation by creating; second, that the cause of the wealth of nations
is practical, inventive intellect, fashioned also in the image of God;
third , that the free exercise of intellect and creativity requires
institutions-an ordo , a system-worthy of the dignity with which
human beings have been endowed by their Creator. (In the classical
tradition, intellect has two sets of habits, theoretical and practical.
Americans have clearly preferred the latter; but each feeds the
other, and it would be wrong to think of Americans as merely practical). As Lord Acton describes it, "The History of Liberty" required
centuries of reflection among Jews and Christians upon the identity
that God had given them , before they could fashion institutions
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worthy of that endowment. Trial and error were required, experiments, partial steps, advances, and declines. And among the halfdozen greatest landmarks in that history was the Constitution of the
United States. 2
Lord Acton counted himself a follower of the "Whig tradition"
and attributed to St. Thomas Aquinas "the earliest exposition of the
Whig theory of revolution." Acton cites a passage written five centuries before the U.S. Declaration of Independence (about the same
time that Simon de Montfort was summoning the English House of
Commons) and suggests that it is from Thomas Aquinas, whose direct echo reverberates through the American Declaration:
A king who is unfaithful to his duty forfeits his claim to obedience. It is not rebellion to depose him, for he is himself a rebel
whom the nation has a right to put down. But it is better to
abridge his power, that he may be unable to abuse it. For this
purpose, the whole nation ought to have a share in governing itself; the constitution ought to combine a limited and elective
monarchy, with an aristocracy of merit, and such an admixture
of democracy as shall admit all classes to office, by popular
election. No government has a right to levy taxes beyond the
limit determined by the people. All political authority is derived from popular suffrage, and all laws must be made by the
people or their representatives. There is no security for us as
long as we depend on the will of another man. 3
By 1776, "truths" more fully developed from such roots had come to
seem to the American Founders as "self-evident" and a common heritage. In his splendid book on the U.S. Constitution, Walter Berns
cites a claim of Thomas Jefferson that in America all Whigs
"thought alike. "4 This claim suggests the essential cultural and philosophical unity of the Framers and the people whose consent they
sought. Reference to the Whig frame of mind further suggests a respect for experience, for singulars, for contingents, for individuals,
for habits, for traditions, for particularities-so to say, an Aristotelian rather than a Platonic approach to politics.
Although the Framers worked within a relatively homogeneous
culture, the words they wrote down and the principles they enunciated embodied so much practical wisdom, distilled from experience,
that in 200 years they have hardly had to be altered. To the contrary,
one might argue that it has taken 200 years ( and the process is not
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yet, is never, complete) for the habits and institutions of the nation
slowly to live up to the full meaning of those original words.5
To repeat myself, I am eternally grateful that the U.S. Constitution was not framed in accord with the theories, habits, and traditions available in 1776 within Slavic cultures or Hispanic cultures, or
African cultures, or Japanese, or French, or German, or any other
cultures. When the Framers announced a novus ordo seclorum - an
enormous claim, that: "the new order of the ages''.._they were expressing their awareness of their own originality. There was no
model they could follow. They were inventing a republic unlike any
other, sui generis. 6 They were well-traveled men, among them some
who had ransacked the libraries of Paris and London searching out
precedents. Yet nowhere in the world of their acquaintance had they
encountered any system like the one they chose to constitute. Forthrightly, they called theirs "new." A new world. A new ordo. A new
republic. Even, a new Israel.
The Framers had, to be sure, learned much from Britain, whence
they imbibed a sense of the common law, a tradition of individual
liberty, an internalized sense both of common obligations and of
personal individuality. But the Framers also knew themselves to be
breaking away from the British model. And British writers knew it,
too: not only Lord Acton a century later but also such writers as
Adam Smith and Richard Cobden, who urged their countrymen to
emulate the new experiments of the Americans, particularly in economics. 7
What we are missing today, two hundred years after the Constitu tional Convention, six score and two years after the death of Lincoln, is a sharp understanding of the originality of this American experiment. The Framers took it to be an experiment in accord with
"the new science of politics. "8 Where in the university today, apart
from a few specialists, would one find an understanding of that "new
science of politics"? Where is the originality of these United States
studied and emphasized? The Framers intended these principles to
be universal. They thought themselves to be describing the "system
of natural liberty," not solely the system of American liberty. They
thought they were proceeding on behalf of all humankind. So also
Lord Acton saw them. But do we so see them? Unless I am mistaken,
the general intellectual mood is to derogate from the importance to
other nations of this originality, even in some quarters to despise it
and in others to ignore it.
Despite the wisdom that others see in our institutions, we ourselves
have not been a philosophical people. I doubt if many Americans
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could write down an exact account of what the American experiment is. We live in considerable intellectual darkness about our
Constitution's own first principles. The Chinese youngsters who carried a model of the Statue of Liberty in Shanghai in June, 1989,
however, and the Eastern Europeans who in throwing out commu nism in the fall of 1989 so often cited American ideals do not ignore
American originality. On the contrary, they hold it up as their
model. The great French Catholic philosopher Jacques Maritain,
one of the architects of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
of the United Nations, wrote of us: "You are advancing in the night,
bearing torches toward which mankind would be glad to tum; but
you leave them enveloped in the fog of a merely experiential approach and mere practical conceptualization, with no universal
ideas to communicate. For lack of an adequate ideology, your lights
cannot be seen. "9 Foreigners who would discover our secrets in their
practical detail, American students who hunger to know their own
national identity, and citizens in need of a standard by which to
judge their progress have been left by and large without intellectual
guides. In the academy more is known of Marx and socialism than
of the distinctive principles of the American science of politics.
The blue-grey planet on which we live contains today 165 nations
or so, 165 "orders" or "systems." Among these, indeed, there is
diversity-but not in infinite range. And our uniqueness, too, is part
of that diversity. It would be amiss to hunger after diversity abroad
while neglecting the ways in which our own experiment is different
from every other. Naturally, we should learn all we can about the
others, be open to them, and raise questions endlessly. But to neglect
our own distinctiveness would be to fail in what we alone can do: articulate before the world who and what we are.

HOW TO AVOID ENVY:
THE AMERICAN SOLUTION
The American Framers were convinced of their originality and knew
that they were undertaking a new experiment on behalf of all hu mankind. Moreover, they were painfully aware that the Constitutional Convention labored-from May until September 1787under the watchful eye of Providence (imaged on the Great Seal of
the United States) , to Whom it bore weighty obligations on behalf of
humankind. At a critical impasse, in fact, Benjamin Franklin urged
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them (a more than Deist act) to pray for the intervention of Providence. 10
The problem the Framers faced may be stated succinctly. Although all Americans believed in republican principles, republican
experiments of the past had ended in bitter division, dissension, and
self-destruction. The very idea of republican government had fallen
into disrepute. According to the old science of politics, to succeed,
republics had to be small, based upon friendship and upon respect
for one another's virtue. Yet republican experiments had always
failed, often speedily. Through careful reflection on past experience, the Framers diagnosed two main historical dangers to republics: from below, dissension arising out of envy and, from above, tyranny growing out of a dominant majority. They also believed that
through a "new science of politics" they had discovered a practical
solution to these problems, a solution the ancients and the medievals
had had no way of knowing.
The first great problem was the problem of envy. To see how Madison solved this requires a larger discussion of the discovery of economics. The old science of politics had known little or nothing of
economics. Lacking even the concept of "political economy," it had
not grasped "the causes of the wealth of nations" and had rarely
stooped to praise the humble utilitarian virtues of a republic built
on commerce. Conceived in an aristocratic and (as it thought) no bler age, the old science of politics dismissed the moral ideal of commerce (if it thought of it at all) as an oxymoron. In the aristocracies
of the past, the poverty and subservience of the many were taken for
granted. No one took the poverty of the great majority to be a scandal, for no one knew a single case in which vast numbers of the poor
had systematically risen out of poverty. Not until the late 1700s did
the unprecedented success of the North American "colonies" provide such a case. The astounding evidence of this success, as Hannah Arendt notes, 11 awakened Europeans at last to the so-called "social problem" of the nineteenth century. If the American poor could
in such large numbers rise from poverty, how could Europe justify
the condition of its own miserables?
In the eighteenth century, European aristocrats had looked down
upon the poor. They looked down , as well, upon persons of commerce, trade, and industry. They spoke a great deal about beauty,
high manners, the love of things for their own sakes, and about virtue both personal and civic. Aristocrats prided themselves on the
splendor of the circumstances of their daily living (their homes,
their entertainments) and on heroic deeds of public service in peace
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and war. As Adam Smith pointed out, wealth in the early modern
period typically lay in the inheritance of lands. 12 Roads and markets
for the produce of these lands being few, the landed aristocracy had
many incentives to consume their goods locally and so drew to themselves many retainers and maintained private armies. In such arrangements lay the cause of many quarrels, conflicts, and wars.
By the time of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and the
writing of The Federalist, however, original thinkers in France
(Montesquieu) and Scotland (David Hume, Adam Ferguson, Adam
Smith) had proposed a new social basis for a free society. Instead of
relying upon the elevated sentiments of the nobility, they preferred
the plain speech of the marketplace. Instead of relying upon a
landed aristocracy, they thought the most solid foundation of a free
society to be "the middling classes," that is, the many (of lowly birth)
engaged in industry, trade, and commerce. While praising some aspects of the classic aristocratic virtues, they called attention also to
their social costs, even absurdities. Instead of disdaining the merely
useful activities of daily life, they celebrated those humdrum activities that actually improved the circumstances of ordinary people.
Instead of rejecting commercial activities, they thought commerce
indispensable to making free republics work-in the virtues it encouraged, in the opportunities it opened for the poor, and in the
economic growth it spurred . Those who shaped this new and original school of thought came to be known, therefore as the "commercial republicans."
I have read no better account of the long, intellectual battle the
commercial republicans fought than Ralph Lerner's chapter "Commerce and Character" in his collection The Thinkz'ng Revolutionary. And no writer better and more fully grasped what they accomplished, through their victory, than Alexis de Tocqueville in
Democracy in America. This "band of brethren" included advocates
as diverse as Montesquieu and John Adams, Adam Smith and Benjamin Franklin, David Hume and Benjamin Rush, who "were
united at least in this: They saw in commercial republicanism a
more sensible and realizable alternative to earlier notions of civic
virtue and a more just alternative to the theological-political regime
that had so long ruled Europe and its colonial pedphery. " 13 What
did the commercial republicans oppose? Three things, chiefly: "visions of perfection beyond the reach of all or most; disdain for the
common, useful, and mundane; judgments founded more on an individual's inherited status than on acts and demonstrated qualities. "14 In place of these, the commercial republicans promoted a
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twofold ideal: liberation from the inherited social order and liberation from old modes of ethical thinking. They dared to imagine "a
new ordering of political, economic, and social life. " 15
A great part of the originality of the commercial republicans lay
in their discovery of the principles of economics. By 1776 they had
discovered, as Adam Smith put it in his title, the Nature and Causes
of the Wealth of Natz'ons. Henceforward, classic treatises "on politics" would have to be modified by the addition of the new term,
"political economy." Not by accident, many of Adam Smith's most
penetrating empirical observations about what works for human
prosperity and liberty- examples that he commended to Scotland
and England for emulation -derived from experiments he had observed overseas in the North American "colonies." As if in reciproca tion, the American Founders discovered in Adam Smith ( and in his
predecessors, especially Hume and Montesquieu) decisive encouragement. If they were, as Madison put it in Federalist 10, to rescue
the republican idea "from the opprobrium under which it has so
long laboured," they would have to make it work. Above all, they
would have to keep it from that early dissolution into "faction and
insurrection" into which all prior republics had so soon fallen. Here
is where the new sophistication in economics was just what they
needed.
So seriously did the authors of The Federalz'st take the threat from
"faction and insurrection" that they devoted to it two whole numbers, 9 and 10. And they addressed the next two numbers, 11 and
12, to basic prerequisites of commerce. In the spirit in which Garry
Wills writes in Explaz'nz'ng A merz'ca of "The Hamiltonian Madison"
and "The Madisonian Hamilton," all four numbers should be read
together. Especially noteworthy in Number 12 , to begin with, is
Hamilton's praise of "the middling classes," whom Hume had already discerned as the best security of the free society: "The assiduous merchant, the laborious husbandman, the active mechanic, and
the industrious manufacturer." This line marks a change of moral
tone from the preference of the classical tradition for gentlemen and
cavaliers. The whole of Hamilton's paragraph, in fact, celebrates
this revolution in moral evaluation from aristocratic (agrarian) to
commercial ideals:
The prosperity of commerce is now perceived and acknowledged by all enlightened statesmen to be the most useful as well
as the most productive source of national wealth, and has accordingly become a primary object of their political cares. By
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multiplying the means of gratification, by promoting the introduction and circulation of the precious metals, those darling
objects of human avarice and enterprise, it serves to vivify and
invigorate all the channels of industry and to make them flow
with greater activity and copiousness. The assiduous merchant,
the laborious husbandman, the active mechanic, and the industrious manufacturer- all orders of men look forward with
eager expectation and growing alacrity to this pleasing reward
of their toils. The often-agitated question between agriculture
and commerce has from indubitable experience received a decision. 16
Albert 0. Hirschman has written brilliantly about this transformation in ideas, under the rubric of "The Arguments for Capitalism
Before its Triumph. " 17 This transformation displaced the classic focus of politics, shifting it away from power and toward wealth. Regarding wealth, it showed that its classic source lay in plunder and
promoted instead invention and industry. Regarding morals, it
shifted from the classic, aristocratic view that the seeking of wealth
is "the root of all evil" to the new commercial republican view that
the moral pretensions of the aristocracy result in fact in the misery of
the poor. Compared to the seeking of power, glory, and honor by the
traditional aristocratic and warrior class, as Samuel Johnson put it,
"a man is seldom so innocently engaged, as in the getting of money."
To discourse further upon this pivotal argument of modern history would take us too far afield here. Suffice it to say that the authors of the Constitution and The Federalist came down decisively
on the side of the commercial republic: so decisively, that the paragraph from Hamilton quoted above, stressing the importance of
prosperity to the success of liberty, concludes as follows : "It is astonishing that so simple a truth should ever have had an adversary; and
it is one, among a multitude of proofs, how apt a spirit of illinformed jealousy, or of too great abstraction and [aristocratic] refinement, is to lead men astray from the plainest truths of reason."
Hamilton, it is true, did not accept whole the theory of Montesquieu that a world of commercial republics would introduce final
peaceableness into history; he disputes this point at some length in
Federalist 6 and 7. Others of the commercial republicans also recognized that their new order would not come without costs. (Tocqueville was to count up these costs some forty years after the successful
ratification of the Constitution). Still, no less than Tocqueville, they
judged that the new American order would blaze a trail for all hu -
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mankind. It would hitch the fate of the republican ideal to
commerce-of democracy, as we say today, to capitalism. Not that
the two cannot appear separately, the one without the other, as in
history they sometimes briefly have, but rather that active commercial habits and the resulting economic growth are a necessary (but
not sufficient) condition for the successful working of a republic.
The Framers, of course, spoke of "acquiring" and "improving" property rather than, in the modem sense, of "economic growth." But
there can be no doubt about their industriousness, their sense of
great achievements waiting to be accomplished, and bustling,
chance-taking energy. Of all this, Tocqueville gives admiring testimony.
For his part, Madison saw quite vividly in Federalist 10 that envy
between social classes-between creditors and debtors, rich and
poor - had helped destroy all earlier republics. Among social evils,
envy is more destructive than hatred-more subtle, more easily rationalized, more easily disguised, and more corrosive. Envy destroys
the instinct for the common good, setting part against part. How,
then, to defeat envy? Only when every single part of the population
has a well-grounded hope that each person or family can "improve
its condition" does each focus its attention upon comparing its
present lot with its future expectations. Otherwise, the normal tendency of humankind is to compare one's own present lot with the lot
of others and to stand eager to pounce upon inequalities. For a
stable republic, it is crucial that citizens compare their lot today
with where, by hard work, effort, and luck, they expect to be tomorrow. This comparison of self with self across time offers a sense of
self-mastery and achievement. It generates high morale. It evokes
love for the Republic that makes it possible. The comparison of one's
own lot with the lot of others, by contrast, breeds envy and generates
what Madison called the "improper or wicked project" of equality. 18
The chief cause of faction, Madison wrote, lies "in different degrees of acquiring property." The secondary cause lies in liberty.
Nonetheless, to seek liberty is to have to cope with both property and
faction. We will treat of property first and then of faction.
By property, Madison did not mean merely material things. On
the contrary, he held that property "embraces everything to which a
man may attach a value and have a right." This includes his life,
faculties, and liberties, not only his material possessions. "As a man
is said to have a right to his property, he may equally be said to have
a property in his rights. "19 It would be a very grave intellectual error,
then, to make the concept of property, so crucial to the history of
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liberty, merely materialistic in its scope, merely acquisitive in its modality, or merely a form of "possessive individualism." On the contrary, without the properties of life, liberty, and moral purpose, an
individual would be stripped of all dignity whatever. And even in economic terms, the primary and most fecund form of wealth is intellectual property-ideas, inventions, new organizing conceptsrather than brute material things.
For the commercial republicans, a regime of private property is
preeminently a social achievement. It is a basic social prerequisite
for the exercise of human liberty. It is a crucial instrument of social
justice (as the tradition of Catholic social thought has long recognized). A regime of private property gives ordinary citizens frequent
and tangible reminders of the limits of state power. 20 In addition, it
gives them the spiritual and material means of exercising their natural liberty in the physical public world, lest it remain entirely an "inner" freedom unable to be expressed in action. Third, a regime of
private property, well protected over generations, gives industrious
individuals many motives to labor intensively not solely for themselves but for future generations. By contrast, wherever private
property is insecure, motives for personal industriousness are much
diminished, prosperity declines, and envy more frequently rears its
contorted face. The curtailment of private property is thus a grave
depressant on economic prosperity and a source of much social conflict.
In brief, the solution of the commercial republicans to the perennial social destructiveness of envy was to promote economic vitality
through commerce - and especially through an understanding of
"improving" property that went far beyond the mere possession of
material things. They thought of property as a dynamic principle,
especially in the form of intellectual property and in the form of inalienable rights.

HOW TO AVOID FACTION AND
INSURRECTION
In writing of the danger that faction and insurrection pose to the
new republic, Madison is well prepared to propose a new vision of
the public good. He takes care to describe the specific complaint
which he is answering: "Complaints are everywhere heard from our
most considerate and virtuous citizens . . . that the public good is
disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are
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too often decided ... by the superior force of an interested and
overbearing majority." 21 Two crucial points appear in this passage.
First, Madison must find a way to achieve the public good. Second,
he cannot locate the public good merely in the will of a majority,
since the charge is that majorities ("interested" and "overbearing")
already do prevail. These two points seem incompatible. If a majority cannot define the public good, who can?
Using materials he has learned from the commercial republicans,
Madison advances an ingenious and novel solution ( on which he
later came to rest his hope of lasting fame). Factions cannot be elim inated. Neither can interests. The solution, then, is to control the effects of both.
Madison discerns two devices for doing this. First, rejecting the
principle of the small republic ("small is safer"), he argued that the
key to republican success lay in "the enlargement of the orbit'~ that
is, in a larger rather than a smaller size, in order to protect diversity.
Classical philosophers had held that democracy is workable only in a
small city (so that the voice of orators can be heard by all). Madison
notes, by contrast, that small groups are easiest to stampede. Rhode
Island or South Carolina or any other individual state may be easily
tyrannized by its dominant interested majority. But the Union, reducing all these seeming local whales to smaller fish by its own much
larger orbit , will be far safer against any local majority. The Union's
diversity of climate, geography, and economic circumstance protects
it from domination either by "a landed interest, a manufacturing
interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest," or by any "lesser
interests."
By their very nature, commercial activities characteristically set
interest against interest. Thus, the multiplication of commercial enterprises generates many rival factions. This great variety of factions
and special interests works to secure the rights of minorities from the
threat of dominant majorities. To this end, the promotion of rapid
economic, commercial, and manufacturing growth is necessary for
the preservation of republican principles. (To supply a recent example: The relative agrarian homogeneity of the South until after
World War II inhibited the protection of the legal rights of Negroes.) Contrary to classical teaching, republican government is
safer in a larger territory than in a smaller. Thus, the thirteen states
united would form a republic safer than any one state alone.
The larger size of the American orbit, Madison first argued,
would create room for many diverse interests, associations, and
sects, preventing any one such from becoming a tyrannical majority
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that would trample on the rights of others. Not the small republic,
but the large, would make for a "more perfect" union, since the
larger orbit would make fundamental rights more secure. In the
name of "the new science of politics," therefore, Madison argued for
union rather than division, in order to increase the orbit. But his
aim in doing so was to substitute diversity for homogeneity. In this
respect, the national motto, e pluribus unum, has a particular and
original force, almost the reverse of the one we usually think of, viz. ,
that the many should flow into one. To the contrary, because of the
Union there is diversity; without it, local tyrannies would be unchecked, as without the North southern slavery would have endured
for decades longer.
Madison's second device for securing the public good is to make
certain that the new, enlarged majority is thoroughly divided. Madison sees two causes of faction -liberty of opinion and diversity in the
faculties of men. He notes that the talents and energies of free men
regularly diverge, as do their opinions. "The diversity in the faculties
of men, from which the rights of property originate, is ... an insuperable obstacle to uniformity of interest." Then comes a very important sentence: "The protection of these faculties is the first object
of government." 22 This is as if to say that the first duty of government is to protect inequality in property. Madison does not flinch
from this hard truth. He follows his thought where it leads : "From
that protection of different unequal faculties of acquiring property,
the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and
views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society
into different interests and parties. " 23 Far from wringing his hands
over such inequalities, at the end of Number 10 Madison describes
"an equal division of property" as an "improper or wicked project. " 2•
Madison is not dismayed by observing that "the latent causes of
faction are thus sown in the nature of men; and we see them everywhere." He does not shrink from noting that human beings are
"much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to cooperate for the common good." The common good is, in fact, infrequently pursued. Worse, this "propensity of mankind to fall into
mutual animosities" is so strong that , where no real reasons for friction exist, fanciful ones are invented. "But the most common and
durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. " Not only is Madison not opposed to this inequality but also wishes by all practical means to increase the diver-

The Originalz"ty of the Commercial Republicans

99

sity of avenues to the acquiring of property and thus the kinds and
types of inequality.
Madison returns to this point in Federalz'st 51 : "If a majority be
united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. There are but two methods of providing against this evil." The
first method would be "by creating a will in the community independent of the majority''...._ through "an hereditary or self-appointed authority." In other words, the authoritarian principle: The Maximum
Leader who decides, "This is the common good. Follow me." Madison's judgment of this method is succinct: "This is, at best, precarious security." So he turns to his second method:
The second method will be exemplified in the federal republic
of the United States. Whilst all authority in it will be derived
from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests and classes of citizens, that the
rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger
from interested combinations of the majority. In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. 25
(Pointedly, Madison leaves out a third way-exhorting and persuading the majority to seek the common good. Given what he has al ready argued, that would seem to be both utopian and fore doomed.) Clearly, Madison's aim is to multiply factions so that no
one faction may accumulate a simple majority. Working majorities
will always be necessary, but if their composition is diverse enough
and ever changing, they can be formed only by a great deal of negotiation, after repeated attempts at mutual understanding. In this
way, narrow viewpoints will give way to at least slightly larger ones,
and the diverse factions will learn habits of mutual adjustment and
cooperation. This enlargement of viewpoint may not go so far as to
attain "the public good" simplicz'ter. But at least it should more
closely approximate it than a hardened, inward-turning provincialism . Since property is the basic cause of faction , the key to preventing simple majorities is to promote a lively and diverse economic order. The key to such diversity is commerce.
Individual American citizens in an undiversified economy might
easily fall into two large and simple classes, the rich and the poor,
those who hold property and those who do not . That is the path that
had already led to the collapse of so many republics in history. It
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must be avoided at all costs. Here Madison notes that not all economic interests are similar. A landed interest generates opinions and
passions quite different from those of a mercantile interest. Capitalrich states differ from mineral-rich states. The highway interests differ from the canal interests. Overseas traders form opinions different
from those of domestic manufacturers. This multiplicity of commercial and manufacturing activities can break up and check the traditional and prevalent agrarian interest, found in every state and
dominant in some. Commerce is the one sure path to blocking the
most likely social base for a "tyranny of the majority."
In addition, "the prosperity of commerce," which we have already
seen Hamilton praise in Number 12, makes the channels of industry
"flow with greater activity and copiousness." Citizens in large numbers see sustained improvement in the condition of their families.
They set their own goals, less in contestation with others than in the
pursuit of their own happiness, as each defines it. They are grateful
to the system through which such abundant graces are shed upon
them. They identify its advancement with further progress in improving their own condition. They lose their propensity to envy.
In short, often by allusive appeal to authors well known to their
audience, Madison and Hamilton argue in Federalist 9 through 12
that union will afford greater security against faction and insurrection than disunion will and that the Union will be good for commerce, and commerce for the Union. Through a diversity as inherent in an enlarged Union as it is in commercial activities, the Union
will much diminish the threat of the tyranny of the majority.

MORE ON THE COMMERCIAL REPUBLICANS
The influence of socialist arguments on historians since Vernon Parrington and Charles Beard has served to make many academics feel
faintly ashamed of the nonsocialist tenor of the American Framers.
This has led to such considerable neglect of the commercial republican tradition that it seems best, before concluding, to fill in the canvas a bit. Permit me to add a few colors in four specific areas. These
touches do not constitute a full argument, I recognize; they are intended to arrest attention and focus it on something quite odd. Such
concepts as private property and commerce, which have been so im portant to the success of the new American order and were so im portant to our Framers, seem an embarrassment to many contemporary academics. So strong a bias cannot be overcome quickly. Still, it
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contrasts sharply with the view of the commercial republicans that
certain economic principles are a necessary (but not sufficient) con dition for the success of republican self-governance. It seems useful
to spell out at least five of the background principles on which the
commercial republicans drew.
1. Ralph Lerner summarizes Montesquieu: " 'Commerce cures
destructive prejudices'; it 'polishes and softens barbaric morals.' In
making men more aware of both human variety and sameness, commerce made them less provincial and in a sense more humane. 'The
spirit of commerce unites nations.' "26 Montesquieu urged nations to
devote themselves to commerce, and then "since their object was
gain, not conquest, they would be 'pacific from principle.'" Lerner
adds: "Even greater than these transnational benefits was the anticipated dividend in increased domestic security. . . . Relieved of the
distortions imposed by ignorance and superstition, political life
would come more and more to wear a human face." He quotes
Hume: "Factions are then less inveterate, revolutions less tragical,
authority less severe, seditions less frequent" and notes that "Smith
seconded Hume's observation, pronouncing this effect the most important of all those stemming from commerce and manufacturing.
Where before men had 'lived almost in a continual state of war with
their neighbours, and of servile dependency upon their superiors,'
now they increasingly had 'order and good government, and, with
them, the liberty and security of individuals.' "27
Commercial activities, Madison had learned from Montesquieu,
soften fanaticism, teach practical compromise, give instruction in
prudence, temper manners, favor the works of peace, and attract
ambitious men away from the allurements of war.
2. To focus the leading energies of a republic on material objects
rather than on spiritual objects is more likely to prevent dissension,
to nourish a spirit of compromise, and to make negotiation easier.
Spiritual principles are indivisible and are not amenable to compromise. To make spiritual principles matters of central contention in a
free republic is highly dangerous, because the glowing embers of the
religious wars- not yet cold-might too easily be rekindled. By contrast, material things are divisible, deals may be struck, and negotiations may proceed on a reasonably calm basis. It is absolutely necessary, then, to give the citizens of a new republic many outlets for
physical, material striving. Tocqueville was particularly impressed
by this American characteristic and its importance for civic peace.
(In our time, the debate over abortion may serve as an example of a
divisive spiritual debate; how one side or the other may compromise
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is not wholly clear, and there is little comfort to be gained, in such
an issue, from the prospect of the tyranny of the one majority or the
other.)
3. For Madison, the first task of government, and the first principle of justice, is to secure "the protection of different and unequal
faculties of acquiring property. "28 This wholly virtuous and legitimate inequality is rooted in the normal diversity of individual natures, characters, and fortunes. That the American Proposition has
this form of inequality as one of its necessary bases is clear enough.
What is less often noted is that the American Proposition is designed
to appeal solely to a people of cooperation and cannot appeal to a
people given to envy. For its first principle holds that to protect inequality of certain kinds is essential for preserving liberty. It is important to see why this is so.
Private property is, in the most earthy of its several analogous
senses, the material which the individual person fashions by his or
her own insight and will. Private property is the instrument used in
the pursuit of happiness. Human beings make quite different
choices concerning property; through their distinctive use of it, they
fashion the story of their lives. Absent rights to property, there is no
material through which the free person might act in history. To respect individual liberty is therefore to respect different faculties for
acquiring, disposing of, and using property.
In one respect, a regime of private property is a defense against
uniformity and conformity. The greyness of regimes that have abolished it is legendary. In this sense, private property protects individuality. In another respect, however, the rationale for private property is the public good. No one holds that property rights are
absolute. Their justification among commercial republicans is that
through them humans best make improvements upon nature and
thus enlarge the common patrimony of humankind. 29 No other regime in actual history except a regime of private property is more
suited to advancing industriousness, imagination, invention, and social cooperation. This claim is an empirical one, found already in
Aquinas. 30 Observing this regime in action in the United States,
Crevecoeur had written:
The American ought therefore to love this country much better
than that wherein either he or his forefathers were born. Here
the rewards of his industry follow with equal steps the progress
of his labour; his labour is founded on the basis of nature, selfz'nterest; can it want a stronger allurement? Wives and chil-
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dren, who before in vain demanded of him a morsel of bread,
now, fat and frolicsome, gladly help their father to clear those
fields whence exuberant crops are to arise to feed and to clothe
them all; without any part being claimed, either by a despotic
prince, a rich abbot, or a mighty lord. 31
4. Because of the influence of Marx, scholars too often assume
that the essence of the commercial republic ("capitalism" is the
name Marx gave to the economic system of "bourgeois democracy")
consists in free markets, the private ownership of the means of production, and the accumulation of profits. These features, however,
are wholly consistent with the precapitalist regimes of traditional
mercantilism, such as Adam Smith was criticizing in Great Britain
and other mercantile nations of 1776. Moreover, because of his own
preoccupation with labor (and a particularly materialistic account
of labor at that), Marx overlooked the key ingredient of a capitalist
economy, whereas his American contemporary Abraham Lincoln
did not.
The Americans were preoccupied with education rather than
brute labor. The same Jefferson who prided himself coequally in the
founding of the University of Virginia and the Declaration of Independence wrote to a young friend that he ought to read The Wealth
of Nations, "the best book extant" on political economy. 32 And what
struck the Americans in that book was its emphasis upon invention
and discovery- as in the opening tale of the pin factory. Thus, Lin coln praised agricultural fairs as extraordinary instruments for the
advancement of the rural economy, precisely because they diffused
the new knowledge on which the production of wealth is based. Not
only that, such fairs "stimulate that discovery and invention into extraordinary activity." In this, they fulfill the purposes of the patentclause of the U.S. Constitution. 33 (The first and only time the word
"right" is used in the body of the Constitution proper concerns the
right, not to physical but to intellectual property, the right of "authors and inventors" to the fruit of their own inventions.) The cause
of the wealth of nations is invention and discovery, not hard labor
nor even an abundance of material property.
In the Homestead Act, Lincoln favored the diffusion of property
holdings as widely as possible. In the Morrill Act, even in the midst
of the Civil War, he secured the cause of the future wealth of the
western states, the building of great universities in those then almost
empty territories. He did this through the public provision of landgrant colleges to advance "the Progress of Science and useful Arts,"
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according to the inspiration of Article I, section 8, clause 8, of the
U .S. Constitution and according to his own words in his address to
the Wisconsin State Fair of 1859 . Later summarizing his own conception of the "proposition" to which the Union was committed,
Lincoln expressed quite succinctly his understanding of "the principle of liberty":
Without the Constz'tutz'on and the Union, we could not have attained the result; but even these are not the primary cause of
our great prosperity. There is something back of these, entwining itself more closely about the human heart. That something
is the principle of "Liberty to all''._ the principle that clears the
path for all- gives hope to all- and by consequence, enterprise
and industry to all. 54
"The great difference between Young America" and old Europe,
Lincoln said in a truly brilliant speech on 11 February 1859, "is the
result of Dz'scoverz'es, Inventz'ons, and Improvements . These, in turn ,
are the result of observatz'on , reflection, and experz'm ent ."35 Lincoln
uses as an example how many hundreds of thousands of men must
have watched "the fluttering motion" of an iron lid on a pot of boiling water before one of them thought to make an experiment to harness steam power. He praises the great inventions of history that have
facilitated "all other inventions and discoveries, " and singles out
four of them: the invention of writing; the invention of p r inting; the
discovery of America (and thus the emancipation of thought and
the propensity of new frontiers to advance civilization and the arts) ;
and the introduction of the patent laws. On the last point , because it
has all the marks of the commercial republican point of view, joining Lincoln's thought to Madison's, let me quote in full:
Next came the Patent laws. These began in England in 1624;
and, in this country, with the adoption of our constitution. Before then, any man might instantly use what another had invented; so that the inventor had no special advantage from his
own invention. The patent system changed this; secured to the
inventor, for a limited time, the exclusive use of his invention;
and thereby added the fuel of interest to the fire of genius, in
the discovery and production of new and useful things. 36
5. Finally, I would like to note that , whereas many of our contemporaries think of commerce in terms of laissez-faire, individualism,
the cash nexus, and as opposite to communitarianism, for the Fram-
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ers and for their intellectual forebears (such as Hume and Smith)
commerce represented a new and superior way of building community. Recalling the relative isolation of the precapitalist agrarian life,
these thinkers held that commerce would bring widely dispersed villages into bustling, informative, self-enlarging, voluntary, creative,
pacific, and lawlike association. Tocqueville is particularly good on
the question of why democracies tend toward commerce and industry and why commercial and industrial societies tend toward democracy but above all on the excitement, romance, and chanciness of
commerce. He has his reservations about commerce (although
among aristocrats he is astonishingly favorable to it), but these are
not nearly so great as his reservations about the alternatives. In
brief, it is important to see the extent to which the Framers were
communitarians even in putting so much faith in commerce and the
new possibilities opened up by contemporary economics. Their example teaches us, at the very least, not to use the word "community"
in too uncritical, nostalgic, and premodern a sense.

CONCLUSION
The Framers, like Lincoln, had every reason to support an enlarged
Union - an unum - in order to secure the inalienable rights cherished by a republican people. But they also had every reason to support a principle of pluralism-e pluribus-in order to make that
Union safe from both a tyrannical majority and an envious mob.
Their originality lay as much in their new principles for the new nation's economy as in their principles for its polity. Indeed, for reasons
of this two-sided originality, the name they have been given combines both sets of principles, "commercial" and "republican. " Better
than their critics, they saw that by such principles as they had
learned from their "new science of politics," they would secure a
longer lasting love for the public good, a more enduring spirit of cooperation and voluntary association, and a greater love for constitutional unity than any republic has ever yet achieved.
In our very variety, we in the United States still remain , two hundred years later, one brotherly and sisterly people. Protecting "private rights," we enjoy an unprecedented degree of "public happiness." Our diversity protects our unity. Permit me to close with the
plea James Madison addressed to the nation in Federalist 14, in the
perilous days during which the Constitution lay in danger of failing
ratification:
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I submit to you, my fellow-citizens, these considerations, in full
confidence that the good sense which has so often marked your
decisions will allow them their due weight and effect; and that
you will never suffer difficulties, however formidable in appearance or however fashionable the error on which they may be
founded , to drive you into the gloomy and perilous scene into
which the advocates for disunion would conduct you. Hearken
not to the unnatural voice which tells you that the people of
America, knit together as they are by so many cords of affection, can no longer live together as members of the same family; can no longer continue the mutual guardians of their mutual happiness; can no longer be fellow-citizens of one great,
respectable, and flourishing empire.
We can imagine Madison looking up from his desk for a moment
before again setting quill to paper:
Hearken not to the voice which petulantly tells you that the
form of government recommended for your adoption is a novelty in the political world; that it has never yet had a place in
the theories of the wildest projectors ; that it rashly attempts
what it is impossible to accomplish. No, my countrymen, shut
your ears against this unhallowed language. Shut your hearts
against the poison which it conveys; the kindred blood which
flows in the veins of American citizens, the mingled blood
which they have shed in defense of their sacred rights, consecrate their Union and excite horror at the idea of their becoming aliens, rivals, enemies.
Madison was eager to protect his own - and the Constitutional
Convention's - originality, lest his fellow citizens overlook it :
Is it not the glory of the people of America that, whilst they
have paid a decent regard to the opinions of former times and
other nations, they have not suffered a blind veneration for an tiquity, for custom, or for names, to overrule the suggestions of
their own good sense, the knowledge of their own situation, and
the lessons of their own experience? To this manly spirit posterity will be indebted for the possession, and the world for the example, of the numerous innovations displayed on the American
theater in favor of private rights and public happiness.
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The diminutive Madison, all of five-foot-six, wanted no one to
overlook the creation of a novus ordo never seen on earth before, yet
of enormous significance for the entire human race:
Had no important step been taken by the leaders of the Revolution for which a precedent could not be discovered, no government established of which an exact model did not present itself,
the people of the United States might at this moment have been
numbered among the melancholy victims of misguided councils, must at best have been laboring under the weight of some
of those forms which have crushed the liberties of the rest of
mankind . Happily for America, happily we trust for the whole
human race, they pursued a new and more noble course. They
accomplished a revolution which has no parallel in the annals
of human society. They reared the fabrics of governments
which have no model on the face of the globe.
Thus was fashioned "a new order of the ages." The American
Catholic bishops meeting in the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore
in 1884, well formed in the "old science of politics" and the classic
Catholic conception of order, had good cause to be grateful to the
Framers. The bishops recognized both the novelty of the Framers
and the Providence whence it sprang. They formally declared of the
Framers that they built "wiser than they knew. "57 Along with Jews
and all the diverse Protestants, Catholics were allowed through the
"new science of politics" to feel at home here, and quite beyond toleration, invited into full and equal participation. E pluribus unum.
NOTES
1. Lincoln held "that labor is prior to, and independent of, capital;
that, in fact , capital is the fruit of labor, and could never have existed if labor had not first existed-that labor can exist without capital, but that
capital could never have existed without labor . . . that labor is the
superior-greatly the superior-of capital." "Address before the Wisconsin
State Agricultural Society, Milwaukee, Wisconsin," 30 September 1859, in
Roy P. Basler, ed. , The Collected Works of Abraham Lz'ncoln, 8 vols. (New
Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1953) , 3 :478 (emphasis in original).
2. Of the U .S. Constitution, Acton wrote, "the powers of the states were
actually enumerated, and thus the states and the union were a check on
each other. That principle of division was the most efficacious restraint on
democracy that has been devised ." He added: "By the development of the
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principle of Federalism, it has produced a community more powerful ,
more prosperous, more intelligent, and more free than any other which the
world has seen." Lord Acton, Lectures on Modern History, intro. Hugh
Trevor-Roper (New York: Meridian Books, 1961), chap. 19, "The American Revolution ," p. 295 .
3. As quoted in "The History of Freedom in Christianity," in Lord Acton, Essays on Freedom and Power, ed. Gertrude Himmelfarb (Cleveland ,
Ohio: World Publishing Co., 1955), p. 88.
4 . Jefferson wrote a friend, "With respect to our rights, and the acts of
the British government contravening those rights, there was but one opin ion on this side of the water. All American Whigs thought alike on these
subjects. " The Declaration of Independence, continued Jefferson, neither
aimed "at originality of principle or sentiment, nor yet copied from any
particular and previous writing, . . . [it] was intended to be an expression
of the American mind, and to give to that expression the proper tone and
spirit called for by the occasion. All its authority rests then on the harmonizing of the sentiments of the day, whether expressed in conversation, in
letters, printed essays, or in the elementary books of public right, as Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, Sidney, etc." Thomas Jefferson to Henry Lee, 8 May
1825 , in Adrienne Koch and William Peden, eds., The Life and Selected
Writings of Thomas Jefferson (New York: Modern Library, 1944) , p. 719;
quoted in Walter Berns, Taking the Constitution Seriously (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987) , p. 251.
5. Cf. Walter Berns: "Slavery was abolished by constitutional amendment, but, to do that, no one word of the preexisting text had to be
amended or deleted.
Constitutional amendments were required to remove state barriers to
black and female suffrage, but not a word of the Constitution had to be
changed to allow blacks and women to vote .
Women now serve in House and Senate, on the Supreme Court, and will,
almost surely, soon be elected vice president and eventually president, but
to accomplish this not one word of the Constitution had or will have to be
changed.
No constitutional change was required to allow 'Jews, Turks, and infidels'
to vote or hold political office. " Berns, Takz'ng the Constitution Seriously ,
pp. 238- 39.
6. Marvin Meyers argues that "although Hume's essay, 'Idea of a Perfect
Commonwealth, ' might have suggested to Madison some advantages of a
large republic, it does not touch the crucial Madisonian argument from the
number and diversity of social-economic interests. Montesquieu's famous
defense of confederate government includes an argument for controlling
the violence of faction that Madison adopted; but it is not the fundamental
argument of Federalz'st 10. See The Spirit of the Laws l: bk. 9, sec. 1. One
could even look back to Aristotle, who proposes that large political societies
have a large 'middle class, ' citizens of moderate property who sustain a
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moderate constitution; yet this is so, he argues, because such states are generally more free from factions of rich and poor, which is not exactly Madison's point. See Politics, bk. 4, chap. 11 , sec. 13." "Beyond the Sum of the
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catalogue . . . I shall venture ... to add one more, on a principle which
has been made the foundation of an objection to the new Constitution; I
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would at the same time be perfectly equalized in their possessions, their
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22 . Ibid.
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25. Federalist 51.
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6
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND
THE SHAPE OF CIVIL SOCIETY
MICHAEL WALZER

I
The Constitution of the United States is really two separate documents, two texts, written at different times, for different purposes, at
the behest of different people. The first text is the original unamended seven articles, the Constitution itself; the second text is the
Bill of Rights, the first ten amendments plus those parts of the original and of subsequent amendments that are now read in terms of
rights theory. The two are dissimilar in style, opposite to one another
as political programs, and intimately joined in practice.
The first text provides a design for state and government. Its purpose is to create a strong and centralized regime restrained by a set
of internal, institutional checks and balances. The political machinery is meant to be powerful; the restraints are built in, part of the
machine and not dependent on the good will or political intelligence of the operators of the machine. The Founders did not have
much faith in anyone's good will, though they were, it has to be said,
fairly confident at least about their own political intelligence. That
confidence doesn't seem today to have been mistaken. The machinery they designed has no doubt been used in ways they did not foresee and would not have approved, but it is, two hundred years later,
almost entirely in place. Current proposals for changing it (the sixyear presidential term , for example) are of the tinkering sort, a tribAfter reading this paper at DePauw University, I also read it at Hebrew University
in Jerusalem and at the University of Bologna . I am grateful to all those who listened and argued. Sanford Levinson read an early draft , and his incisive questions
and criticisms helped greatly in the process of revision .
113

114

Michael Walzer

ute to the enduring value of what is being tinkered with. That is not
to say, obviously, that the Constitution makes it impossible for political leaders to behave stupidly or immorally. But it does make it unlikely that a leader behaving in such a way won't encounter institutional opposition. Somewhere in the state machine, officials will
find it in their personal interest, or in the interest of their offices, to
scrutinize, criticize, resist, and counteract the policies of the leader.
He will then complain that something is wrong with the machine;
he can't make it run. But that's what the machine is like; that's when
it is running according to its constitutional design.
If the first text is focused on the state, the second text is focused on
civil society. It is in part the work of men who were worried by the
state machine and who were critical of the specific design of the
Founders. The second text opposes the first: Its most passionate advocates had little confidence in the internal checks and balances;
they insisted instead on a set of external restraints, a statement of
principles, a "bill" of rights. 1 The Bill is meant to fix the boundaries
of future state action: All that is most valued in civil society lies on
the other side, off limits. Churches, political assemblies, newspapers, private homes, and finally individual men and women are protected against political interventions. (The separate states are also
protected, but I shall not focus on them just now.)
By and large the external restraints have held or, at least , they
have been restored after each partial collapse; they have never collapsed entirely. This is so only because they were incorporated into
the machine itself, admitted to a central role in the regime of checks
and balances. The Supreme Court has made the Bill of Rights its
own bill of entitlement and has undertaken actively to enforce what
would otherwise be a merely hortatory document . It is not the case
that the Court's claim to "judicial review" hangs on the Bill; it was
first asserted on the basis of what appears to be an unproblematic
account of judicial jurisdiction, part of the original Constitution.
Yet the claim would be far less significant without the second text.
Despite Marbury v. Madison , the Court is likely to have remained ,
without the second text, the weakest , "the least dangerous," of the
three branches of government . 2 Ironically, the Court has been
strengthened not only with regard to the president and the Congress
but also with regard to civil society itself. What the state machine
protects it can also subvert . The greater the power to protect, the
greater the power to subvert.
It is hard now to imagine what the first text would be like without
the second, the Constitution without the Bill of Rights (or with the
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Bill only as a hortatory addendum). The political machine would
certainly be different, and so might the society be that it organizes
and protects. But perhaps that society, even as it was at the end of
the eighteenth century, required the Bill; required just this inscription of rights; wrote, so to speak, its own ticket. We have a Bill of
Rights because we have a diverse and pluralistic society. It's not that
the Bill is functional to the society but rather that it expresses the
sensitivities and aspirations of the members. Whether it is actually
helpful to them, either as individuals or as a "people," is precisely
what is at issue in many constitutional debates. The sensitivities and
aspirations are not at issue. American civil society has its origin in
acts of resistance to and flight from religious persecution. The primary purpose of the Bill of Rights is to make such persecution and
all its well-remembered political and judicial concomitants impossible. Rights are entitlements to nonconformity and dissidence. The
first ten amendments are acts of self-defense on the part of potential
nonconformists and dissidents, collective efforts to guarantee diversity; and one may assume that a society capable of such efforts early
on would have been capable of them later, too. Still, the textual
guarantees are impressive and valuable.
So the Supreme Court became the guardian not of platonic virtue
but, in the first instance at least, of Protestant conscience. And
given what it means to be conscientious, the justices did not have to
convince themselves that particular consciences were virtuous or
necessarily right in their protestations in order to conclude that they
were worth guarding. Conscience had only to be sincere. Understood in this way, the right of conscience was simply another name
for the freedom of the individual. The aura of conscience extended
to the whole person, to the mind and spirit that conscience guides,
the physical body in which it lives, the home where it is nourished,
the activities it inspires. All these are protected as the concentric
circles around a sacred center-the individual who shares knowledge (co-science) with God. As the ancient Jews built walls around
their Torah, protecting one law with another, so the Americans built
walls around the individual, protecting one right with another. The
Court guards the walls.
It is commonly said that property is the original right, the right
that lies at the heart of the liberal enterprise. 3 Original it probably is
so far as early modem legal history goes, but I have come to believe,
reading the political and religious literature of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, that conscience is theoretically central from
the beginning. What makes Lockean self-ownership plausible is the
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moral self-possession of Protestant men and women, who know, better than anyone else, how they ought to live. They also know, better
than anyone else, how they should invest their labor and how they
should use the products of their labor. Perhaps these two sorts of
knowledge are ideologically as well as theoretically related. I have
no reason to deny that the long list of rights reflects economic as well
as religious interests. The aura, however, as one might expect, comes
from religion, and that is not unimportant. If it serves to strengthen
the moral and political claims of property, it also makes it impossible to focus exclusively on those claims. Property belongs to some,
conscience to all; property is oligarchic, conscience democratic (or
anarchic) ; given our history, however, the one will always call the
other to mind.
The "unencumbered self" of liberal doctrine, so evocatively described by Michael Sandel, bears in its original form the encumbrances of divinity; and it derives from those encumbrances the
larger part of its attraction. 4 The individual is bound to his God the singular possessive pronoun is very important-and unencumbered only with reference to his fellow men. "Whatsoever hopes or
obligations I should be bound with," an English radical of the 1640s
told Oliver Cromwell, "if afterwards God should reveal himself, I
would break it speedily, if it were an hundred a day. "5 It is because of
his close and personal relation to God that someone like that is capable of "protestantism" in every other relation. The list of obligations and impositions against which conscientious men and women
have protested is very long: church attendance, religious oaths, military conscription, censorship, tithes and taxes, expropriation and
eminent domain, public health laws, paternalistic regulation, marriage vows, and so on. Some of these protests are successful, others
are not; some of them may be divinely authorized, others, we can
safely assume, are not; they are all made possible by the existence of
an individual putatively tied to God and then constitutionally authorized to have scruples about every other tie .
This authorization is conservative in its consequences insofar as
the Bill of Rights reflects the actually existing civil society and insofar as individuals are already possessed of their rights: holding in
their hands whatever it is they take to be rightfully theirs, free in fact
from all the bonds that they regard as illegitimate. In theoretical
terms, the Constitution turns the privileged position of such individuals into a matter of law; in practical terms, it fortifies positions that
might otherwise be radically exposed to the assaults of democratic
majorities (although these assaults have turned out to be less dan-
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gerous than expected). The case is clearest with regard to property
owners, where a rights-oriented interpretation of the due process
clause made possession, unless it came by way of force or fraud , into
a legal and moral entitlement that was effective for decades against
strongly based reform movements. But there are other examples.
Consider the extraordinary longevity of the original assignment of
conscientious objector status (by most of the thirteen states) to the
enrolled members of certain explicitly named Protestant sects. Today's members possess those rights as a virtual inheritance, and because of this possession it has been difficult to claim the same or similar rights for anyone else. If for much of its history the Supreme
Court was the defender of the economic status quo, it was also,
though more intermittently, the defender of the religious status quo.
And the same defense extended to the social status quo, represented
by the combined rights of worship, assembly, petition, due process,
trial by one's peers, and so on. So constitutional conservatism sustains something like the civil society of the eighteenth century even
in the face of industrial revolution, mass immigration, urbanization , cold war - changes not only in the scope but also in the very
character of our common life .

II
Conservatism must be the crucial feature of any written constitution: Why write it down except to give the machinery it designs and
the principles it proclaims stability over the long haul? And yet the
Constitution is also a radical document, opening the way for, if not
actually stimulating, social change. I want to turn now to the sub versive logic of rights, which is, I suppose, the currently fashionable
topic, though it is not fashion alone that dictates the turn. In the
last several decades, in politics and jurisprudence alike, the Constitution's second text has come fully into its own. Instead of a set of restraints on the operation of the state machine, the Bill of Rights is
more and more taken to describe the purpose of the machine . Once
it was said that the government must not violate individual rights as
it goes about its business. Now it is said that the chief business of
government is to realize individual rights. Rights these days are less
things that people actually have than things that they have a right to
have - and therefore ought to have rz"ght now. 6 What lies behind this
sea-change is the discovery (and the self-discovery) of the invisible
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men and women of twentieth-century civil society. For these people,
the first text of the Constitution provides an agency, and the second
text a mandate, for social change.
So the Constitution facilitates the defense but also the transformation of civil society. I want to look now at four different sorts of
social and political action through which the transformation is attempted. Though the list is logically neat, I don't claim that it is exhaustive. It begins with civil society, then moves on to the state, on
the assumption that the transformative work is commonly initiated
by individuals and groups who then seek the help of one or another
part of the governmental machine.
First, collective action to alter the existing patterns of ownership,
hierarchy, command and obedience: the work of parties and mass
movements. Here the Bill of Rights functions primarily to enable
groups of citizens to assemble, organize, petition, and so on. But it is
also said, as in the civil rights movement for example, that oppressed and excluded men and women don't in fact enjoy the rights
enumerated in the Bill and will never enjoy them until the social order has been transformed. So the Bill provides a reason as well as an
enabling framework for transformation. The most significant fact
about political action of this sort, however, is its relative lack of success. Despite many beginnings, moments of high hope, and real
achievements along the way, the social order and all its hierarchies
are more or less intact. One reason for this (relative) failure is the
very diversity of civil society and the protection accorded to diversity
by the Bill of Rights. This group, let's say, supports a certain reform;
another group opposes it; and both act with equal right (to assemble, organize, petition, and so on) even if one side is "right" in terms
of rights theory. Another perhaps more important reason is that diversity does not express itself only in differences of opinion but also
in differences in power. Enabling is equal, but in most cases of political or social conflict the two sides are not equally able. Effective political organization requires resources as well as constitutional
entitlements-and those who already have resources are likely to be
constitutionally entitled to them. So the conservatism of rights subverts their inherent subversiveness.
Second, individual action to alter one's own relationships without
waiting for a more general social transformation. If collective action
takes the form that Albert Hirschman calls "voice," individual
action commonly takes the form of "exit." 7 It is marked by a radically individualist and separatist spirit: emigration, secession, di vorce, resignation, disengagement. The spirit, again, has religious
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origins - in the idea of a conscience that can never be locked up,
tied down, coerced or bound, except with reference to a personal
God. The post-Protestant individual claims a similar freedom, usually without the exception. Privacy is the most cherished individual
right, and it is on its behalf that the Supreme Court has shaped a
new right "constructively" out of all the explicit rights of the Bill and
guaranteed the integrity of a private realm. The construction seems
legitimate enough; one can't protect rights of association without
acknowledging rights of dissociation. But just as the "unencumbered self" of liberal theory was once thought to bear the encumbrances of God, so he has ever since been thought ready and willing
to encumber himself. If he protested against one obligation, he assumed another; left one church, joined another; divorced one
spouse, married another. It would be a very great change indeed in
the pattern of social relationships if the "unencumbered self" of
theory were to emerge in practice as the radically unattached
individual-standing alone but with the very best legal standing,
the ward, as it were, of the Court.
Third, governmental action for the sake of social reform or transformation (seconding and supporting the collective efforts of parties
and movements within civil society). This is exactly the sort of action
that was supposed to be constrained by the Bill of Rights, the second
text setting limits on the powers created by the first, without however
making it impossible to exercise those powers. But the government
can act on behalf of rights as well as be subject to their constraint.
The classic example in recent times is the enforcement of school desegregation in the name of "equal protection." Wherever rights are
systematically violated, government must seek a systematic remedy,
and it is unlikely that the remedy can consist entirely of prohibitions
and preventions. Positive action will commonly be required, institutional rearrangements, new governmental policies and social practices. Given the regime of checks and balances, this sort of thing is
achieved, if it is achieved at all, very slowly. Competing interests inside the state machine, like competing interests in civil society, inhibit social transformation.
Fourth, governmental action for the sake of individual freedom
(seconding and supporting private efforts). What is involved here is
precisely prohibition and prevention, the annulment of repressive
legislation, the hindrance of hindrances to free choice and private
willfulness. Here the Court has been the most important agency, authorized by the second text to oppose all other agencies of govern ment. Its achievements are impressive: It has banned prayer in the

120

Michael Walzer

public schools, legalized abortion, virtually abolished the censorship
of art and literature, extended the right of conscientious objection to
nonreligious persons, established the private realm. Other agencies
are also active, as in recent legislation ( at the state rather than the
federal level) reforming the procedures for divorce and divorce settlements, so as to make divorce much easier than it once was and
also, apparently, to shift resources from families and children to
single individuals, mostly men. 8 One can be happy or unhappy
about these achievements or happy about some and unhappy about
others, but they do derive in a fairly consistent way from the second
text: They are generated by taking rights and the rights-bearing individual seriously. As soon as one does that, the rights that we actually exercise fade in significance before the rights that we might exercise, if only the powerful machine provided by the first text can be
harnessed for the job.
What this brief survey suggests is the strongly individualist bias
that the second text introduces into the Constitution as a whole. Of
course, it is generally true in every human society that individuals
are more capable of changing their own situation than of changing
the social order, but I don't think that there are many societies in
which the possibilities for individual change are so large and so radical that they function as a virtual substitute for social change. Nor
can there be many societies in which the government, as incapable
in the United States as anywhere else of structural reform, can so
easily be enlisted in defense of individual freedom, that is to say, in
defense of protest , separation, and privacy. Of the four sorts of
action that I have described, the second and fourth , where single individuals are the active agents or immediate beneficiaries, are culturally preferred and constitutionally favored-most likely, therefore, to be effective . It is easy enough to think of individuals and
whole classes of individuals for whom they are not (yet) effective,
whose rights are not (yet) taken seriously. But the social and constitutional tendency is clear.
We might describe that tendency, programmatically, in the language of "critical legal theory." It represents, as Roberto Unger
writes of his own program , a "super-liberalism" which "pushes the
liberal premises about state and society, about freedom from dependence and governance of social relations by the will , to the point at
which they merge into a large ambition: the building of a social
world less alien to a self that can always violate the generative rules
of its own mental or social constructs. "9 This is the old Protestant
scheme restated (in state-of-the-art theoretical language) , with the
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same self at the center, who can always scruple at doing what, only a
short time ago, he solemnly promised to do. It seems that the self is
known now by his will rather than his conscience, but he poses familiar problems nonetheless. Doesn't the dissidence of his dissent,
the constant violation of generative rules, get in the way of the larger
enterprise, "building a social world"? Unger hedges his bets when he
hopes for nothing more than a world "less alien" to the eternally
transgressive self. Indeed, it is hard to imagine any sort of social
world in which this self won't be constrained to some degree, in
which, therefore, he won't continue to feel himself alien, something
less than Rousseau's citizen bound only by his own will. What is the
program, then, for this "something less"? What account can we give
of the legitimate constraints on dissidence and violation?

III
We might respond to these questions simply by pointing to the first
text of the Constitution. There the government is authorized to tax
its citizens, to punish them for violating its laws, to regulate their
commercial relations, to raise armies and make war. But this just de scribes the capabilities of the machine; it doesn't tell us how it is to
be operated or for what ends. The ends described in the preamble
are too inclusive to be very helpful: "establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the gen eral Welfare, and secure the blessings of Liberty for ourselves and
our Posterity." On a certain reading of the liberal tradition, the last
two of these stand in sharp contradiction to one another: The more
liberty is secured for individuals, the less general will welfare be. I
don't want to insist that this is the only correct reading of the tradition, but certainly the actual experience of protestantism, separatism, and privatization makes it hard to say what an adjective like
"general," or even a plural pronoun like "our, " might mean. Is there
anything that is so importantly general , so deeply ours, that we
might for its sake discourage protest, separation, and privacy?
A hard question. I assume that most Americans are not
prepared-certainly, I am not - to give up any of the rights enumerated in the second text. But one of the chief reasons for valuing
those rights, it seems to me, is that they facilitate the first and third
forms, the collective and cooperative forms, of social action. They
enable groups of citizens who share some religious or political or economic understanding or interest to organize themselves, to act on
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their understanding and defend their interest. The assumption of
the Constitution, of the two texts taken together, is that people will
have different ideas, first of all about eternal life and salvation and
then about the preamble's list: justice, tranquility, defense, welfare,
and liberty. The theoretical justification for these differences is individualist in character; hence the bias of the text. But the expected
activity was collective: When one asserts "the right of the people
peacefully to assemble," one expects assemblies- not litigious individuals tracked by lawyers, but gatherings, meetings, caucuses, and
party conventions; not legal argument, but political debate; not
briefs, but pamphlets.
The privatizing effects of the Bill of Rights were almost certainly
not anticipated by the authors of the Bill. What they had in mind,
as I have already suggested, was the existing diversity of American
society. This was indeed a separatist society, composed, that is, of
people who had literally separated themselves from old world states
and churches. Once again, these people justified their separation on
grounds of private conscience, the moral knowledge each one of
them shared with his God. In practice, however, they shared this
knowledge among themselves too. And so the diversity to which they
gave rise was a diversity of groups. The groups rested on individual
consent, but they rested on consent with some confidence and security. That's why it was so easy to assign conscientious objector status
on the basis of membership. 10 The separatism of American life did
not mean, or was not taken to mean, that Americans were frivolous
in their associations. On the contrary, they made weighty decisions
and formed stable groups; hence the actions of these groups, their
assemblies and petitions and, by extension, their rallies, demonstrations, marches, and strikes, were worthy of constitutional protection. Individuals with consciences and interests formed groups with
purposes. And since the purpose of many of these groups was and is
to convince the rest of us to live in a certain way, to think of justice,
tranquility, and so on, in these terms rather than those, the socializing effects of conscience and interest are extensive and far reaching.
Yet this is true only so long as it seems both necessary and possible
to convince the rest of us to live in a certain way. There is always this
alternative: to live that way oneself "without tarrying for the magistrate," as seventeenth-century Protestants argued-or for anyone
else. Despite its anticipation of collective action, the Constitution
has turned out to favor something else, nicely summed up in the
twentieth-century maxim about "doing your own thing." Imagine
now a civil society founded on this maxim, a literal diversity of indi-
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viduals, this one and that one and that one and that one, not an assembly or a congregation or a community but something more like
what Sartre calls a "series. "11 Of course, doing your own thing does
not mean living in isolation, for some of the things one wants to do
can't be done alone. People will still come together for conversation,
love, worship, and even the defense of common interests. But these
unions are likely to be temporary and unstable, given the radical individualism on which they are based. The example of religious cultism in the United States today suggests that they are also likely to be
frivolous. Cults are as entitled to constitutional protection as
churches and congregations; we would not want a governmental office set up to distinguish between serious and silly religiosity. But
that is not a reason to rejoice in the advance of silliness. Similarly,
the growing number of people living alone- living in "single person
households," in the census phrase - are entitled to exactly the same
protection that families get against, say, "unreasonable searches and
seizures," but that is no reason to rejoice in the advance of solitude
and dissociation.
A Sartre an "series," a dissociated society, is a limiting case.
Sartre's example is a queue, and the example makes it obvious that a
whole society organized on the serial principle is not possible: Without some background solidarity, every queue would turn into a melee. Similarly, a society composed entirely of single-family households and religious cults would have no cohesion at all, would not,
in fact, be a "society." I am describing tendencies, not established
realities. Still, it is worth asking what resistance we can put up to
these tendencies.
It is not the divisiveness of dissociation that is worrying. Rousseau
argued long ago that if a society had to be divided, then multiplying
the divisions would reduce their force and salience: A host of secondary associations is second best to none at all. 12 In my limiting
case, however, the host equals the total number of citizens; every individual member of society is self-associated, primary in his own
eyes, secondary in everyone else's. The conflicts among individuals
are then too dispersed and trivial to threaten the stability of social
life, but they are also too dispersed and trivial to energize social life.
A society in which political parties and interest groups quarrel
about the common defense and the general welfare is, however bitter the quarrels, a society whose members are forced to think about
what is common and what is general. They are mobilized for democratic politics, that is, for public work of many different kinds, more
or less useful, more or less interesting to their fellows; whereas in a
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dissociated society all work is apolitical, private, and (mostly) uninteresting.
Is there some way to bring rights-bearing individuals together, to
enhance the possibilities for collective action? Here the Supreme
Court is not likely to be much help; the second text that it enforces
doesn't press in this direction, whatever the anticipation of its authors. Consulting a lawyer and writing a brief will not right now
(though it sometimes might) advance the cause of association. Perhaps the Constitution as a whole, conceived as the sacred text of a
civil religion, might help. Indeed, the Constitution is the sacred text
of our civil religion, but the seminary in which the text is studied,
expounded, and interpreted is the law school; the chief ritual observance is litigation; and litigation serves most importantly to enhance the second and fourth forms, the privatizing forms, of social
action. We can, of course, celebrate the diversity that the Constitution fosters and protects. It is harder to celebrate radical dissociation. Can we be knit together by our mutual acceptance of separation? A society that respects individualism can also respect itself and
value the legal structure through which it operates. I am less sure
about a society whose members are merely tolerant of (or resigned
to) each other's isolation. Are they grateful to be allowed, when they
please, to part company and be left alone, or do they yearn (secretly)
for an unconstitutional solidarity?
Yearnings like that can be dangerous, and yet I want to argue that
a decent society requires not only individual rights but also group
solidarities and the pluralist and democratic politics that groups
make possible. Democracy itself is a value sufficiently general and
sufficiently ours to warrant state action against the long-term effects
of privatization. If the Court defends and extends the regime of
rights, then perhaps it is the task of Congress to look for ways of
strengthening the internal life, the jurisdictional reach, and the cohesiveness of secondary associations. I have no list of measures in
mind; I would only recall the way in which the Wagner Act facilitated the organization of labor unions in the 1930s or the way in
which matching grants to private welfare agencies have made it possible today for religious groups to run an extensive system of daycare centers, hospitals, and nursing homes. The Constitution is biased toward individual rights, and perhaps it should be; but
constitutional power exists to balance the bias or to counter some of
its effects. And just as the Court's commitment to rights generates
new rights and pushes separatism beyond the actually existing sepa-
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rateness of civil society, so Congress's commitment to group solidarity ought to generate new groupings and new experiences of collective action: worker-owned factories, health cooperatives, experimental schools, neighborhood alliances, and so on.
It should not be the goal of congressional action, however, to
create a single, all-encompassing solidarity. That was what the Bill
of Rights, and especially the First Amendment with its noestablishment clause, was designed to prevent-for the sake of a
civil society that is probably still lively and diverse enough to resist
the creation. The Bill was designed, indeed, to protect the existing
states as well as the existing churches, interest groups, and families,
and perhaps we need to look again to our federalist past if we are
to revitalize associational life. The states do not seem at this moment the best possible units for collective action, but no one can
predict at what level of politics or society the best units might be
found. We have to ask: Where is there some effective demand for
organizational structure and common effort? Where might there
be an enthusiastic response to governmental initiative? Where are
the creative forces in our society that might benefit, as the labor
movement once benefited, from political authorization? Insofar as
these questions have answers, we have a political agenda and a constitutional structure within which to pursue it . If it ever happens
that they have no answers, we are probably beyond constitutional
help.
I argued at the beginning of this paper that the original Constitution designed a state and the Bill of Rights reflected a society. The
purpose of the Bill was to make the constituent elements of that society inaccessible to the state. Its authors thought those elements,
rights-bearing individuals, above all, to be strong and creative. Today those same individuals, carrying those same rights (or new rights
of the same sort), look very different: Dissociation renders them
weak and passive. So it makes sense to call the state to the rescue of
civil society and then to search for effective means of rescue - for the
state is the only constitutionally specified agent of collective action
and the only agent that might, conceivably, be pregnant with additional agents. I need only say, finally, that when the state acts in this
way it can only act subject to its internal checks and balances, which
now include all the rights that the Court enforces. But I don't think
it is merely a political trick (though it may be tricky) to look for ways
of limiting protestantism, separatism, and privatization without violating individual rights.
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POLITICAL "REALISM" AND
THE PROGRESSIVE DEGRADATION
OF CITIZENSHIP: A QUIET
CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS
ROBERT E. CALVERT

The great Statesman, like the great moral leader, is one who appeals to the
higher emotions, to principle, to self-restraint, not to selfishness and appetite.
-A. Lawrence Lowell
I'll tell you what wins votes. Whatever puts money in here [his wallet] wins
votes, and whatever takes money out of here loses votes.
- George Bush
A political actor, be he good or evil, does not deal in unreality. Rather, he creates realities that matter.... An actor not only projects, he causes his audience to project certain qualities.
- George WzU
If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences.
- WI. Thomas

It sometimes happens in the public life of a nation that a casual, offhand remark by a political figure reveals with stark clarity one of the
master assumptions not only of his or her entourage, party, or class,
but, more or less, of the age. Such a moment occurred during the
1984 presidential campaign. Speaking to "about 2,000 cheering ReFor helpful criticisms and comment on this essay in its various drafts, I am grateful
to James Cooper, Byron Daynes, Jean Elshtai_n, Maria Falco, Ralph Gray, David
Greenstone, Michael Novak, Ralph Raymond, and Bruce Stinebrickner. Especially
valuable were the hard and good questions raised by my student assistants,
Douglas Driemeier, Donald Featherstone, and Vikash Yadav, whose critical presence I am happy to acknowledge as nothing short of collegial.
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publicans" in Ohio in the midst of the campaign, Vice-President
George Bush suggested that Ohioans felt themselves to be part of a
national economic recovery brought about by the Reagan administration. Then, in what must have been a theatrical moment, Mr.
Bush removed his wallet from his pocket and declared, quoting
James Rhodes, a former governor of Ohio, that the only issue in a
campaign is the "pocketbook''- "who is putting money in and who is
taking it out." "One reason Ronald Reagan is going to get reelected," he predicted, "is because he's putting something in and the
other people are taking something out. "1
This striking display of tough-minded political realism did not escape the notice of Geraldine Ferraro, Mr. Bush's opponent. Ms. Ferraro was quick to attack Bush's way of making his pointbrandishing his wallet- as well as the point itself, charging that
"that single gesture of selfishness tells us more about the true character of this administration than all their apple pie. " 2
For all anyone cared- the incident was not widely reported and
provoked no editorial comment-Bush could have ignored Ferraro's
charge. This was hardly the first time the Reagan administration
had been attacked for encouraging, often by its own example, the
purely self-regarding instincts of the American people. The great
wave of indifference with which the vice-president's remark was met
suggested that the nation had lost its capacity to be shocked. Yet
"selfishness" is a strong word, and the vice-president evidently
thought it could not go unanswered. Ignoring the thrust of Ferraro's
charge, Bush countered that
the opposition goes around buying off every single special interest group in sight with promises our nation can't afford. And
then they get all ... preachy about selfishness. If they're talking about greed, they ought to talk about the greed of big government, which under the last administration knew absolutely
no bounds.
Continuing as though Ferraro had maligned the American voter, he
defended not the Reagan administration, the object of Ferraro's attack, but the American people:
The opposition talks as if it were immoral to want to take care
of your own family, loved ones, and work toward the good life
and maybe buy a new car or get a mortgage on a house or save
up for your children's education. We've got news for them -
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that is the American dream. There's nothing wrong about it
[at] all; freedom, opportunity, family, faith, fair play-that's
what America is all about. And if they don't understand it, it's
too darn bad. 3
Returning to the issue at the end of the campaign, Ferraro directly
disputed Bush's emphasis on voter self-interest:
George Bush has said this election is only about putting money
in the voters' wallets. Of course we care about money, but that's
only one thing, not everything, Americans care about. We care
about peace, equal opportunity, and the one thing our opponents just don't understand is that we care about each other. 4

I
What are we to make of the Bush-Rhodes view of the American
voter and of the correlative conception of the American Dream? We
might begin by noting again that despite the gravity of such issues,
especially as the nation moved toward the Bicentennial of its Constitution, this exchange between Bush and Ferraro received virtually
no attention at the time, either from the news media, other political
figures, or interested onlookers. Possibly it seemed to be commonplace campaign rhetoric, merely a reiteration of hackneyed themes
by both sides and hence "not news."
The themes of that campaign aside, it is surely not news that voters will reward the party in power if times are good and punish it if
times are hard, or that Americans in general do have the aspirations
Bush sums up as the American Dream. Democrats as well as Republicans, liberals as well as conservatives know these basic facts of
American political life. Nor is it remarkable that the typical American can be held to have a practical, or "utilitarian," bent when it
comes to life in general and to government in particular. These familiar facts would seem to make of the vice-president's pronouncements something like truisms-again, not worth reporting.
Reporters might at least have noticed, however, that such "realism" about what moves voters has rarely been articulated so openly
by a politician of Mr. Bush's elevated status, certainly not in recent
times. For a parallel, one would have to return to 1920s Normalcy or
to the cynicism and crassness of the Gilded Age, only to find that
even in those nadirs of the American public spirit the politicians of
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the day tried to keep up at least the appearance of high-mindedness.
What seems new, even shocking, about the vice-president's assertion , when seen against the backdrop of American history and political culture, is that it is so candid, indeed brazen; so stripped of euphemism; so indifferent, say, to the question of social justice or to
ideology or party loyalty; so totally devoid of any gesture toward
civic responsibility; so exclusively centered on what has been only a
part of the traditional meaning assigned to membership in the
American polity and of the rights, obligations, and expectations associated with that membership. In a couple of sentences and one
theatrical gesture, the vice-president had reduced American citizenship, a complex political and moral status with a rich history, to a
single, material, individualistic, and self-regarding dimension.
It will not do to try to soften the impact of the statement about
wallets by invoking the family and the American Dream. Mr. Bush's
victory in that unremarked little debate seems only to provide substance for some of Tocqueville's worst fears about American egalitarian individualism, apprehensions inspired precisely because this new
phenomenon, the individualist, retreated to his "little society" of
"family and friends" and left society at large to fend for itself. 5 Look
to see in the vice-president's understanding of the American Dream,
with its foundation exclusively in economic self-interest, whether
there is any room for the American democratic penchant for political freedom, or for the cultivation of those institutions and beliefs
that for Tocqueville served as a barrier to majority tyranny and administrative despotism, or for the doctrine of "self-interest properly
understood." Where in this picture of the family-as-consumptionunit can one discern the political tie that once was thought to bind
Americans into a republic? In this truncated version of our public
philosophy there is only one positive reference to anything having to
do with government and politics-a fleeting mention of a providing
(if not providential) president a grateful people will surely return to
power, a paternal presence looming benignly and remotely over a
prospering nation. Surely Tocqueville would not have been reassured by the spectacle of such a people governed by such a figure as
he pondered the health and prospects of American democracy.
Having said all this, I want immediately to caution critics of
George Bush and his administration against deriving comfort from
the analysis I present here; if what I say has any merit, we confront
in this particular expression a point of view very much in the mainstream of contemporary American political culture. I hope in what
follows to show why it is indeed so commonplace in our time to see
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voters not as citizens but as "individuals" concerned only with their
own economic well-being and, similarly, why it is so easy to describe
the American Dream as utterly lacking political content. There
should be no comfort in this for any of us. 6
It is already evident that this now-conventional voter, and the correlative vision of the American Dream, could be cited by the other
essayists in this volume as disturbing confirmation that their concerns for the well-being of American constitutional democracy are
not imaginary. Such a voter may be seen to represent the triumph of
Jefferson's hedonistic or humanist liberalism, as David Greenstone
sees it, over the reformed or public-spirited liberalism of John Adams. Such a voter represents in principle the final privatization and
emancipation of Michael Walzer's "protestant" individual from any
and all restraints, including the inevitable restraints of democratic
politics - to the point that both of Walzer's texts of the Constitution
would seem to be irrelevant. We have an awful caricature of Jean
Elshtain's "exquisitely social" individual, then, the sort of "citizen"
who, devoted only to personal and family welfare, will find incom prehensible the notion of a common good urged by Robert Bellah.
Indeed, given the self-absorbed preoccupation with consumption, it
is hard to imagine a voter so oriented as the individual filled with
the spirit of enterprise important to Michael Novak.
We are partially reassured on hearing, from Michael Walzer, that
these images of a thoroughly privatized citizen and an impoverished
politics are only tendencies and not accomplished facts, an observation that applies, fortunately, with even greater force to the vicepresident's conception of what wins elections. I say this because it is
important to note that Bush's statement about why voters vote as
they do is, in our time anyway, false - not an overgeneralization, not
an exaggeration of the truth, not an overstatement of a basically
sound analysis, but, in its unqualified form, simply and radically
false. 7
If the point were only that most Americans, most of the time, tend
to decide whom to vote for on the basis of how they are faring
economically- or even that they generally allow their economic position to eclipse other and competing interests and concerns they
may have as citizens as they cast their votes-one could cite much
evidence in support of that position. But that is not the position of
those who speak in this vein.
The vice-president, for example, is not generalizing about voter
behavior as a political scientist might-indeed, is not making an
"empirical statement" or presenting a "refutable hypothesis" at all.
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Rather, it would seem, instead of bad political science, the assertion
about the pocketbook voter is something quite different. On the one
hand, candidate Bush, on the stump, is articulating what must be
seen as some rather conventional American folk wisdom about how
people behave in politics, saying "what everybody knows," with the
confident assurance that what he says will be well received. He is
communicating with his audience on the basis of what in Parsonian
sociology is called a shared "belief system." On the other hand, his
unqualified assertion about what moves the voter can also be seen as
a kind of philosophical or theoretical claim, a declaration indeed
about "human nature" in politics; his voter is reminiscent of the
"natural man" imagined by the great social-contract thinkers of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, who in one way or other made
a point of telling us, as Rousseau said, to "lay facts aside" in understanding what they were about. 8 In neither case, whether folk wisdom or crude political philosophy, is Bush's statement such as to be
considered more or less true when measured against the facts,
against what actual people actually do. It would not have occurred
to the vice-president to offer evidence for his claim about the significance of the pocketbook in elections or for anyone in his audience to
ask for it. 9
Whatever the ontological status of the kind of voter revealed in
Bush's remark, he seems more than vaguely familiar. We think we
have met him before, or at any rate some version of him, his ancestor, so to speak, in other times in American history and not only as
Tocqueville's individualist or as a shade of the Grant or Harding
eras. Indeed, so American does he seem that he may be thought to
have come over on the Mayflower. Surely John Winthrop was speaking to that kind of person, or to that person in each of his listeners,
as he laid out his "Modell of Christian Charity" on board the
Arbella-warning of the fate that would befall them if they "fell to
embrace this world" and lost sight of the main (but not the only)
reason they had come to New England. Winthrop again might be
thought to have confronted the ancestor of the late twentiethcentury voter when he reminded his constituents, in his famous
"Speech to the General Court," that "natural" liberty, the liberty to
do just as you please without regard for what is right or for the wellbeing of others, is a false and pernicious kind of liberty and quite incompatible with the natural and moral necessity of living together
in communities.
The American revolutionaries were no less aware of a forerunner
of this creature as they asserted, anxiously if bravely, that as individ-
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ual citizens and as a people they were capable of the self-discipline,
public spiritedness, devotion to the public good-in a word, the republican virtue-required of them if they were to govern themselves
without a king. Building on their Puritan heritage and blending it
with the republicanism of Machiavelli and Montesquieu and the
Whiggism of eighteenth-century England, their elaborate paeans of
praise to republican virtue bespoke as well their fear of their own
proclivities for selfish, antirepublican, and unpatriotic kinds of vice.
Perhaps, we think, we can most clearly see the kind of citizen the
vice-president seemed to have in mind in Madison's doleful speculations on "human nature," as he and the other Framers struggled to
fashion a constitution suitable for a people fallen, as it were, from
republican grace-a people, they believed, whose civic virtue had at
best been much exaggerated. When Madison contemplated ordinary Americans-the majority of his countrymen-he was less impressed by their willingness to sacrifice their personal interests for
the common good than by their willingness to "vex and oppress each
other" in their own interest. 10 Left to their own devices, which included, Madison believed, a conception of republicanism imperfectly grounded in human nature and a correspondingly chaotic
politics, the noble ideals of the Revolution seemed fated for disaster.
Yet for all the apparent familiarity, we really do not find the solitary, purely self-interested individual in Puritanism, in revolutionary republicanism, or in Madisonian constitutional theory. At best
we find him in these earlier American conceptions of the human
person only as an intimation, a constant and fearful possibility, the
dark side of the soul, embedded in and hence merely a dimension of
a whole human being- a threat to the very life of the "errand into
the wilderness," the Revolution, the Republic and also a challenge
to religion, to revolutionary zeal and practice, to republican education, and to statecraft. Indeed, when we consider that Winthrop,
the Revolutionaries, and Madison were preaching (literally in Winthrop's case) against such a man, seeking not just to "domesticate"
him, as the vice-president does in his response to Geraldine Ferraro,
but to civilize him, to see his essence as a human being not in his
merely natural but in his civic self, we may want to conclude that
Bush's voter is not present at all in early American political culture.
Viewed the other way around, if from some merely Natural Man
you took away Winthrop's preoccupation with a close-knit community, the revolutionaries' Spirit of '76, or the remaining virtue that
Madison allowed to the American common man, what you got was
surely not Bush's voter. In the case of each of these earlier American
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concerns about character, what remained when the defining characteristics of the citizen were wholly absent was something wild and
uncontrollable, vicious in the extreme, worse (for Winthrop) than
an animal; what you got was the turbulent mob of Federalist
nightmares-not the rather tame (if corrupt) and predictable egoist
portrayed by the vice-president. More than this, we have to see the
vice-president's pronouncement, given its appearance in a political
campaign aimed at renewing the legitimacy of the American political order, as a kind of reverse jeremiad- an endorsement (if not a
celebration) of the least noble part of the American character, a
contribution, indeed, to the very corruption of the American electorate he cites as promising his reelection.

II

George Bush's voter did not spring full blown from the head of
George Bush. Governor James Rhodes, the immediate source, did
not arrive at such a politically denatured conception of the American citizen on his own or spontaneously. That the "2,000 Republicans" cheered and the journalists yawned suggests something more
fundamental. To repeat, in his remarks about the American voter
and Dream George Bush voiced an assumption of the age, and not a
point of view peculiar to himself or his party. In this essay I am not
interested in George Bush's politics but in our politics; Bush's remarks are important not because they were uttered by George Herbert Walker Bush but because his view of what is ultimately "real" in
our politics is so widely shared. 11 That he was also the vice-president
and hence unavoidably speaking with the authority of his office is
perhaps significant if we think about the effect of his remarks on his
listeners. The point here, however, is only that Mr. Bush is plausibly
an American representative of his time.
He at any rate seems to express our sense of reality. In a famous
chapter of Democracy in America, Tocqueville observes that the
Americans of Jacksonian America had unconsciously adopted the
"philosophical approach" of Descartes, unconsciously, that is, because they had never read Descartes. Spurning books and systems,
deferring to no aristocracy, Americans doubted everything but the
"witness of their own eyes" and relied only on their "individual effort
and judgment" as the source of certain knowledge. 12 If Tocqueville
were to examine Americans of today, and in particular George
Bush's remark about the only thing that counts in an election, he
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might well conclude that his favorite democrats had exchanged Descartes for Jeremy Bentham as their philosophical guide. When we
want to talk about what human beings are really like, we intuitively
abstract them, as Bentham did, from any and all social contexts;
and when we want to report our conclusions about human nature,
we unsweivingly declare "man" to be nothing more nor less than
Bentham's utility maximizer. No broad experience of actual human
beings is necessary to produce this conviction. Anyone doubting this.
need only engage beginning college students in an open-ended discussion of "human nature." Innocent of history (as was Bentham),
to say nothing of anthropology, they "know" that "man" naturally
seeks to maximize his pleasures and minimize his pains and generally to "better his condition," and they know this before they take the
introductory course in economics or behavioral psychology.
Bush's voter, let us be clear, is just such a Benthamite abstraction.
As presented he is a pure type, not a part, dimension, or aspect of a
larger, more complex human person; he is purely, simply, radically
devoid of the usual range of characteristics that suggest the whole
person- a "realistic" fiction with most of the reality left out. In particular, he is wholly unaffected by that wide range of cultural learn ings political scientists sometimes call political socialization. Indeed, those complex and subtle understandings, often all jumbled
together, that somehow tell us what it means to be a good person, a
good American, and a good citizen, form no part of his conception
of himself. This suggests that if we are to understand this socially
unconstituted voter we have to see him, strictly speaking, as "nonAmerican," as existing essentially outside of American history but
also, in a sense, as "un-American''...._surely in conflict with the traditions and culture that inform and sustain our political life.
For all that, he is familiar. We recognize him not because we've
met him in earlier incarnations in American political culture,
though individuals approximating the model have surely existed,
nor because he is so plausibly "seen" in today's politics, nor because
we think our experience confirms his presence as we observe Ed
Meese, Michael Deaver, Pentagon weapons procurers, Ivan Boesky,
HUD bureaucrats, S&L criminals, or some yuppie we particularly
dislike. He is so familiar to us, so unnewsworthy, because he is the
centerpiece of a well-known theory of human nature in the modern
Western world we Americans seem especially to prize. Not just a figment of George Bush's imagination and no mere creature of media
cynicism, he is none other than the archetypal Enlightenment Individual, and a thoroughly modernized one at that. He is the Eco-
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nomic Man of Econ. lA, who more recently has taken on new life as
the self-interested voter in so-called public or rational-choice theory.
The vice-president's tough-minded, unsentimental, bottom-line
"realism," then, is a reification of an ahistorical, merely hypothetical, intuitively perceived, theoretical construct.
We next have to ask how it is that in a presidential campaign
speech, appealing to such an unreal theorist's fantasy, to such a textbook abstraction, has come to be regarded as not merely the last
word in realism but as something of a cliche. How has it happened
that one of the most extravagant and radical flights of the theoretical imagination in Western political theory has come to be regarded
as obvious (if disquieting) common sense- an operative bit of American political folklore?

III
A revived interest in the 1980s in free-market ideology is no doubt
the immediate source of this unreal realism. Virtually silenced by
nearly two generations of a dominant welfare-state liberalism,
American liberalism's "conservative" variant could once again wax
theoretical under Ronald Reagan - and could again seek to create a
real world to correspond to its putatively eternal, if hypothetical and
abstract, verities. When the "bottom line" has become a metaphor
for what Marxists used to call the "last analysis," it is perhaps not
surprising that the irreducible truth about politics should be expressed with the double-lined certitude of the accountant.
The laissez-faire renaissance notwithstanding, there is nothing
specifically or distinctively conservative ( or even Republican) about
Bush's voter. 18 On the contrary, the politics appropriate to such a
figure-a "politics" focused exclusively on what's-in-it-for-me-andmy-family-derives, ultimately, I want to argue, from the tradition
of American reform, from sources in our history and culture usually
thought to be on the left. If this unlovely conception of the citizen
seems to flow so obviously from an antigovernment, public-bedamned, contemporary conservatism, it may be only that one of the
functions of liberals on the American right is to preserve some of the
more unattractive innovations of liberals on the American left.
America is "conservative," Gunnar Myrdal once noted, but "the
principles conserved are liberal, and some, indeed, are radical. " 14
Far from being a product of American conservatism, the corruption represented by Bush's voter is exactly what Herbert Hoover used
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to denounce Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal for trying to produce in the American people. What else was the welfare state, for
Hoover, but the wholesale buying of votes, to the destruction of the
freedom, independence, and moral fiber of the American people?
We may begin by seeing that George Bush, insofar as he represents
contemporary "conservatism," has been schooled by FDR, and in reducing the public-spirited citizen to the purely self-regarding voter,
Bush is merely expressing a latter-day version of New Deal realism.
At least up to a point. In speaking of the pocketbook we may say
that Mr. Bush went not perhaps to the heart but surely to the real
core of the political vision, inaugurated by the New Deal, that has
dominated American politics since 1932. It is in no way to detract
from the idealism and commitment to social justice that made the
New Deal such a force in American politics to point out that it was
launched from a very material foundation. Indeed, nearly twenty
years before Franklin Roosevelt in his Second Inaugural Address saw
"one-third of a nation ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-nourished" and promised to do something about it, Herbert Croly, the intellectual architect (if it had one) of the New Deal, had described the American
common man's material expectations in terms that made something
like the New Deal, given the Great Depression, a virtual necessity.
All Americans, according to Croly, the God-centered Puritans no
less than the immigrants of his own day, came to these shores at least
in part to better their material lot in life. "With all their professions
of Christianity," Croly wrote of his countrymen, "their national idea
remains thoroughly worldly. . . . The promise, which bulks so large
in their patriotic outlook, is a promise of comfort and prosperity for
an ever increasing majority of good Americans. " 1• So important had
the quest for material well being become to Americans, he noted,
that the expectation of it was regarded as a kind of national birthright and a test of political legitimacy itself:

The success of this democratic political system was indissolubly
associated in the American mind with the persistence of abundant and widely distributed economic prosperity. Our democratic institutions became in a sense the guarantee that prosperity would continue to be abundant and accessible. In case
the majority of good Americans were not prosperous, there
would be grave reasons for suspecting that our institutions were
not doing their duty. 16
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In describing the voter and the American Dream as he does, George
Bush can plausibly be seen as in the New Deal tradition.
Consider, too, Bush's view of the presidency. "Our democratic institutions," to which Croly referred, preeminently included that office as a consequence of the Roosevelt Revolution. Reflecting on the
New Deal in the 1950s, Clinton Rossiter could announce that the
presidency had evolved in such a way as to provide informal acknowledgment of Croly's vision of the link between popular material
aspirations and democratic political institutions. Not only did the
post-New Deal president continue to be the "voice of the people," as
he had been since Andrew Jackson, he was now also the "manager of
prosperity. "17 It should thus occasion no surprise that in 1984 a president who put money in the voters' wallets is seen as doing his duty
and is duly reelected.
The self-regarding voter and largely material American Dream
are thus the recognizable if not wholly legitimate offspring of that
convenient marriage of Hamiltonian means ( a powerful national
government) and Jeffersonian ends (popular material well-being)
sanctified by Croly's Promise of American Life.
Yet they also stand as eloquent criticisms of the failure of the New
Deal to go beyond the admittedly pressing material needs of the
American people to the nurturing of the civic self. It is hard to escape the conclusion, for example, that the "interest group liberalism" stemming from the New Deal, to use Theodore Lowi's term , 18
failed to link popular material aspirations with what Croly also had
said was a constant of American political history and culture. Croly
had of course been quick to add that material well-being was only
half the promise of American life; the land of economic prosperity
was also the land of individual freedom and of a personal dignity
that could come only from social equality. "America" stood for a
way of life that also meant both individual and social improvement:
The amelioration promised to aliens and to future Americans
was to possess its moral and social aspects. The implication was,
and still is, that by virtue of the more comfortable and less
trammeled lives which Americans were enabled to lead, they
would constitute a better society and would become in general
a worthier set of men. 19
And it was for the sake of transforming this promise into a "constructive national purpose" that Croly set forth a theory that would
reconcile the American democrat, hitherto "self-reliant, undisci-
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plined, suspicious of authority, equalitarian, and individualistic,"
exhibiting a "mixture of optimism, fatalism, and conservatism" 20
and overwhelmingly local in his practical attachments if not his pa triotic sentiments, with a "national political organization"- that is,
with active, positive government. We may not wish to lament the
failure of Croly's own technocratic vision to receive full institutional
expression in the remainder of the twentieth century, but the point
is that, contrary to Croly's hopes for a "worthier set of men," however defined, the development of the American political system was
somehow arrested at a rather primitive and material level. A "better" society? We at any rate became a richer one, and, as Croly's
sense of irony might have led him to remark, sufficient unto the day
was the prosperity thereof.
Indeed, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the New Deal
failed to link popular material aspirations with a "constructive social
ideal" pursued by a "national organization" and guided by a "noble
national purpose," Croly's or anyone else's. It is even harder to believe that the New Deal bequeathed to George Bush a conception of
the civic self in any essential consistent with what citizenship meant
to the founding generation. But on that subject Croly himself, theorist of the New Deal, was revealingly silent.
It is true that the zeal, dedication, and passion for social justice
expressed by and through FDR's Democratic party was not reducible
to a bread-and-butter prosperity or to the homeliness of Bush's
American Dream. It may also be true, however, that the actual arrival of national prosperity after World War II served to obscure the
extent to which a thinly disguised majoritarian selfishness had become tacitly established as a surrogate public philosophy. What if,
say, only one-tenth of the nation continues in one way or other to be
wretched and the remainder are pretty well off and reasonably content? A Democratic party slogan of 1968- "If you want to continue
to live like a Republican, vote Democratic'~ gets us part of the way
to Bush's voter. A remark at the Republican National Convention in
1972-"The majority of the American people are unyoung, unblack, and unpoor'~ takes us the rest of the way.

IV
Yet the ultimate source of this view of the satisfied citizen and of a
diminished American Dream , as George Bush's reference to the
"special interests" makes us see, is not the New Deal but Croly's own
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Progressive era-the New Deal being practically an ad hoc or pragmatic extension of Progressivism. Under the gun because of the
Great Depression, the New Deal never got around to addressing any
but the most pressing and obvious problems and may well have instilled in the American popular consciousness the notion that politics and government were for serving your own or your group's economic interest and for nothing else . If so, the New Deal was but
acting out a script prepared by the previous generation of theorists
and reformers.
It was not merely that the economic crisis made an essentially ma terial American Dream seem good enough under the circumstances
and civic virtue in the citizen a luxury. More than this, the understanding of reality generated by the Progressives made any alterna tive appear as it has ever since, idealistic, naive, out of touch with
the facts of life, even threateningly moralistic. For the New Deal to
have done much besides attend to the economic crisis, it would have
been required not only to transcend itself but also to repudiate some
of the most fundamental assumptions of Progressivism.

V

Science, plus technology, plus industry, was surely much of what
"progress" meant to the Progressive era. It would be hard to exaggerate the faith in science and expertise that inspired those legions
of zealous reformers. A more promising faith for the new century
confronting them, science had in principle replaced religion for
growing numbers of Americans, certainly those in enlightened leadership circles, as the basis of their world view. And knowledge (science) was power, as Francis Bacon had insisted, power through technology and industry for producing just that material prosperity
Croly cited as the sine qua non of American political legitimacy.
Moreover, the industrial transformation of America also meant na tional power, internally as the rapid growth of bureaucracy called
forth by the regulatory movement brought about a centralization of
both political and administrative power and externally as the United
States was well on its way to becoming the most powerful, as well as
the richest, nation on earth.
Although such progress had indeed transformed American society and economy almost beyond recognition during the half century
after the Civil War, the reformers themselves, Mr. Dooley observed,
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were not making a revolution but only "beating a carpet," attempting to purge what they thought to be an essentially sound system of
adventitious corrupting elements, the works, in their view, of evil
and designing men.
What Mr. Dooley could not see, what the reformers themselves
(Croly possibly excepted) were unable to see, was that they were contributing willy-nilly to the consolidation of the Hamiltonian national State system. The Framers of the Constitution, we should not
forget , sought to create not only a more perfect union but, as the
Anti-Federalists quickly saw, a more powerful national government,
a system of government of potentially great power indeed.
It was Alexander Hamilton who foresaw an industrial America ( as
opposed to Jefferson's agrarian ideal) and who saw Americans more
as factory workers than as independent citizens. It was Hamilton
who sought to wed the interests of well-to-do manufacturers to the
new national government, who urged the neutralization of state and
local political power, who advocated (successfully) that the national
government have direct power over individual citizens, who championed a strong presidency over a factionalized congress, and who argued (again, successfully) for a national government (and especially
the judiciary) generally removed as far as possible from popular control. Though it was no doubt hard for American capitalists to see
the Progressives and later the New Dealers as their benefactors, both
eras of reform, while helping generally to realize Hamilton's vision
perhaps most importantly served to rationalize and stabilize a "political economy" 2 1 that otherwise threatened to self-destruct.
The Progressive reformers nevertheless took their carpet beating
seriously because they were altogether uncritical believers (very
American ones) in the idea of progress. Where the European theorists of the generic idea of progress looked back on the past as a record of darkness, superstition, and oppression, the American Progressives for the most part saw the exact opposite. As Croly wryly
noted, his fellow Progressives were inclined to be "protestants,"
meaning that they cherished a vision of the American political system functionally similar to Luther's conception of the primitive
Church. This suggested that "reform" was really a kind of Reformation, a re-forming of the present corrupt system in light of the purity
of the original plan of the Framers - a restoration, indeed a "revival. " Those great statesmen had discovered for all time Nature's
plan for the perfect form of government, which an inattentive citizenry, alas, had allowed to fall under the control of the Unscrupulous. There was thus nothing fundamentally wrong with the Ameri-
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can political system; it had simply been corrupted by bad men - the
urban bosses, the unprincipled "plutocrats," dishonest politicians in
both parties, and the like . Eliminate these corrupting elements by
means of the appropriate reforms, and all would be well - that is,
would be as the Founding Fathers intended.
Not only was the American past a good and glorious one, it was
also uniquely American; though in accord with the dictates of Nature itself, the American political order was also the peculiar possession of the American people. The reformers never doubted Lincoln's
belief that if democracy failed in America, it would "perish from
this earth." America was truly the last best hope of mankind.
For all the "worldliness" of the American promise, we cannot begin to understand the Progressives or their legacy unless we see that
they defined the past, the way of life they thought they remembered
and wanted to restore, almost exclusively in terms that are unmistakably political. Specifically, viewing the work of the Framers through
lenses tinted by Jacksonianism, Progressive Americans saw the
struggle against the bosses and the trusts as a struggle for a revived
"democracy." If Lincoln had said the Civil War was "somehow
caused" by slavery, he was quite certain that the ultimate issue was
whether there would survive the "government of the people, by the
people, and for the people" that "our fathers" had "brought forth on
this continent." With Lincoln's triad of democratic phrases ringing
in their ears-the platforms of all three parties in 1912, Republican,
Democratic, and Progressive, quoted Lincoln - the Progressives had
a political battle cry that embraced the whole of the American way
of life, and its name was democracy.
A way of life so conceived, democracy so dedicated, was in deep
trouble as it confronted the realities of the new age dawning. The
old way of life, the life of rural and small town America , of a rough
social equality, of wide open economic opportunity, of small-scale
participatory politics, of the vague and shifting boundaries between
politics, morality, economic pursuits, and religion - this democracy,
as Tocqueville himself foresaw in his warnings about an "aristocracy
of manufacturers, "22 was quite incompatible with the inevitable concentrations of economic, social, and political pow~r of the new industrial society and bureaucratic state. In short, the Hamiltonian
system emerging, both cause and effect of progress, was the virtual
negation of the past the Progressive crusaders thought they wanted
to restore.
The old way of life itself, as Marx and William Graham Sumner
in their different ways pointed out, would change quickly enough,
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as "capitalism" (Marx) or "the industrial organization" (Sumner)
transformed the most basic conditions of life and created a world after its own image. "Democracy," however, the complex range of
meanings and associations that had defined and legitimated the old
way of life, was a more serious problem. The received or traditional
meaning of the national creed had become an embarrassment. The
new system wanted obedient workers, consumers, and taxpayers,
and, when necessary, soldiers; it would have a hard time coping with
the traditional American democrat- "self-reliant, undisciplined,
suspicious of authority, equalitarian, and individualistic," as Croly
described him, which was a good enough picture of the Jacksonian
participating citizen. Plainly, "democracy" too had to be transformed, and this the Progressives would achieve without quite knowing what they had done.
As a force for the modernization of American life, as a largely unwitting instrument of consolidated, centralized, national power in a
bureaucratic, technological age, 23 the Progressive movement, Janusfaced between past and future, had to discredit an old way of life before it could create a new one. And since that old American way of
life had been described-indeed defined-almost exclusively in political terms, as a republican and democratic as well as a natural
and a moral order, the Progressive movement, before it was finished,
had effectively undermined where it had not outright destroyed the
specifically political legacy of the American past. In particular, the
Progressives in effect depoliticized the concept of the good American as they thought about and worked toward the new society, believing all the while that they were only restoring "government of the
people, by the people, and for the people" to its rightful place in the
American scheme of things. Here a distinction is in order. Although
the crusading reformers thus unintentionally contributed to this
transformation of democracy and the citizen, it was mainly the work
of ostensibly detached intellectuals - and in particular of the newly
professionalized social scientists, who quickly assumed a kind of
oracular status in American life. 24
Were trusts and other new forms of organization and concen trated power a violation of the old egalitarian competitive and
moral order? No doubt, but there was another way to look at it:
With the new and unsentimental economics able to explain "economies of scale," all but the most fervent trust busters were forced to
agree that concentration of economic power, bigness per se, was not
only not necessarily bad but was in fact part of the very (Hamiltonian) means by which the Qeffersonian) material aspirations of the
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American common man were to be realized. Yet there was both
more and less in the old republicanism of Jefferson ( even granting
his "hedonism") than "making it''._ less because republican strictures
against "luxury" precluded a quest for mere wealth and power and
more because Jefferson's republicanism required that citizens be
"participators" in their own government, that they be publz"c persons. 25 Unfortunately, a corporate economy and a fragmented polity
made that part of old republicanism, now "democracy," increasingly problematic.
What to do with "democracy" as a political way of life? Could
there be an understanding of what it meant to a good American
that avoided the political altogether? "A democracy is more than a
form of government," John Dewey had said; "it is primarily a mode
of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience." 26 Ultimately it would be seen as no form of government at all and not
much in the way of "associated living" either, as the Progressives
came to encourage a view of the "citizen" as "the individual," with
"making it" the chief concern. The concept of "democratic capitalism," developed later in the century as a stratagem in corporate
public relations, reinforced the point that democracy and hence
Americanism was somehow a function of economics. Yet it was
the Progressives themselves who had paved the way for this
reductionism-for the easy identification of a classic form of
government, a "constitution" requiring a common involvement in a
politically defined way of life, with an economic system based on individual, material self-interest. 27
The Progressive theorists propounded a new idea of politics and
ultimately of citizenship, in which neither democracy nor republicanism as Americans had understood them made any sense. They
did this, moreover, in the time-honored American way, in the guise
of an attack on theory and ideas as such. Pragmatism in general and
the newly self-conscious discipline of political science in particular,
both contributors to what Bernard Crick called the "cult of realism
in the Progressive era," set about quietly to divorce democratic politics from any notion of a common good and citizenship itself from
any conception of an integrated life. When the new realists were finished, politics could never again be identified with the good, either
of the person or of society, and especially not of that quaint relic, the
State. In this campaign, it must be said, the practical (and zealous)
reformers themselves were unwitting accomplices.
In the first place, the crusaders in the movement approached the
task of political reform deeply alienated from both the politics and
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the government of their day. Government for the most part they
deemed properly to be the province of experts, and the age seemed
determined to transform all political questions into administrative
ones. As for politics, the reformers' many devices for direct democracy bespoke a conviction that parties, legislatures, and courtrooms
were irretrievably corrupt-certainly not fit instruments for genuine
popular rule. Inevitably, it would seem, "politics" and "political,"
virtual synonyms for dishonesty, incompetence, and worse, became
dissociated in the minds of reformers with the virtue traditionally attaching to the activity appropriate to the citizen. "Politics" and "political" became objects of distaste and moral revulsion. Hence the
reputation of the reformers for self-righteousness and of their public
action as a crusade.
When the passion for reform subsided, such a politics of redemption and reformation would collapse of its own unfulfilled hopes and
expectations - with more than a little help, however, from its ostensible friends, the scientific realists. Serving as the midwife of disillusionment, the new science of politics attacked directly the core of
(crusading) Progressive democratic beliefs about good citizenship.
Did the reformers exalt civic-mindedness; careful, detached, objective attention to the "issues"; the sacrifice of time, energy, and personal resources for the public good - and this on an increasing num her of complex and arcane matters that vexed even the experts?
Voting studies could easily show that this "rationalist image of the
common man" (Carl Friedrich's term) was largely a "myth." Were
the crusaders appalled at the rank selfishness and dirty dealing of
the "special interests," whose machinations were a blight on the land
and a standing violation of the common good? The "group interpretation of politics" provided by Arthur F. Bentley argued that such
group behavior was merely what the political game was all about,
that it was unscientific to judge the motives of the groups, and that
in any case the "common good" was another of those "myths" with
no basis in the observable behavior of groups. Did the reformers talk
reverently of the "sovereign" people, and of the "will" of the people?
They did so just as the growing economic, social , and ethnic diversity of American society made the notion of a unified popular will
wildly at odds with the facts. Democratic citizenship on that model
thus was rendered "unrealistic" and those who continued to believe
in it naive.
Nor was this all . As the crusaders' conception of the citizen drew
heavily on a century of conviction about democracy and the common man, the scientific critique of Populist and then Progressive

146

Robert E. Calvert

political revivalism necessarily went further than its ostensible target. There was in fact no room for the old democratic citizen, or for
republican virtue, or for the common good, or for a sovereign
people (however conceived), in Bentley's scheme of things. In the old
order the good citizen, the good American, and the good man or
woman had formed a continuum, a unity, a kind of gestalt; in
Bentley's political science, however, concerned as it was to be scien tific and to accept as real only the observable and the measurable,
there were only "roles" and groups of various kinds and nothing
more. A realist, scientific political science was simply uninterested
in what would later be dismissed as "normative" concepts, concepts
derived from an older political science and from a traditional American public philosophy now derided by Bentley as "soul-stuff." As
Charles A . Beard put it, to be scientific meant you had to separate
the study of politics from "theology, ethics, and patriotism," which
together could be taken as summing up traditional American beliefs. 28 And like Marx (or at any rate Engels), Bentley also relegated
the "state" to his own museum of antiquities, perhaps alongside "the
individual," who for Bentley was real only as a member of a group.
"When the groups are adequately stated, everything is stated,"
Bentley claimed. "When I say everything I mean everything. The
complete description is the complete science." 29
Between the moralistic crusaders who thought of the citizen in
such rarified and demanding terms as virtually to guarantee disillusionment and the amoral political scientists who appeared simply to
define the citizen out of existence, there would seem to be little left
of the traditional American democrat. Yet it was not enough that
the democrat's self-understanding as a participating citizen be exposed as a myth - a lesson that would be reinforced over and over as
the complexities of the new society made politics increasingly bewildering and the efficacy of the typical citizen more and more in
doubt. It was also necessary that the myths of the past be exploded
as well. A movement serious about progress-that believed with
John Dewey in the "continuous reconstruction of experience''...... could
not allow the past to remain unreconstructed. Not only was civic virtue seen to be a myth in the twentieth century, it was also important
to show that it had never been real.
This task fell on the capable head of Charles A. Beard, a realist
political scientist who was arguably this century's most influential
American historian as well. Just as Bentley's political science did not
permit distinguishing one group from another in respect to their virtue in serving the common good, so Beard's "flat" history showed
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that the past in this same respect was in no way superior to or even
different from the present. His conclusion, traumatic to the patriotic Americans of his day, was that an unsentimental view of the
Founding Fathers revealed their feet to be made of some very familiar clay.
The central thesis of Beard's best known and most influential
book, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United
States (1913), was that the Constitution as it emerged from the convention was essentially an economic and a conservative document,
with its political meaning a reflection of the economic interests of
those who had framed it. This meant that the Founding Fathers
were not disinterested patriots, "working merely under the guidance
of abstract principles of political science," but rather, like the politicians of his own day, representatives of "distinct groups whose economic interests they understood and felt in concrete, definite forms
through their own personal experience with identical property
rights. "30 What is more, since they saw the main threat to their property rights to be the politically volatile common man, the Framers
were seen to be fearful of the radical masses, contemptuous of popular judgment, opposed to majority rule-in a word, antidemocratic.
In fine, there was a clear link, Beard argued, between the Framers'
antidemocratic views, the structure of the Constitution, and their
desire to protect their own economic interests.
Academic critics have not dealt gently with Beard's book. Beard's
method was seriously faulty, it was said, and he had some of his facts
wrong. According to Gordon Wood, it has been "torn to shreds. "31
Much of the criticism, however, seemed to say only that Beard had
exaggerated, had only overstated his case; it thus had the no doubt
unintended effect of confirming the heart of Beard's thesis: "The
Constitution was not just an economic document. . . . We would be
doing a grave injustice to the political sagacity of the Founding Fathers if we assumed that property or personal gain was their only
motive . . .. If the members of the Convention were directly interested in the outcome of their work and expected to derive benefits
from the establishment of the new system, so also did most of the
people of the country. . . . Since most of the people were middleclass and had private property, practically everybody was interested
in the protection of property." Beard had thus failed to see, the critics alleged, that the Founding Fathers were speaking for Americans
generally, not just themselves. "A constitution which did not protect
property would have been rejected without any question, for the
American people had fought the Revolution for the preservation of
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life, liberty, and property. "32 "That personal economic interests were
involved is undeniable. Yet the principles they carried with them to
Philadelphia would not all have fitted in their pocketbooks. "33
Yet if some of those principles were carried to the convention in
their pocketbooks, that was good enough in a "realistic" age to establish the "self-interest" of the Framers and, if one were so disposed
in an age that was also moralistic, to see such self-interest as tainting
their entire enterprise. "To a generation of materialists," wrote
Henry Steele Commager, Beard's economic interpretation
made clear that the stuff of history was material. To a generation disillusioned by the exploitation and ruthlessness of big
business, it discovered that the past, too, had been ravaged by
exploitation and greed. To a generation that looked with fishy
eyes on the claims of Wilsonian idealism and all but rejoiced in
their frustration, it suggested that each generation had made
similar claims and that all earlier idealisms had been similarly
flawed by selfishness and hypocrisy. 34
Whatever the merits of Beard's analysis, and there was both more
and less in Beard's scholarship than his devoted followers and his
critics allowed, his characterization of the Framers was the coup de
grace for the traditional conception of the American citizen.
For the citizen? To the contrary, was not Beard's book a critique of
the Founding Fathers? And beyond that was it not a covert attack on
the entrenched business interests of his day, who had shown themselves to be adept at using the Madisonian Constitution to frustrate
citizen-led movements for reform? Had not Beard himself (anachronistically) described the politics of the constitutional era as a
struggle between "populism and business"? As a Progressive and a
radical, was not Beard against the entrenched conservatives, past
and present, and for the popular forces for progress?
True enough. What Beard did, however, was tacitly to deny the
possibility of civic or republican virtue as such. If even those fabled
American heroes, presented to over a century of American school
children as exemplars of all the virtues of the citizen, turned out to
be such ordinary human beings, what was the point of trying to be
anything other than your natural self? The key here, perhaps, is
Commager's word "hypocrisy." A. Lawrence Lowell was speaking
very much in what was widely assumed to be the spirit of the Founders when he said that the "great statesman" was a kind of moral tutor
to the people, appealing always to "higher emotions, to principle, to
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self-restraint, not to selfishness and appetite ." Now, after Beard's
realist expose, it was evident for everyone to see that all the fine talk
about principles and self-restraint served only to divert attention
from the Founders' own selfish preoccupation with their appetites.
What would have most grieved the Framers of the Constitution,
of course, was the attack on their republican virtue implied in the
charge that their motives were essentially economic. To the men of
Philadelphia this would have signified corruption - the triumph of
their private interests over the common good. The unkindest cut of
all is that they came out looking very much like one of Madison's factions, "actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest,
adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community. "35 In the language of the Progressive era, which is still our language today, Beard had in effect
accused the Founding Fathers of being a "special interest."
Some moral tutors they turned out to be! Had the Founding Fathers been honest and realistic, the Progressives have encouraged us
to believe, they would have acknowledged frankly and openly that
they, like everyone else, were intent on using the res publica for their
own private and economic advantage. Had they told it like it is, we
should suppose, had they been self-aware and up-front about their
motives, it might have been unnecessary for Harold Lasswell, that
eloquent voice of Progressive realism, to tell us that politics is really
only a matter of who gets what, when, and how.
Commager assures us that neither Beard nor his close disciples
took "malign satisfaction" in seeing the grand plans of the past revealed as flawed or in seeing "history divested of its heroes, and heroes of their halos. "56 Contrary to his own prescription about what it
meant to be scientific, Beard himself was animated in his work, according to Commager, by "patriotism" as well as a "passionate concern" for the truth. "But in those who knew him only through his
writings, he encouraged an attitude of iconoclasm and, often, of
cynicism. " 37

VI
The difference between Progressive realism and cynicism was at best
never easy to see. As the Progressive wisdom has filtered down to our
own time, transmitted by legions of teachers, journalists, politicians,
novelists, filmmakers, and other shapers of our consciousness, few of
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whom may ever have heard of Beard or Bentley, much less read their
books, we may have lost sight of the difference altogether.
This, it seems to me, is how, finally, we are to understand George
Bush's voter- as the apotheosis of this historically transmitted synthesis of realism and cynicism. This commonplace and nonexistent
political animal is the Progressive Anti-Myth become the Established Myth of our own time, appearing today as Benthamism sui
generis transmuted into a politically empty American Dream. A
"synthetic-a priori" truth, as philosophers say, neo-Progressive political realism holds that it is both human nature and very American the way it really is and should be with us- that all men and women,
in this case voters, serve only themselves (and their families). It is
merely the American Dream the Framers of the Constitution really
had in mind all along as they laid the foundation for our system of
"democratic capitalism," though because of a lot of false consciousness about republicanism they never quite got around to saying so.
After nearly three quarters of a century of being told that the
virtues of the traditional citizen are idealistic, moralistic, and the
outlook of the self-righteous do-gooder, or worse, illiberal, antiindividualist, or even socialist, we may have landed through "progress" at a point where the current mood makes it possible, even necessary, to regard what was once a priceless possession as empty of any
real meaning, as entailing no obligations and promising no political
identity-a "citizen" of very easy virtue indeed. What is left of the
Progressive crusade on this side of progress has become a holding
operation, a kind of neo-Progressive conservatism rooted in the culturally defined "realities" of human nature, whose only political
goal is to continue to protect the people against the special interests.
Yet everything is now upside down. In his way Bush was making the
same assessment of the American voter that Beard made of the
Founding Fathers. He was describing a corrupt citizen and a thoroughly corrupt one at that. If the Framers were not statesmen disinterestedly prescribing for the common good, so the average American is not a citizen but only a self-interested voter, using the political
system (in this case the presidency) , as the Founding Fathers did the
Constitution, for private economic benefit.
Unlike Beard, however, Bush is plainly not critical of the object of
his analysis, and not only because it would be imprudent to say uncomplimentary things about the people while soliciting their support. The more important reason is that the language of Progressive
democracy, which is still our language today, lacks the vocabulary
for criticizing the people or even for perceiving flaws in them. For
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the Progressive-as-crusader "the people" could do no wrong; they
were the general or public interest against which "special" interests
were defined. For the Progressive-as-realist, the scientific analyst of
group behavior, there were in the first place no good or bad guys
and also no public interest. In both cases there was only power, only
the majority-and progress: an endlessly expanding economy and
an inexhaustible cornucopia of material blessings, which in the long
run made it unnecessary to worry much about who got what, when,
or how, or about civic virtue. When progress, "realistically" understood, precludes talk about Croly's "worthier set of men" and concentrates our attention solely on material well-being, the less said
about civic virtue the better. This has made it possible for later generations of liberals to think of public policy and the polity itself as
having no bearing at all on who we are or what kind of human beings we might become, indeed as morally neutral. 38
In fact, only in old republican terms can the people be corrupt.
To say nothing of the Anti-Federalists, even Madison would not hesitate to see in Bush's "people" merely a majority faction, a mass of
voters lacking any concern for the common good, interested only in
their own advantage. They would be a quiescent majority faction,
satisfied, even complacent, to be sure, and thus would fail to pose
the kind of political threat Madison feared from the turbulent common man, but they would be a faction nonetheless. And Tocqueville
would see in the teeming millions of individuals constituting Bush's
polity, all dreaming their own dreams but all dreaming the same
dream, precisely the ingredients of the majority tyranny he feared. 59
This accounts in Bush's response to Ferraro for the sort of inverted
Progressivism of his attack on the "special interests," those clamorous and easily identifiable groups who have diverted government to
their own advantage and against whom the majority of the American people had to be defended by the power of a putatively neutral
national administration. To the original Progressives, of course, the
"special interests" were the railroads, the oil companies-trusts of
every kind: violators all of the American promise, destroyers of competition, stiflers of opportunity, guarantors of inequality, corruptors
of politicians. But the "special interests" of our times are very different kinds of groups. They are the groups for whom "progress" remains a chimera - blacks and other minorities, the poor, women, or
more broadly, all those unorganized folk lacking wealth, power, and
access in a system that will work only on those terms. They are the
residual beneficiaries of the lengthening policy and institutional
shadow of the New Deal. Unlike "the people" in 1914 or 1984, such
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groups will never be a majority. Their fate lies with a majority conceived by the wisdom now conventional as purely and simply selfinterested, and for that reason, when flattered, incipiently tyrannical.
In the end it is an odd kind of realism that overlooks the wisdom
of an imposing line of thinkers with their own reputation for realism
who have held that political institutions, including constitutions,
must be anchored in the interests, affections, beliefs, and character
of the people they govern. Aristotle, Machiavelli, Montesquieu,
Rousseau, Burke, Hume, Paine, and Tocqueville, as well as our own
Founding Fathers, all argued this point, and all would have declared
a society based on the likes of Bush's voter to be impossible.
Contrary to our instincts conditioned by Progressive political realism, candidate Bush, as spokesman for the dominant assumption of
our times, is wrong about the American voter and not simply in the
obvious sense that typical voters in fact are likely to weigh other factors besides their pocketbooks as they decide how to cast their votes.
He is wrong in the more important sense that the entire way of understanding our political life represented by such realism is fundamentally mistaken, and worse, dangerous. No political order could
work, our own, perhaps, least of all, if it were composed entirely of
the kind of citizen his assessment presupposes. A constitutional democracy committed both to political unity and to social and cultural diversity, yet whose vision is limited to private dreams, is arguably on its way to self-destruction.
The real significance of Mr. Bush's remarks is not that he is talking (mistakenly) about real voters but to them. It makes a difference
how we understand ourselves as a people and as a society, and the
way in which we talk to each other about what we basically are will
inevitably have consequences. Such prophesies as are generated by
our "realism" can be self-fulfilling in ways that are as disastrous as
they are real.
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